CRITICAL THEORY OF THE GENERAL INTRODUCTION COURSE IN PHILOSOPHY A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy University of Southern California In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by Gerard Hinrichs June 1940 UMI Number: DP29612 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI DP29612 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest' CZT" ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Mi 48106- 1346 T h is d issertation, w ritte n by .......... 5 m M D . . H I H R l G H S . . ....... under the guidance o f h i La_ F a c u lty C om m ittee on Studies, and approved by a ll its members, has been presented to and accepted by the C o u n cil on G raduate S tu d y a n d Research, in p a rtia l f u l fillm e n t o f requirem ents fo r the degree of D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y D ean S ecretary D a te .. C o m m itte e on Studies Maxima debetur puero reverentia. Juvenal, X I V , 47. To my friends Dyche Prins Shili TA B LE OP CONTENTS CHAPTER I. II. PAGE PROBLEM, SCOPE, MATERIALS ..................... ! PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CON CERNING THE SUITABILITY OP THE APPROACH THROUGH THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY . ............ III. 15 PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CON CERNING THE SUITABILITY OP THE APPROACH THROUGH ONE FAVORED SYSTEM ...................... IV. 47 PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CON CERNING THE SUITABILITY OP THE APPROACH THROUGH PROBLEMS OPPHILOSOPHY ................ V. 62 PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CON CERNING THE SUITABILITY OP THE APPROACH THROUGH A GENERAL SURVEY OF PROBLEMS AND S Y S T E M S ...................................... VI. 82 PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CON CERNING THE SUITABILITY OF THE APPROACH THROUGH SELECTED VII. TYPES OPHISTORICAL SYSTEMS . 90 PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CON CERNING THE SUITABILITY OF APPROACHES THROUGH PRE-PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT-MATTERS AND DISCI PLINES: SCIENCES, LITERATURE, KULTURGESCHICHTE, RELIGION, LOGIC.. ............................. 100 V CHAPTER VIII. PAGE SIGNIFICANT TRENDS FROM IMPARTIALITY AND SPECIAL-PLEADING IN TEACHING SYSTEMS, TO ASSISTANCE INSELF-STUDY ......................... IX. SIGNIFICANT DEVICES EMPLOYED SUPPLEMENTARILY TO-SELECTED AND ARRANGED READING MATERIALS . . X. SUMMARY. 180 CRITICAL THEORY OF THE GENERAL INTRO DUCTION COURSE.SOLUTION OF PROBLEM .............. XII. 157 G. W. ALLPORT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE. OF PHILOSOPHY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATURITY OF PERSONALITY XI. 142 204 THE DIRECT GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY IN VARIOUS TYPES OF TEACHING SITUATIONS . . . B I B L IO G R A P H Y ........................................... 246 279 CHAPTER I PROBLEM, SCOPE, MATERIALS This study is a critique of certain assumptions which are habitually made in the interests of mass education in philosophy. It reveals the maze-running performance of philosopher-teachers in their docility to commands to do a work under conditions which negate its very idea. It-reveals minds professionally insulated against suggestions from the outside, minds so enamored of their own outlook that they fail the elementary requirement to distinguish it from the purpose it serves for them, and can think of nothing more original than new ways of presenting it. Anything so philosophic as objectifying and examining their own premises, assumptions, and aims occurs to them only at rare intervals in flashes of insight which warm their pride without moving them to action. Or if action follows, it is uncritical— a rushing into print with a new outline or text-book which brilliantly emphasizes one truth at the expense of ten others and brilliantly exemplifies Love joy»s observation that philosophers typically fall into love with ideas at first sight. If the philosopher would keep to his splendid isolation, he would not fall under the necessity of arjpraising his own worth, but could everlastingly assume and enjoy it, and, like 2 the poet and the fool, would rather retain the traditional regard he has enjoyed for daring to be what he is. But he has stepped into the world of working men and has under taken to participate in furthering the common good under the aegis of Education. And now he is admitting (what his students have been broadcasting by word and attitude) that he is in straits and in need of clarifying his purposes. He is really faced with the task of ascertaining in what sense what he is and represents is for the common good, and then of determining accordingly whether he belongs within the present educational set-up or outside it, as something to be pointed to or at. The point of departure of these assertions is the fact that philosophers have gone on record as being notably dissatisfied with the character and results of their teach ing in the general introduction to philosophy, and this dissatisfaction crystallizes mainly about the introductory text-book. Having thus placed himself on record, the philos opher is now available for study. The text-book of general introduction to philosophy contains materials selected, arranged, and presented in a manner deemed most suitable to the needs of beginners in philosophy. Together with the rather sketchy critical literature that has grown up about it and about the teaching of philosophy, the text-book represents, it may safely be assumed, the best understanding of the total situation in 3 the first course. At least, these materials represent the only understanding that has been accepted as significant for publication. If a better understanding is commonly possessed, It is strange that only'those who are ignorant of it have got their texts and studies published and that those who possess it have not seen fit or been able to do so. The existence oftext-books of general introduction to philosophy rests upon the assumption— really a corollary of the assumption that mass education in philosophy is possible— that beginners can be introduced to philosophy by reading (and listening to) carefully selected, skilfully organized, and appropriately uttered materials; a belief that the text, as such, has a function, is an aid, in philosophic learning. The solicitude expended in making texts more satisfactory rests upon a further assumption. The difficult content, the high theme and abstruse thought, the price, the persistent new attempts more appropricitely and more effectively to make these materials available to beginners surely indicate— on the presumption that they are seriously meant— that the introductory text is intended to serve an important function. They indicate that instructors pin certain hopes on it, and base certain expectations upon its use. They indicate a consciousness that, depending upon its suitability to the teaching situation, the text will either aid the process of instruction, or impede and complicate it, or play no part at all to the discomfiture of 4 student and instructor alike. It is safe, on these grounds, to assert the operation of this second assumption, namely, that the introductory text, as such, has an important function. A third fact,, resting upon a third assumption, is the wide sale— intended by publishers and effected by instructors and students— of these same introductory texts. The fact that a text-book is published is evidence that it is under stood by its author, by its publisher, and by every instructor who adopts it for his classes to be serviceable for groups of students other than those taught by its author. What is involved here if not the assumption that the introductory text has a general philosophic usefulness, that the text book, as such, is suited to introduce any and all to philo sophy? But the assumption of general philosophic usefulness is itself a constellation of assumptions, for it clearly supposes that philosophy is a matter of well-grounded beliefs, that there is a philosophic criterion common to all, and that philosophic learning is specifically the same for all. Now to get away from the idea of texts to actual texts on the market and in u s e . The mere existence of books called text-books of general introduction to philosophy does not necessarily ground the assumptions involved in the idea of a text. The existence of what may be texts only in name testifies for sure only to the presence of a pedagogical purpose, the purpose of introducing people to philosophy. And not just to a colorless, abstract purpose, but to that purpose incarnate in a specific conception of philosophy, of the learning process, of relevant literary materials and activities, and of the role of the teacher. Such a specific conception of what it means to introduce people to philo sophy constitutes a definite method or type of approach. It is abstractly possible that existing texts and types of approach and even the assumptions involved in the idea of a text are wide of the mark, and yet that people can be introduced to philosophy. Again, it is possible that the text has a place in the first course, but not texts of the kinds that are now available. The only way of determining the suitability of existing texts and of the types of approach they exemplify would be to exhibit their relevance to the aim of introducing people to philosophy. While the mere existence of introductory texts does not ground the assumption that the text has a place in the first course, it nevertheless creates a certain presumption to that effect. This presumption, other things being equal, would be strengthened by the increasing number of texts. But since a presumption rests upon extrinsic con siderations and not upon intrinsic evidence of merit, its basis in fact is in turn presumed, until shown otherwise, to be challenged by -unexpected and undesired consequences to which it appears to lead. And if existing texts were on record as leading to notably unsatisfactory results, then candor would have to face the possibility that the trouble lay not just in existing texts or types of approach, but perhaps even in the assumptions basic to the idea of the text and of specific types of approach— assumptions made in the interests of mass education in philosophy. It is a matter of record and also easily gathered from the record that existing texts of general introduction to philosophy are notably unsatisfactory, as also are the various types of approach they exemplify. The fluid state of the introductory text betrays dissatisfaction with existing texts and types of approach and concern to eliminate specific short comings and to present difficult philosophical materials to beginners more suitably and effectively. The various types of approach present conflicting conceptions of philosophy, of the learning process, of the role of teacher, text, etc. Yet each approach and text has as its raison d*etre the conviction of its advocate or author that it exemplifies the true conception of philosophy, of the learning process, and of the role of external aids. Are these conflicting convictions compatible with the assumption that philosophy is a matter of well-grounded beliefs, employs a criterion common to all, and that philosophic learning is specifically the same for all? Are they compatible with the claims made by advocates of each approach that it is suited to the job of introducing beginners to philosophy and with the charges made by its critics that it produces undesirable results instead, including a dislike for philosophy, a mistaken idea of it, and disastrous advertisement? Are they compatible with the fact that, for example, the advocate of the approach through the history of philosophy considers the approach through a single preferred system a perversion of the philosophic spirit, while the advocate of the approach through a single system which he identifies with philosophy considers the approach through history to be dangerously misleading and a useless burdening of the mind with exploded ideas? Texts representative of each kind of approach are considered unsatisfactory enough by sufficient writers and instructors to inspire and patronize the publication of texts exemplifying other kinds of approach. Does this conflict mean merely that existing texts and types of approach are unsatisfactory in general or in part; or must the explanation of the trouble be sought in their under lying assumptions, in their idea? Since advocates and critics alike base their affirm ations on their own experiences as teachers of philosophy, there can be no denying the factual basis of their respective claims and charges. The problem is not a problem of selecting some facts and rejecting others, for mere selection leaves facts as opaque as it found them. The problem is somehow to discern the structure of meaning which places all the facts in their proper interrelationships. Clearly9 an understanding of the unsatisfactoriness of existing texts and types of approach would involve penetrating the level of apparent conflict to the level of the conception of the philosophic aim, of philosophic learning, and of the role of external aids of instruction. It would mean bringing to light the principles, structural and basic to the elements and affirm ations of that conflict, and working those principles into a coherent, critical theory of the general introduction course. In the light of such a theory it would be possible to pass judgment on the suitability of existing text-books and types of approach to philosophy in a scientific, as opposed to the present merely empiric, fashion. Such a task is truly philosophic, in that it is con cerned with defining the value and determining the feasibility of seeking certain ends that are identified with philosophy. The issue it would decide is important for teacher, student, and academic philosophy. The student wants a text that justifies its cost, or else none at all. And a text of introduction to philosophy justifies its cost primarily on the basis of its appropriateness for introducing people to philosophy, whatever its value as history, biography, or literature. If investigation revealed that the text has no place in the introductory course, or has no important function to serve there, then the ground would he cut from false hopes and -unfounded expectations in instructors and students alike, and attention could be shifted to more productive phases of the teaching and learning process, and expense saved. The instructor needs a suitable tool of instruction, or if that is out of the question, at least a better understanding of the teaching situation in the first course than seems to be evidenced by writers of existing texts, of reviews of them, and of studies in the teaching of philosophy. The instruc tor in philosophy, like the teacher of anything else, needs, besides knowledge of and enthusiasm for his special field9 a knowledge of the conditions that must be arranged in order to engage and retain the interest of beginners in the values he wishes them to experience. And finally, such knowledge decides not only the personal success of the instructor, but also the fate of academic philosophy, first and subsequent courses alike, for the effectiveness of the teacher and of his written tool determine the enrollment and the advertising of philosophy courses. The objection that everybody knows that texts on the market— even Professor Patrick»s— are unsatisfactory does not hold water. What everybody knows is not yet public knowledge— first because the conviction that existing texts are un satisfactory does not involve a knowledge of what the un satisfactoriness consists in specifically and in detail, 10 second because the reasons for the unsatisfactoriness, if known, have, not yet been authoritatively established. There is no record of existing or projected research on the subject. The problem, accordingly, is stated as follows: Are existing types of general introduction to philosophy suited to their purpose? 1. What principles are involved in the claims that various types of approach are suited to their purpose? 2• What principles are involved in the charges that these types are not suited to their purpose? 5. What is the purpose of the general introduction course conceived to be? 4. What is the learning situation in the first course conceived to be? 5. What devices other than selected and arranged reading and lecture materials are mentioned and used to achieve the objective of the general introduction course? 6. What bearing on this study has G. W. Allport*s^ doctrine of the significance of philosophy for the development of a mature philosophy? In the general statement of the problem the phrase "general introduction to philosophy" is used as opposed to introductions to philosophy through a special subject such as ^ G. W. Allport, Personality. Jl Psychological Interpre tation. 1937. 11 logic or psychology— introductions which are courses in the preparatory subject alone, without going into philosophy. The peculiar pretension of the general introduction is that it would put the beginner speedily in possession of a perspective on philosophy which a teacher or writer has attained in course of research and teaching. In the term !Tsuited to" is contained the idea of being relevant to a purpose, as opposed to being perhaps fortuitously effective, or even popular. As to being fortuitously effective, to adopt a text and type of approach on the principle that the only students who are going to learn anyhow will learn from any text in spite of the teach ing is to surrender intelligent planning and to resign oneself to Providence or to chance. Basic to all pedagogy is the assumption that the more that can be known about the teaching and learning process, the more suitably and effectively can means be devised for achieving educational objectives, and the wiser one may become as to the feasibility and appropriate ness of attempting to achieve certain objectives at all. Intelligence of ends and means is a recognized substitute for blind trial and error, theoretically at least, even in the teaching of philosophy. The popularity of a text is not sufficient of itself to ground a judgment of the suitability of the text for introducing students to philosophy. The popularity of a IE book is not an explanation but a problem. It may be little more than a tribute to the author»s literary quality or to his canny reading of the public’s momentary taste for "heavy" literature in the form'of outlines— as Will Durant admits. The question, What is the interest of Durant’s readers a function of, philosophy or something else? cannot be answered merely by pointing to the title of his book or even to his purpose in writing it. The answer depends upon the suitability of his selection, arrangement, and presentation of materials to elicit the reader’s philosophic interest. .hold good of spoken discourse. The same remarks The "enjoyment" of a poetic or grand manner and utterance in lecturers and preachers is not always a satisfaction deriving from comprehension, but sometimes merely from a sense of privilege, enhanced by the listener’s inability to follow the language. Under the term "purpose" comes the triple idea of a) effecting a development b) in American college students c) into philosophy. American college students and texts available to them directly or by translation indicate the scope of the present study. The materials of this dissertation were found in text-books of general introduction, in reviews of them, and in periodical articles and studies bearing directly or ^ Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy. p. viii. 13 significantly on the general introduction course. The investigator has refrained from using his own appraisals of existing types of introduction, and has limited his subject-matter to judgments made by writers of published works. Only the attempt to discover, order, and apply the principles involved in these public judgments is original in this study. The significance of the study of Allport for this dissertation is that his conception of the psychological function of philosophy is confirmed by the idea of philosophy which is implicit in the criticisms of existing types of approach to philosophy— criticisms based on the teaching experience of critics. Maine de Biran^* observed over a century ago that a psychological doctrine whose implications were belied by educational experiment was thereby branded as untrue or incomplete. Allport*s study of the structure and development of personality has not only shown and elucidated the incompleteness of certain psychological doctrines2,of personality *development and structure, but has also pointed out their place and relative importance for an understanding of personality. And 'while no one acquainted with the rudiments 1 Maine de Biran, Oeuvres, translation XIII, p. 90 (ed. Tisserand). ^ E.g., the biological theory of personality, the Freudian interpretation of religious and aesthetic personalities, TTeonditioning,T and !!imitationTT as generalized theories of learning, etc. 14 of logic would assert tiie truth of a psychological hypothesis on the strength of the confirmation of its implications in the field of education, nevertheless he would be justified in preferring it to theories it displaced on the strength of its confirmation by the available evidence to date, and in attributing its superiority over those theories to that feature of it for lack of which they were displaced. The feature of Allport*s psychology which is significant to the present study is his doctrine that a consciously possessed philosophy of life is essential to the maturity of one’s personality, conferring unity and a sense of direction under conscious control. CHAPTER II PRINCIPLES INVOLVED I N CLAIMS AND CHARGES CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF THE APPROACH THROUGH THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1. Claims tliat the historical approach is suited to 4 its purpose. Simply to suggest the general nature of the inquiry, we to are interested in the historical approach in its capacity a) engage the studentTs interest and philosophy. b) develop it into What is there in the claims made for its suita bility to this purpose that commends it to its advocates? a) Engaging the student’s interest. Some advocates of the historical approach significantly qualify their claim that the historical approach is interest ing to students- by specifying the caliber of student. He must be the "thoughtful," "intelligent" type: The thoughtful student finds this history fascinat ing, and full of inspiration. ...it reviews the philosophical experience of the ~ race (in which) intelligent persons are interested. By implication, Patrick lays the student’s interest in the historical approach to its concreteness and ease, when he 1 J. H. W. Stuckenberg, Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, p. 376. 2 Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, pp. 2-3. 16 says; Owing to the abstract and difficult character of philosophical inquiries, their study is usually approached historically. The history of philosophy is perhaps the best approach to the whole subject.1 Stuckenberg says this much better in the words: The genesis of problems in history corresponds largely with that in the mind of the individual.2 Windelband speaks of the “great.. .didactic valuen of beginning with Greek philosophy, especially in its earliest developments: It is of a highly instructive character, because of the splendid simplicity and resolute onesided ness with which these gifted founders of science, not yet distracted by an abundance of material, conceived their intellectual work and naively ac complished it.& Thilly, too, in the following passage seems to iden tify or at least to assume a necessary connection between simplicity of starting point and student interest: It likewise serves as a useful preparation for philosophical speculation; passing, as it does from the simpler to the more complex and diffi cult constructions of thought.^ Cushman and Rogers deny that the beginner has any interest in the mere history of philosophy, but claim that interest in the history of philosophy is generated in the 1 G. T. W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 64. 2 Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 370. ® Wilhelm Windelband, An Introduction to Philosophy, 4 Thilly, o£. cit., pp. 2-3. id7 student "by pointing out to him the significance of the history of philosophy for an understanding of the political and liter ary history and the geography which they bring to the study of philosophy. "If the history of philosophy is to have any sig nificance for the beginner, it must be shown to give a mean ing to h i s t o r y * . Dotterer echoes this belief in the words: One may approach the study of philosophy by at tempting to gain a knowledge of the principal movements of thought from the time of the clas sic Greeks to the present. It is interesting to observe how the various schools of thought were Influenced by the political and economic conditions of the time when they arose; and how every great system has influenced those which have succeeded it.2 Further treatment of this departure from the mere history of philosophy occurs on page 115. Hocking sees interest generated not only by linking the history of ideas with its cultural background, but also by the student’s contact with the living personalities who gave the world those Ideas: He discovers thought in its living context of biography and social change, and his own concern for truth Is deepened by association with the motives which animated the heroes of human specu lation.3 H. S. Cushman, A Beginner’s History of Philosophy, vol.l, p.vi; see also A. K. Rogers’ review of Cushman’s A Beginner’s History of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 20: 212-215, M a r c h , 1911. 2 R. H. Dotterer, Philosophy by Way of the Sciences; An Introductory Text-Book, pp. 16^17. 3 W. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy,p. vii. 18 It should be noted that Hooking*s second point has strength only when students would be required to read the works of the "heroes of human speculation” themselves; and could hardly be realized by their reading textbook accounts of such men and their works. However, if such biographical works as Durantfs Story of Philosophy are rightly treated under the history of philosophy, they very well exemplify in another form what Hocking had in mind, for Durant, for example, chooses the biographical form because in its dress philosophy retains ...its beauty and its joy. We shall seek it not in its shrivelled abstractness and formality, but clothed in the living form of genius; we shall study not merely philosophies, but philosophers; we shall spend our time with the saints and martyrs of thought, letting their radiant spirit play about us until perhaps we too, in some measure, shall partake of what Leonardo called, "the noblest pleasure, the joy of understanding. Hudson, in his study of a questionnaire sent to advo cates of the historical approach among others, reveals that in the minds of some,' student interest is linked with the idea of the reality of problems to students. They assert that the history of the actual rise of problems is indispensable to making problems real to the student, who comes with no realiza tion of the problems of philosophy.^ Durant, o£. cit., p. 4. 2 I. W. Hudson, "The Aims and Methods of Introductio Courses; A Questionaire,” in Journal of Philosophy, 9: 33, January 18, 1912. 19 The history of* philosophy then engages the interest of students who are thoughtful and intelligent; hy being fasci nating, full of inspiration, beautiful and joyful in its living context, concrete, easy; by presenting problems in an order which largely follows the order of their psychological occur rence in the individual mind; by being splendidly simple and resolutely onesided (in the case of the early Ureeks), by giving meaning to history in general, by deepening the studentTs concern for truth when studied in its living context of the motives which animated the heroes of human speculation, by making the problems of philosophy real to students. b) Developing the studentfs interest into philosophy. Under this head is comprised a double theme: A. the question of the nature of the development, whether it is a process of acceptance or of conquest, a matter of memory or sympathy and imagination or reasoning or criticism; B. the question of the results of the development, whether information or perspective, knowledge or wisdom, new facts or a sense of direction, a world-view or a habit of looking for the meaning of things. A. of For Stuckenberg the development is of the nature a conquest or mastery, which he regards as one of the elements of philosophizing: "The effort to master the various systems is a fine discipline for philosophizing.”^ Such effort Stuckenberg, o£. cit., p. 376. is for him rightly called original thinking, a term which he says is little -understood by many who strongly emphasize it as essential for the true study of philosophy. According to him, original thinking ...consists in all those efforts of thinking which lead to the discovery of what was before unknown to the thinker himself, though it may have been known to others. A discovery to the individual may be old in history.3* Thilly speaks of what goes on in the student in the historical approach as a "training” of the mind in abstract thinking.^ Kulpe, who believes that moderns can be disabused of their mistaken idea of philosophy as each m a n ’s opinion only by showing them what philosophy has always meant throughout history, refers to what happens in the student as a "survey of opposing tendencies and changing definitions," which "can not but impel anyone who thinks for himself to indicate what seems to him to be the probable solution or explication of the questions under discussion." With Stuckenberg and Thilly there is consciousness of the need of considerable, effort on the part of the student to understand the historical material; with Kulpe there is simply Stuckenberg, 2 ojd. cit., p. 372. Thilly, o£. cit., p. 2. 3 « Oswald Kulpe, Introduction to Philosophy; Handbook for Students of Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics and General 21- a survey or looking-out-upon from a point of vantage. This metaphor of leisurely and lordly contemplation of, rather than active struggle with, historical materials is found also in Patrick, who assures the beginner: No matter how large the problems are, we may at any rate quite modestly approach them by historical inquiry. We may read what Plato and Aristotle, what Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Royce have written about them. We may associate for a while with the great men of the past.l Hocking, also, employs this (what may have been intended as a) subtle device of understatement, of great psychological value to beginners, in his statement that the beginner "discov ers" thought in its living context, and that his own concern for truth is deepened by "association" with the motives which 2 animated the heroes of human speculation. Rohrbaugh, to whom "philosophy is a corporate, cooper ative affair,” changes the metaphor again and speaks of an "ex amination of the routes travelled by other minds,” which is necessary before plunging into the problems. Calkins’ idea of the process in which the beginner be comes a philosopher by the historical approach is the direct opposite of the easy reading or survey conception. She speaks of "hammering out the meaning of Spinoza, of Kant, or of Patrick, o£. cit., p. 64. 2 Hocking, o£. cit., p. vii. 5 L. G-. Rohrbaugh, A Natural Approach to Philosophy, p. ix. 22 Aristotle,” of comparing passages to get at their common sig nificance or divergence, of estimating the different state ments of a philosopher with reference to the date of their formulation,'1* She also speaks of the historical approach as "forcing 3 the student to take different points of view” . On one hand, then, the development of the student interest is spoken of as an arduous conquest of textual mean ings, an active mastery of recalcitrant material, a hammering out of meanings, the overcoming, by the student himself, of his own narrow, dogmatic, and uncritical outlook by forcing himself to take different points of view; an examination. On the other hand, it is described as a simple reading and associ ating and surveying and discovering process, perceptual or contemplative in its effortlessness. B. As to the results of the development of the stude interest into philosophy by the historical approach, whether ad dition of information or development of attitude— concerning the latter Stuckenberg remarks that "the genetic study of philosophic thought...develops the mind” . Thilly adds that it 1 P. M. W. Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, P Loc. Cit. 3 Stuckenberg, 0 £. cit., p. 370. ..•trains the mind in abstract thinking. In this way we are aided in working out our own views of the world and of life. But it is hardly fair to dissociate the disciplinary from the informative effect of the historical approach, for the former is asserted.to be consequent upon the latter. But in different ways, as the following study will show. According to Stuckenberg, the effect of the histori cal approach is that it t?not merely develops the mind," but also "both reveals and solves difficulties," and "develops 2 philosophic thought." For Thilly, "we are aided in working out our own views of the world and of life" both because our minds were trained in abstract thinking and because we have reviewed the philosorz phical experience of the race* Calkins points out that an important advantage of the historical over the science approach to philosophy in point of result is that the former, by reason of its larger and longer view, avoids leading the student to a possible confusion of 4. the scientific with philosophic method. Another valuable result, according to Calkins, of the Thilly, o p . cit., pp. 2-3. 2 Stuckenberg, ojd. cit., p.370. 3 Thilly, 0 2 • cit., pp. 2-3* ^ Calkins, ojd. cit., p. 7. historical approach is breadth of view in the sense that the student sees serious alternatives and progressive corrections in various systems, which prevent his remaining uncritical and dogmatic.^ For Maritain, the valuable features of the historical approach are that it ...acquaints beginners with the problems of philoso phy, introducing them into the world, entirely new to them, of rational speculation, and furnishing them, incidentally, with much extremely useful knowledge. Their first requisite is to know'what they are study ing, and to possess a sufficiently live and accurate notion of the problems of philosophy presented in their simplest form.2 But this is not all, for by a judicious selection of the history of philosophy stopping with Aristotle, "that is to say until the conclusion of its formative period” (sic!), it is possible to show "how the transition was effected be tween the teaching of common sense and the scientific know ledge of philosophers...and how a particular conception of philosophy...results inevitably from this historical inquiry, rz and naturally forces itself upon the mind.” Wright, too,.approves such an historical survey on the ground that it 1 h o c * cit. 2 Jacques Maritain, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 18Loc. cit. 25 ...orients the student in the problems, and when he meets them for the second time in the latter half of the book he is ready to attack them with renewed interest and prof it.3Hibben, on the other hand, wrote his Problems of Philosophy in order to orient the student of the history of philosophy. 2 For Rohrbaugh, the significant result of the histori cal approach is knowledge of the routes travelled by other minds, which is vital to the attempt of the individual to solve these problems; they yield only to the continued pres sure of the race. The individual lacks enough experience to use as materials. With Hocking, the conception of the individual obliged to arrive at solutions of the great problems after a study of all that the great thinkers have thought about them is not emphasized as much as the idea of discovering how thought func tions in its living context of biography and social change, and the idea of having o n e ’s concern for truth deepened by association with the motives which animated the heroes of OS human speculation. • He speaks of foiming a few enduring in tellectual companionships. 1 W. K. Wright Ts review of <T. A. Leightonfs An Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 28: 216-817, March, 1919. s J. G-. Hibben, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. v-vi. s Hocking, ojo. cit., p. vii. 26 Hud s o n rs questionnaire study records a claim that in the historical approach the student has a better chance to escape partiality and onesidedness than in an independent introduction; also that the indispensable function of the study of the actual rise of problems is that it makes the problems of philosophy real to the student, who comes with no realization of these problems Bakewell echoes the claim that the student escapes indoctrination by the historical method— alone, he insists: So, in spite of the familiar criticisms, which recur at regular intervals, the introduction to philosophy by way of its history remains the best method of approach, for it is the only way in which a student has any chance of being protected from the prejudices of his instructor. Prejudices may, indeed, peep through the cloak of impartiality in which the historian hides, but a free use of the sources will minimize their influence,2 Its great positive values are rehearsed in the fol lowing hymn of praise: One sends a student to the history of philoso phy that he may sojourn for a while in the worlds of those whose vision has been broadest, in order that he may be able to face present day problems from the vantage ground of the history of thought,— just as the much traveled man when he returns home is able to view his native land and its problems in larger perspective* 1 Hudson, o£. cit,, pp. 32-33. 2 C. M. Bakewell*s review of Cushman*s A Beginner*s History of Philosophy, p. 329. The history of philosophy is a cure of the provin cialism which comes from isolation in time, — in o n e ’s own time, and from isolation in some little hamlet of the world of mind. The value of the study is obvious, its aim clear, but...*1Cushman repeats the refrain of perspective as of central importance to .American students: The .American student is sufficiently imbued with the "modern spirit." If there is one impression more important than all others that an .American student should receive, it is the historical. Above every thing else he should get a recognition of perspective. The history of philosophy is one of the most important subjects in the curriculum to teach him the value of the historical.^ Summarizing: the results of the historical approach, or what the student is introduced to, are variously described as knowledge of the philosophical experience of the race and mental training which aid us in working out our own views of the world and of life; the revelation and solution of diffi culties and the development of philosophic thought; the avoid ance of a confusion of the scientific with philosophic method; the achievement of a breadth of view which realizes the in dividual insufficiency and the mutually corrective character of the various systems; the providing of the student with vicarious racial experience and technics for attacking the problems of philosophy, which do not yield to independent 1 Ibid-. PP* 329-330. 2 H. E. Cusliman’s review of H. Hoffding's Brief History of M o d e m Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 10: 386-388, July 3, 19T3^ attack; the discovery of how thought functions in its living context of biography and social change; the deepening of one's concern for truth by association with the motives which animated the heroes of human speculation; the inevitable acceptance of a particular conception of philosophy (Scholasticism, perhaps MaritainTs own Thomism), which naturally forces itself upon the mind; the escape from the partiality and onesidedness which threaten the student in independent introductions; the indis pensable function of making the problems of philosophy real to the student, who comes with no realization of the problems of philosophy; perspective on present-day problems; cure of pro vincialism; the joy of understanding. Calling to mind the specific .question we have just answered— namely, what principles are involved in the claims that the historical approach is suited to its purpose?— ;the reader will note that what has just been summarized above as the results claimed for the historical approach all falls under the rubric ”philosophy,” for it represents what the student is said to be introduced to by the historical approach. The start ing point is the student who, because he is thoughtful and in telligent, is interested, fascinated, inspired by the reflec tion of his own commonsense attitudes in early Greek philoso phy and by the splendidly simple and resolutely onesided develop ment of these concrete and easy problems in an -order which provi dentially follows the order of their psychological unfolding in 39 his mind; by seeing these problems in the light of their con temporary civilization and of the noble motives of the heroes of human speculation, so that the problems are sensed by the student as real problems— to him. -And the development of the student’s interest from this point to what was revealed above to be ’’philosophy” or the term of his development is, if pre sided over by hulpe, Patrick, or Hocking, and perhaps Rohrbaugh, a relatively effortless judicial reading, surveying, discover ing, or eavesdropping process, where meanings are obvious and constitute no problem, but merely provide opportunity for a selection or choice. With Bakewell it is a ”journey” to a marvelously instructive foreign land. YThereas in the ease of Stuckenberg and Calkins the development is regarded, perhaps because of their insistence upon original texts, as a strenu ous battle with recalcitrant material by an unseasoned mind, a hammering out of textual meanings, a disciplined strengthen ing of the powers of the mind and an enforced sympathy with unfamiliar points of view in detail. Escape from prejudices of the teacher is achieved by reading in the sources, and the whole effect is a cure of provincialism and a larger perspec tive on the present, as in the case of a widely-travelled man returned home. 3. charges that the historical approach is not suited to its purpose. a) student’s interest. In the matter of the starting point— engaging the Stuckenberg believes that there are serious disadvant ages in employing the historical approach: The student is not yet prepared to comprehend the leading problems, much less the systems themselves; for this, the study of philosophy proper is the only adequate preparation. Hegel was certainly not inclined to make phil osophy easy for students; but he pronounced the history of philosophy, which Herbart and Schelling recommended as propaedeutics to phil osophy, too difficult for that purpose.— Philosophische Propaedeutik, XVIII.1 Hocking charges that the interest, of students, when not killed by "the appalling multiplicity of systems,"2 is wasted: It is hard, in an historical course, to get up steam on the problem, let us say of free will, as many times as there are philosophers who have had something to say on it.*5 Hibben has it that the victim of the historical ap proach fails to see the drift of things owing to his ignor ance of the stoek problems of philosophy; this Is the reason why Hibben wrote his Problems of Philosophy— to supply the defect of the historical approach: One who is undertaking for the first time a course . in the history of philosophy finds himself natural ly at a loss to understand the relations between earlier and later periods of thought, and therefore wants a proper perspective; accordingly he fails to appreciate the drift of things.4 Stuckenberg, o£. cit., p. 376. 2 Hocking, ojd. cit., p. viii. 3 Itid. P* ix. 4 Hibben, o£. cit., pp. v-vi. b) Charges that the nature of the development is un suited to the purpose of the course. Barrett maintains that it is impossible to introduce the student to that spirit of reasoned inquiry which is the essential characteristic of all philosophical thinking "merely through description of what others think or have thought’1'!: In other words, mere memory work is not yet philosophizing. There is something about the following statement of Stuckenberg which suggests that the mere history of philosophy is a challenge only to the memory of the student; that, depend ing upon the student’s interest and motivation, the historical approach might or might not stimulate him to critically master systems rather than to commit them: Memory is valuable as an aid in philosophizing, but a hinderance if it becomes the substitute. The philosopher is not made by learning, but by critically mastering systems; not by committing, but by thinking and perhaps transcending the thoughts of other thinkers. This suggestion is strengthened by the following re mark: Many current views of philosophy have their source in the reading of the philosophic thoughts of others, rather than in the study of philosophy itself.3 Stuckenberg here pointedly contrasts "reading" with "study." 1 Clifford Barrett, Philosophy, An Introductory Study of Fundamental Problems and Attitudes, p. v. s Stuckenberg, ojd. 3 Ibid., p. 377. cit., p. 370. 52 Paulsen objects to the aimless and wandering character of the historical paths along which the mind is led: It is full of deviations and circuitous .paths.-** ffindelband echoes this sentiment: The former (a predominantly historical method) would...be open to the objection that the phil osophers themselves, at least in their purely historical succession, seem to be a confusing and conflicting group, in the study of which one is apt to lose the real thread, or to miss the most important points.2 Windelband goes on to say that in the study of that portion of history— the early Greek period— which the beginner could follow by reason of its simplicity, he is losing his time, because ...the grandiose and primitive schemes of these pioneers do not meet the more complicated prob lems of modern times. Their simple, strong lines cannot provide an expression of the finer struc ture of modern thought, which goes deep into the multiplicity of the individual.3 The remainder of the charges against the historical approach repeat the refrain that the mind of the beginner is too empty and too weak to follow and understand the history of philosophy, with disastrous results, which are now taken up. c) Charges that the historical approach does not introduce students to philosophy, but produces undesirable 1 Friedrich Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. xviii. 2 Windelband, o£. cit., p. 24. 3 Loc. cit. 33 results. Confusion and loss of bearings are the tenor of many charges, For example, Stuckenberg: The mind unprepared for this history is confused by the numerous perplexing themes, and lost in the labyrinths of speculation.1 Again, he asserts that "instead of clear conceptions, a medley of indistinct notions is usually the result” .2 Cunningham connects the student’s confusion with lack of mental power and with condensation of material: The historical part of the book will very pro bably not serve the purpose which the author intends; on the contrary, l am inclined to think that it will defeat its own end. instead of help ing the student for whom the book is presumably written, this historical introduction will rather confuse him. in my opinion, it is simply impos sible to give in one Part of an introduction to Philosophy a summary of the whole history of phil osophical speculation, even though one hundred and seven pages be devoted to that purpose, which will be of very much assistance to the average student in comprehending problems discussed in another part. This arrangement presupposes powers of syn thesis which the uninitiated student does not pos sess. 3 Cunningham believes this method to be inferior to the plan of "using the historical background for the one specific purpose of orienting the student with reference to the problem in hand" as each problem is taken up. **■ Stuckenberg, o p . cit., p. 376. 2 Ibid., p. 377. 3 C. W. Cunningham’s review of 0. 0. Fletchers’ Intro duction to Philosophy, in Philosophical Keview, 33: 318-31$, ’ March, 1914. 4 Ibid.. P* 220. 34 Rogers bears witness to the beginner*s lack of mental power in his observation that "the wealth of material (e.g., in such a complete history as Web e r ’s) is bound to confuse the beginner, no matter how clearly it is put."'*' Windelband adds his opinion as follows: The philosophers themselves, at least in their purely historical succession, seem to be a con fusing and conflicting group, in the study of which one is apt to lose the real thread, or to miss the most Important points. Other writers point out how the beginner’s confusion in turn leads philosophy. to seriously mistaken notions of the nature of Paulsen links confusion with scepticism: If history is presented to him at the outset Y/ith its endless great and little differences of views and arguments, helpless confusion easily results, and the end of it all is a frightful scepticism, i±e comes to believe that the history of philosophy teaches that every philosopher is opposed to the other and hence that the entire undertaking results in nothing.3 Cushman argues that, taught alone, the history of philosophy is strange territory to the beginner, and that the possibility of its giving a meaning to history in general is something that must be explicitly shown; if it is not, the result for the student is a wrong historical perspective: 1 A. K. Rogers, A Student’s History of Philosophy, p. vi. . cit., 2 ?/indelband, ojd p. 34. ® Paulsen, o£. ext., p. xviii. If the history of philosophy is treated only as a series of doctrines, the student beginning the subject feels not only that the land is strange, but that he is a stranger in it. Besides, to isolate the historical philosophical doctrines is to give the student a wrong historical perspec tive, since philosophic thought and contemporary events are two inseparable aspects of history. Each interprets the other, and neither can be correctly understood without the other, if the history of philosophy is to have any significance for the beginner, it must be shown to give a. mean ing to history.i Leighton, in effect, says the same thing when he states that A beginning course which attempts to cover, in detail, the entire History of European and American Philosophy is beyond the grasp of most beginners. They are bewildered by the constant succession of theories not easily distinguishable, and become confused as to the fundamental issues and standpoints. They fail to get the connections between philosophy and the general culture of a period.^ Dotterer links the student’s bewilderment with an attendant self-deception that the philosopher is essentially an exegete: There are two very serious objections to the practice of beginning the study of philosophy with the history of philosophy. In the first place, there is danger that the beginner will be bewildered by the succession of strange ideas, and that he will come to think of phil- osophy as nothing but a parade of bizarre doc trines and off-color points of view, which no sensible person is expected to take seriously. Cushman, o p . cit., p. vi. 2 J. A. Leighton, The Field of Philosophy; An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, p. v. 56 In the second place, there is danger of falling into the error of identifying philosophy with its history, and of regarding philosophizing as merely a species of literary criticism* The student of philosophy thus becomes primarily an exegete who imagines that his work is done when by the aid of grammar and dictionary (supple mented by such biographical information as he has been able to amass) he has succeeded in de termining the (probable) meaning of the most important passages in the masterpieces of phil osophy *1 The California Associates make a suggestive connec tion between the undesirable results of the historical ap proach in science students and the latters* characteristic onesidedness. They tell us that the science-trained student is scandalized by the conflicting answers of philosophy, owing to his inability to see that the subjective side of ideas is as instructive as the objective (truth) side. Con sequently, when he is introduced to philosophy by the histori cal approach, ...it is not strange, then, that the student frequently emerges from an introductory study of philosophy, convinced that there is little to it but the clash of competing systems, or a bewildering assortment of intellectual patterns, between which he can only choose in an arbitrary and subjective way.s Lamprecht, in his preface to the California Associates* Knowledge and Society, lays the difficulty to neutrality of 1 Dotterer, o£. cit., p. 17. 2 California Associates in Philosophy: G. P. Adams, W. R. Dennes, J . Loewenberg, and others, Knowledge and Society, a Philosophical Approach to Modern civilization, p ."1581. attitude on the part of the writer of the history: When an introduction to philosophy tries to achieve neutrality and to avoid dogmatism by reviewing all the historic types of philosophy, the outcome is only too often the opinion, as I have heard people say in reminiscence about their undergraduate courses, that *it makes no difference what one believes because all opin ions have alike been sponsored by some great thinkers and opposed by others.,-‘In short, the historical approach «issues too many times in...a confusion that retards fresh inquiry.”2 Paulsen has it that the reason why, students are ad versely affected by a writer’s attempted neutrality in set ting forth the history of philosophy is that explanation in volves a standpoint, or is made from a platform, so that the attempt to get away from a standpoint or to cut loose from a platform deprives the student of the point of reference which makes the explanation significant. man can explain philosophical problems and their solutions unless he has himself taken an independent stand in reference to them, nor can he do so without introducing his own views into the exposition.3 imo Reviewer H. T. G. remarks that if the writer or teacher sedulously refrains from introducing his own views, the student will draw his own devastating conclusion that philosophy is not important since it has apparently not taken hold of the 1 Ibid., pp. v-vi: See also S. P. Lamprecht*s review of Maritain1s An introduction to Philosophy, in journal of Philo sophy, p • 307‘T™May 2l, 1&31. 2 u a l i f o m i a Associates, ££. cit., p. vi. 3 F h ^ ^ e hfliFjvsiuXntSgQdiaQtldhotoolhilbi^Qphy,:cp. xi. 58 writer vitally at any point: Suck an attitude (strict impartiality, no con clusions; does leave the reader with a feeling of frustration, even with a conviction of the futility of philosophizing. ...too judicial an attitude in the classroom may leave the student with the feeling that the professor does not really care.1 The general criticism that the beginner will lay hold of just enough scattered facts what to choice his under standing of philosophy is about takes another form in the case of hocking: This way has its dangers; they arise chierly rrom the plenitude of genius which has been poured into philosophy during two thousand years of reflection. There is a multitude, a growing multitude, of thinkers worthy of consideration. The mind becomes fatigued by its riches; and may gain the paradoxical im pression of futility. It is hard for tne be ginner, especially if he reads dutifully, to take history in the right way: not as an ob ligation to imow all that wise men have thought— no one achieves this— but as an opportunity to make a few durable gnd important intellectual companionships. If five out of forty great names light up with a personal allurement, one has found his friends among the philosophers, and his reading of history has been a success, xhe likelihood that an .American student will achieve this Is increased, I believe, if history is his second course rather than his first.2 Stuckenberg suggests that the studentTs deception as to the nature of philosophy results in misrepresentation of philosophy to the general public: 1 i±. T. C ’s review of Patrick’s Introduction to phil osophy, in journal of Philo sophy, 33: 160-161, march 12, 1936. 2 Hocking, op. cit., p. vii Some imagine that in this history they study philosophy itself, and perhaps claim to under stand philosophy after learning a few ideas from different systems. Many current views of philosophy have their source in the read ing of the philosophic thoughts of others, rather than in the study of philosophy itself.1 Robinson recognizes this danger, but adds that it can be overcome: The chief danger is that the student gets only a smattering of the various systems, with very little comprehension of what philosophy is.... Heed not have this effect if the student is serious, alert, and willing to work, and the teacher a real philosopher, and not a pedant with an axe to grind in the form of a philoso phy of his own he is trying to inculcate.2 Robinson himself apparently has decided that teachers and students who meet his requirements will fare better with an approach other than the historical, as his own text*— An Introduction to Living Philo sophy— bears witness. Bakewell graphically depicts the usual alternative fates of histories of philosophy in a way that the reader will remember later in connection with the difficulties in volved in the problems approach and the single system approach He intends to compliment the man whose book he is reviewing, but succeeds only in being ambiguously amusing: Most histories of philosophy are either his tories with a purpose, the purpose, namely, of establishing the historian's own philoso phy as the sum of the wisdom of the ages; or 1 Stuckenberg, o£. cit., p. 377. 2 D. S* Robinson, An Introduction to Living Philosophy; A General Introduction to Contemporary Types and Problems p. 7. else they give us a succession of philosophies which resemble Kaleidoscopic pictures, each pretty after its fashion, all intricate and more or less fantastic, and none very definitely related to what goes before and what comes after. Professor Thilly has hit the happy mean.1 Concluding his review, Bakewell enunciates a princi ple which ruthlessly restricts the suitability of the histori cal approach to those individual students for whom specific periods of history do not have to be exhaustively reconstruct ed. In other words, he implicitly adopts the principle of a student-centered rather than a content-centered course, lie enunciates this principle in the course of expressing his criticism of Thilly*s generous treatment of the mediaeval period— a concession to completeness which Bakewell pronounces pedagogieally futile: The way of life, and the fashions of thought, in the middle ages make the mediaeval mind far more remote from us than the Greek. To understand the greatness of that period, to appreciate the vital ity of its thinking, one must literally soak in its atmosphere; one must bring to life again the exper ience of which the mediaeval philosophers were the interpreters, and this means a thorough study of the whole historical, social, political, religious and intellectual setting. Apart from.this, one is pretty sure to carry away the old prejudices, that the mediaeval philosophers spent their time in idle and profitless debate, and in the spinning of hypersubtle distinctions, bailing such an exhaustive study, one had better be content to sample the mediaeval mind by extensive reading in one or more of its representative writers.2 1 G. M. Bakewell<s review of P. Thilly*s A History of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 34: p. 330, May, 1915. 2 Ibid., p. 331 41 This same argument is applicable to any period of history with which the individual student is unfamiliar, and to students # lose outlook is mediaeval rather than modern as well as to those whose outlook is modern rather than medi aeval. It emphasizes the radical heterogeneity of individuals, which is only slightly overcome by such academic devices as the entrance requirements of certain schools, which differ moreover among themselves. The comparison of this thepreceding section on pages section with the summary of 27 to 29 reveals the following points: 1. Both claims and criticisms regarding the suita bility of the historical approach for Its purpose are made from a common understanding that the historical approach Is a means as well as an end, a device, an instrument. is question of its being a suitable instrument. is apparent in all claims that it trains, There This fact guides, and broadens the mind; and in all criticisms that it confuses, misleads, and bewilders the mind. Defense and attack have to do with what the historical approach does or does not, can do or cannot do. 2. veals Even the claims that the historical approach re and solves difficulties, and provides the student with information and technics fail to establish the intrinsic value of the historical approach, for the admitted purpose 42 of providing the student with this material is to equip him to solve problems for himself. 3. The claim that the student is interested in the historical approach by reason of its concreteness and its historical and biographical context is qualified on the one hand by requirements that the student be ^thoughtful*1 and *fintelligent** (which is a petitio), and is nullified by the criticism of Windelband that the simplicity of early Greek thought is out of effective relationship with modern problems. If these points are well taken, then the only problems which the historical approach will make '’real11 to the student are problems other than his own present-day ones. 4. The claim that the historical approach trains the mind and provides information so -that the student can then work out his own outlook on life is met with the charge that there Is nothing in historical materials that challenges the student po do more than memorize them; that not training, but confusion, bewilderment, a sense of futility, of the unimpor tance of philosophy, and loss of bearings attends the tyrofs useless attempt to deal with the appalling multiplicity of systems, the conflicting authorities, the circuitous routes and deviations, the endlessly repeated and never solved problems. 5. Instead of achieving a breadth of view in which all systems have a place in their order, the student becomes sceptical of them all. miscarries. The impartiality of teacher and text as 6. Instead of having his concern for truth deepened, he has had it dissolved. 7. instead of understanding even one system and ap preciating the meaning it lends to existence, he prefers to live, undeceived, in the world of unaided perception; in other words, he does escape the partiality and onesidedness which threaten the student in independent introductions, hut becomes a champion of his own lack of any development, which is worse, ne is like the traveler whose trip has only con firmed his opinion of the silliness of other beliefs and customs than those of his native land. 8. The very perfection of the historian's art— his impartiality and detachment— is held to disqualify the his torical approach, for it precludes taking an independent stand, and the latter is essential to the explanation of phil osophical problems and their solutions, as well as to convey ing a sense of the reality and importance of philosophic prob1 ems. 9. in the purpose to train and stock the mind of the student with the problems, the experience, and the tech nics of the race, there is implied the idea that the individ ual has something at stake in these problems; that what he has at stake in these problems is everything that is really important to him; that wherein he as an individual falls out side what he has in common with all other individuals of the race, therein he has nothing important at stake; that he ex hibits ^thoughtfulness” and "intelligence” by the interest he shows in problems common to all men; that he has an obligation to attack these universal problems; that he can do so signifie antly only by arming himself with the armor and weapons of his predecessors; that this can be done in a course of general in troduction by the historical approach. There is a decidedly rationalistic ring to all this, an assumption that human na ture in general is the locus of intrinsic values and central problems and that individuals are the locus only of instru mental values and derivative problems, it involves the corol lary that ”thoughtfulness" and flintelligence” are exhibited by a determined recession from the concrete world to the ab stract, from the perceptual to the rational, from dealing with particulars to dealing witn universals and generals. The ped agogical problem is how to lead the beginner from his interest in particulars to an understanding of universals. The solu tion by the historical approach is a business of having the student read how the problems arose in the consciousness of his forebears, with what weapons and technics they were at tacked, in order that he may carry on where they left off, instead of repeating their mistakes. But if one questions the assumptions back of this endeavor to burden each individual with the racefs problems, and takes the stand that each individual is the locus of in trinsic values and of the important problems, then the ped agogical problem is modified, and it is no longer necessary— might perhaps even be noxious— to insist upon burdening each individual with all the worries or all the privileges of the race, r o r in such a conception the emphasis is upon the de velopment of the individual person— his soundness, integrity, and fitness. And the past would be consul tea, not primarily for the purpose of remaking the individual into an image of a racial ideal, but rather for the purpose of consulting the type of well-being suited to the complexion and possibilities of each individual. Is it possible that a study of the relation of phil osophers to their problems would disclose, not that they were concerned to solve them because they were problems common to all men, but that their own peace of mind depended upon their solving these problems? What is the significance of the fact that each philosopher refused to rely upon authority and merely accept solutions from other thinkers no matter how superior the latter were? Is there any connection between the inability of students to understand the speculations of great thinkers and the question of the pertinence of those speculations to the student’s present stage of development? Even if the student understands the great thinkers, what follows: that his obligation is to push the great problems as far as he can with the help of the great thinkers, or that he may merely contemplate their work with pleasure without even allowing it to affect his outlook, in case it threatened the integrity of his outlook? On the answer to these questions depends the suit ability of the historical approach to philosophy considered as helping the student to meet his obligation to carry on philosophy as a racial enterprise; or even to engage in phil osophizing for his own peace of mind. Is it necessary to re frain from philosophizing until one has before him all the materials and technics of the race and is skilled in their usev What assumption is b ack of such a belief? Do teachers of philosophy confuse the technics necessary in arriving at conclusions acceptable to scientific researchers with the learning process of students? Are there no problems and solutions except for him who possesses the maturity and special training and historical resources necessary to a strictly scientific investigation? solving problems? 10. What is the purpose of To whom is what a problem when? When Bakewell dwells upon the pedagogical futility of teaching that period of the history of philoso phy which, owing to the student's unfamiliarity with it, would have to be exhaustively reconstructed, he is in effect sounding the deathknell of the teaching of all periods of the history of philosophy— or has the alternative of suiting the teaching of the period to the student for whom that period does not have to be exhaustively reconstructed, in other words, he has Implicitly surrendered the concept of the his torical approach as content-centered in favor of the concept of it as student-centered. CHAPTER III PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS .AND CHARGES CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OP THE APPROACH THROUGH ONE FAVORED SYSTEM 1, Claims that the approach through one favored ' system is suited to its purpose. a) In the matter of the starting point— engaging the student’s interest* « . Kulpe listed as ’’the great advantages possessed by works of the first type (whose authors attempt to lead their readers to philosophize, by enumerating the principal phil osophical problems and indicating their solution)— definite ness of fundamental principles, and the interest which is lent to all exposition by a warm personal conviction...their stimulating quality.”1 b) Development of student’s interest into philoso phy. Paulsen maintains that teaching of philosophy can take place only by persuasion; hence, that a man can teach only what he is convinced of himself: Or we might consider the problems and thoughts in the form of a discussion of these questions. X have chosen the latter method, or rather 1 was com pelled to employ it, because it seemed to me to be 1 Kulpe, ojj>. cit., p. 5 the only possible method, no man can explain phil osophical problems and their solutions unless he has himself taken an independent stand in reference to them. .Nor can he do so without introducing his own views and judgments into the exposition. Hence I shall not merely set forth the problems together with their possible and historical solutions, but X shall at the same time attempt to convince the reader that my solution is the correct o n e .1 But Paulsen’s conception of the type of persuasion that will be effective is decidedly superior, for it is grounded in thorough historical study and proceeds by pre senting the student with the relevant historical materials, so that he may be convinced of the fairness of Paulsen’s judgment. Speaking of the kind of lectures of which his Introduction to philosophy is a written transcript, he says The first and foremost purpose of university lectures is to teach: they are not meant to stir up emotions by a flow of eloquence in order to influence the judgment; and still less, of course, can it be their purpose to amuse. They must appeal to the understand ing so as to stimulate independent thoughts and judgment. This will be accomplished most readily if the lecturer begins with a presentation of the facts, followed by an exposition of the various possible views con cerning their interpretation and construction together with the reasons governing the deci sion. Thus he is brought to state his own views, not with an air of dogmatic inf alii- . bility, nor with belittling invectives against those entertaining different opinions, but with the calm assurance which springs from a good conscience, or in other words, from the con sciousness that one is guided only by reasons and always willing to yield to reasons that are better than o n e ’s own. In this way the student is brought in touch with the facts 1 Paulsen, ££. cit., p. xi 49 themselves, and his mind is set free to inquire into them and come to its own decision.1 Paulsen’s essential position is that each person has the right to draw his own conclusions to the best of his abili ty after studying the evidence as far as it makes sense to him. Speaking of his outlines of the historical material in connec tion with each problem and of the conclusions to which he felt himself bound to come on the basis of his understanding of the evidence, he remarks frankly: Both methods regularly lead to the same goal. Of course, the choice of the historically-significant points by which the direction of the development is determined ultimately and always depends on their agreement with o n e ’s own thoughts.3 This is a serious admission, for it means that the stu dent is given no more opportunity to disagree with the author when reading the historical background of a problem than when following the author’s argumentation— for the selection of which historical background is relevant to the problem is mere ly the shadow of the argumentation. however, Paulsen justifies this procedure on the ground that such indoctrination serves the indispensable pedagogical function of reducing the welter of historical material to a relatively simple outline intelligible to the beginner. To charges that he minimizes differences between the great ideal 1 ^ i e d r i c h 4 P a u l s e n , an autobiography, p. 466. 2 Faml senp. xvii-xviii. 1Intro due t ion to Philosophy, pp. istic systems, and harmonizes them he replies: And yet it may he expedient for the time being to disregard the differences and to emphasize the great features that they have in common, in geographical instruction we first place be fore the pupil charts which show only the main outlines of countries and oceans, the principal mountain-chains and the great water-courses. Special charts showing the smallest details would simply confuse him.1 Sellars concurs that the student himself has the job of understanding the evidence on the basis of which the writer has come to his conclusions, and speaks of the 2 effort required as a Mwrestling,f with the problems, c) What the student is introduced to. Paulsen frankly admits that he presents his histori cal material in such a way as ...to produce the conviction that the work of philosophical reflection which has lasted for so many centuries has not been in vain, but rather that it leads to a view of the world that is uniform in its main features and as sumes a more pronounced shape as the years roll on.3 if this sounds like reckless optimism to anyone, he is assured by miss Calkins that it cannot last if unjusti fied: Even the scrupulous and rigorous study of any one great philosophical system must reveal the 1 XjO c • ext. 2 R. W. Sellers, The Essentials of philosophy, p. 14. 3 Paulsen, o£. cit., pp. xviii-xix. means for the correction of its own inconsistencies. Hume, for example, implies the existence of the self which he denies, for he employs the 1 to make the denial.i Kulpe willingly granted that the philosophizing ap proach nmay, no doubt, stimulate an occasional student to philosophic thought, and so lead him to undertake a closer . study of philosophy itself.11^ Summarizing: the student!s interest is caught, stimu lated, and fed throughout by the author’s warm personal convic tion and by the definiteness of his fundamental principles. By representing his position as the outcome of reason on the basis of evidence which he submits in toto to the student, the author displays his good faith to the student, allowing him to make up his own mind. Of course, the author’s choice and presentation of materials make the student’s agreement with his position a foreordained conclusion. But this practice is pedagogically sound because when the student later becomes aware of the need of modifying the system, he is by that time presumably ready to develop further. Meanwhile, his wrestling with the materials even under the guidance of the author is sustained by the author’s faith that there is a reassuring unity and direction to the bulk of philosophic reflection throughout the centuries, so that he may be led to undertake 1 Calkins, op. cit., pp. 7-8. p Kulpe, op. cit., p. 4. 52 a closer study of philosophy itself (says isnlpe, for whom philosophy itself is what he nas found it to be— the whole literature of philosophy understood as so many attempts to solve three irreducible types of problem. )*** 2. Charges that the approach through one favored system is not suited to its purpose, but produces undesir able results. a) In the matter of the starting point— engaging the studentfs interest. iiindelband implies that this approach is faulty as a pedagogical device for the reason that its users mistake what interests themselves for what interests their students: The systematic method of solution has appealed chiefly to philosophers because it could be used as an introduction to their philosophies.. .Treat ment of this kind is more to the taste of the author than of the reader, for the reader, as a rule, desires an introduction to philosophy in general, not to a particular system.2 Windelband's assumption is that the course is to be designed to meet the desires and expectations of the reader rather than those of the author. It is Windelbandfs opinion thatthe reader desires an introduction al, but to philosophy in gener the principle he has Implied is hospitable to other in terpretations • Robinson1s idea of the most serious objection that Kulpe, ££. cit.» pp. 237-239. 2 Windelband, ojd. cit., pp. 24-25. 55 this approach (in common with the approach through history and through special philosophic disciplines) has to meet is that "they do not give any attention at the outset to the student’s own philosophy."**' Langer has it that the student instinctively shies away from all attempts at indoctrination: If the text-book e g r e s s e s an opinion, the reader fears that he is being lobbied for one of the con tending factions.2 Durant charges that philosophy, when dismembered and reduced to Metaphysics, Logic, !Epistemology, Ethics, and the rest loses all its joy and beauty, and hence its interest.3 In short, this approach is mistaken because based on a confusion of what interests the teacher with what interests the student, because it does not give any attention at the outset to the student’s own philosophy, because the student instinctively resists indoctrination, and because a living thing has been reduced to an autopsied corpse. These critic isms are made from a platform which maintains that the approach is to be designed to satisfy the desires and expectations of the student rather than those of the teacher, that the stu dent’s own philosophy is to be the starting point of the ap proach, and that people can be interested in and possibly 1 Robinson, o£. cit., p. 6. 2 Susanne K. Langer, The Practice of Philosophy, p. ix. 3 Durant, ojd . cit., p. 4. instructed "by philosophy only when it is presented to them as making a difference in a human life. b) Development of the student*s interest. Burnham and Wheelwright object that the attempt to indoctrinate the student by exhibiting the necessity of coming to given conclusions on the basis of selected historical and dialectical materials is bound to fail, because However valid t h e .structure of a philosophical doctrine may be, there is nothing whatever to force us to accept those presuppositions and that method. No matter how self-evident they may seem to those who accept them, experience is sufficiently complex to lend, when we shift the emphasis, plausibility to a denial or at least a limitation of their validity. When we examine the history of philosophy we find that, in fact, no one system has ever been accepted for long by a majority of those who think about such things. • .even many of the neo-thomists admit that a great deal of straining is necessary to assimilate m o d e m science .1 Strictly speaking, this not an important objection to the approach, for the problem is not to give the beginner his final philosophy in a single first dose, but to get him nicely started. However, it is a healthy reminder of the futility and perhaps danger to the student of so effectively indoctri nating him with a system that he feels obliged to ignore or condemn whatever is incompatible with it. Nicholson employs an expression which, v&ille not per haps adequately describing what happens in a student who really 1 J. Burnham and P. Wheelwright, Introduction to Phil osophical Analysis, p. 449. strives to master a system,yet suggests the attitude of stu dents who envisage their job as one of memory at most; he speaks of the student "who with a glassy eye contemplates a structure already complete. c) Results of the approach through one system— what it really introduces the student to. Leighton maintains that what the student has been introduced to is simply not philosophy, but the ideas of other people. Philosophy is not something added to the stu dent from the outside: He cannot take his philosophy at second hand from his fellows or tradition.. .a philosophy is a m a n fs own life-attitude. Therefore, it is the most in timate and personal quality of an individual life. Philosophy is not the system of any man or school. It is the individual mind animated by the spirit or openminded and persistent endeavor to discover the whole truth in regard to life and reality. Barrett concurs that this approach misleads the stu dent as to the nature of philosophy, because philosophy is essentially not a content of conclusions,but the spirit and 4 method by which they were reached. Robinson is emphatic on the perversion of philosophy, teacher, and student produced by this method: *** J. A. Mieholson, in Introductory Course in Philoso p h y , p. 244. Leighton, o£. cit., p. 15. 3 Ibid. p . 21 . ^ B a r r e l ojo. cit., p. v; also California Associates, op.cit.t p. vii. <56 One method is to indoctrinate the student as soon as possible with some special brand of philosophy.•.This method never produces a philo sopher.3* (produces)...pompous conceit...cads in phil osophy. ..closes the mind of the student to the realm of philosophy .2 Beware of the propagandist type of philosopher. Me has missed his calling. He belongs either in the pulpit or in the journalistic profession.3 Micholson’s mild observation is that Philosophy is much more a movement than a monu ment; and the student who acquires habits of critical thinking is much more of a philosopher than he who with a glassy eye contemplates a a structure already complete .4 Editor S. T. Lamprecht judicially points out that the very success of the method of indoctrination is the production of an attitude hostile to the philosophic spirit: When an introduction to philosophy seeks to pro mote conviction and to avoid inconclusiveness by sponsoring some one philosophical point of view, the outcome is not infrequently the supposition that problems have been settled and need not be reopened...Thus courses in philosophy issue too many times in...a complacency that is hostile to a philosophic spirit .3 Maritain’s position is that to attempt to indoctrinate a student with a system without having first persuaded him by historic review that the system is historically inevitable, 1 Robinson, o£. cit., p. 5. 2 Ibid. p. 6. 3 Ibid. P. 52. 4 Nicholson, 0 £. cit., p. 244. 3 California Associates, o£. cit., p. vi. S7 would be to give him a false impression of philosophy, that is,, •..would be to present the traditional conception of philosophy under an arbitrary and a priori as pect wholly alien to it, and to risk enslaving our pupils to empty formulae .1 Leighton, in another passage curiously different in tenor from the two passages quoted above, but compatible with them, complains that the purely topical and systematic intro duction ...does not bring the student into contact with the most significant historical developments of philoso phy. Me does not, in this way, begin to see what role philosophy has played in the life of civiliza tion.^ Leightonfs emphasis, like Paulsen 1 s, is upon the right of the individual to come to the conclusions that are meaning ful to him, a right tempered by the duty to learn to the best of o n e rs ability from other thinkers of the past and present. K u l p e ’s essential criticism of the approach through one system is that it is unsuited to the present cie facto need of philosophy to appear as a racial as opposed to an individu alistic enterprise: But today we hear, only too often, the voice that proclaims the approaching end of philosophy, or condemns it as a useless superfluity. Judgments of this kind cannot arise except from ignorance of what philosophy is and what it means, and cannot be corrected except by an accurate report of what the main business of philosophy has been in all times . 3 1 Maritain, ojd. cit., p. 19. 2 Leighton, ojd. cit., p. v. 3 KjJilpe, ojo. cit., p. 4. 58 That is to say, the single system approach is unsuited to present needs because it is not a full and accurate report of philosophic history and literature, it is, "as a rule, en tirely without the characteristics whieh we judge to be valu able"*** in the omnibus approach of iiulpe^ preference, charac teristics which he enumerates as follows: • ..to find out what has been done in the past, to get a vocabulary of technical terms, to understand the reasons for the divergence of the schools, and the significance of the supreme efforts of our own time towards the advancement of philosophical sci ence , 2 Criticisms therefore are made from the platform that philosophy is not an outlook accepted from the outside but each m a n Ts own life-attitude; that the development of each m a n Ts life-attitude is unduly restricted by confining it with in any one of the historical systems; that it takes place not by the addition of more facts from the outside but by the ac tivity of each mind, which selects and appraises and uses ma terials that It understands; that each m i n d Ts radical autonomy of judgment is mistakenly regarded by all attempts to indoc trinate students as an evil to be overcome, n u l p e ’s criticism is made with the belief that the beginner should have no espe cial trouble reading and appreciating the significance of a 1 5 P* 5. 2 IkM*> p * 4 * full and accurate report of the business of philosophy in all times, and that the presentation of this report to the student is what is meant by introducing him to philosophy. nulpe's criticism is therefore an objection to the limited material presented to the beginner; philosophy is not just one system, but all systems. The difference between hulpefs criticism and that which precedes his at the beginning of this paragraph is the difference between insisting that the student proceed on the basis of his peculiar personal mental complexion and abili ties and insistence that a person judge of the true nature of philosophy only after coming to know the historic business of philosophy. The objection to the way the approach through one sys tem leads the student to the acceptance of it is based on the belief that it is unphilosophieal to make the student accept definitively a set of conclusions based on selected evidence. The reasoning of the student is simply a dog-like following of the thoughts of another, or a glassy-eyed contemplation of a structure already complete. With regard to starting point, the criticisms involve the assumption that the approach to philosophy should be de signed to satisfy the desires and expectations of the students rather than those of the teacher, that the studentTs own phil osophy should be the starting point, and his sense the judge. of reality 60 Comparing this summary of section 2 with the summary of section 1 on page 4E, the reader will note the following points: 1. If there is anything common both to the idea of the student*s interest being engaged by the author’s warm per sonal conviction and to the idea that the student1s own phil osophy should be the starting point of any approach to philoso phy, it is perhaps that the student is captured by the teacher*s real concern about issues which are of concern to the student, or perhaps we should say, about issues of the same Kind, as those which concern the student. appear later. What these issues are will It is the satisfaction of desires and expecta tions linked with these issues that any approach to philosophy must at least begin to effect. S. Ihe idea common to having the student follow and check the reasoning of the teacher in the light of historical materials selected by the teacher and to having the student branch out by his own self-initiated activity into materials selected from a wider field by himself in answer to issues raised by his own desires and expectations— is that the stu dent must learn the spirit and acquire the habit of understand ing, to the best of his ability, what he is about. In short, the development of reasonableness and understanding as opposed to mere acceptance without understanding. If Nicholson is be lieved, it is possible to accept a system without having grown 61 in sympathetic and critical thinking. 3. The special goal of the approach through one sys tem is at best the understanding and at worst the mere accept ance of it; the special goal of the survey approach of its a critic hulpe xs the acquaintance of the student with a full and accurate report of the business of philosophy in all times; but the goal of the approach, to philosophy, according to Leighton and P aulsen’s basic assumptions, is each student’s best understanding of issues raised by his desires and expec tations that is possible to h i m . There is simply a difference of emphasis and, in the case of the approach through one system, a difference of scope. In the third case, the emphasis is upon issues raised by the student’s desires and expectations as start ing point, as principle of selection of materials for their sa tisfaction, and as judge of the v<rorth of those materials. In the other two cases, the emphasis is upon content as such, as in Kulpe, or on content that has proved satisfactory to issues raised by the desires and expectations of the teacher. 4. The more successful the approach through one system has been, the more certainly has the student been indulging in literary appreciation and mental calisthenics rather than cop ing with issues arising from his desires and esqoectations and knowledge. CHAPTER IV PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF THE APPROACH THROUGH THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY If there is any difference between the problems ap proach and the approach through one system, it is, generally, first of all a desire to treat problems separately instead of emphasizing their essential systematic interrelationships and selectively instead of covering the whole terrain of philoso phy; secondly, a professed desire— not always realized— to es cape from o n e ’s bias in the esqposition of problems and solu tions and the attempt to stimulate independent thinking on the part of the student instead of persuading him to the w r i t e r ’s own views* G. Kennedy puts this very clearly in a review of four Introductions of 1924 vintage: Each one presumes that philosophy is a definite sub ject-matter which can be presented in a straightfor ward and impersonal fashion. This subject-matter consists of a number of "problems" for which there are certain solutions. The purpose of an introduc tion to philosophy is to inform the student that these problems exist and then acquaint him with all the extant theories about them, and the chief merits of the writer of an introduction will be clearness and impartiality. He must be careful to remain a professor .1 i G. Kennedy’s review of G. P. Conger’s A Course in Philosophy; J • H . R y a n ’s An Introduction to Philosophy; G T lv. Cunningham’s Problems of Philo sophy; G. T. W. Patrick’s Intro duction to Philosophy,~Tn journal of Philosophy, 22: 360-362, June 18, 1925. 65 Leighton emphasizes fewer problems more fully treated: I feel that Professor Cunningham has attempted to cover too much ground in the space laid out. I am sure that it is better to take fewer problems and to hammer away at them, unless the students that have fallen to my lot were an exceptionally dull group, 1 feel that my experience warrants the prediction that the average undergraduate would carry away from Professor Cunningham*s text, if it were used as the basis of the course, much confu sion of mind.31 . claims that the problem approach is suited to its purpose. a) Engaging the student’s interest; starting point. Patrick prefers the problem method to the historical on the ground that it is ”still more modest** than the latter, and easier for the student: Finally, there is a still more modest method of studying philosophy than that of its history. Preliminary even to this is the definition of terms and the mere statement and exposition of the various problems, with the mention of the different theories about them...we may define terms and explain theories and perhaps to some extent examine critically the concepts used. Possibly we may find that the divergence among the various systems of philosophy— a divergence much exploited by the critics— is not so great after all. This would seem to be the ideal way to take up the study of philosophy: first, through an *Introduction,* to get the terms, problems, and typical theories before us; second, through the study of the history of philosophy, to gain a know ledge of the opinions of its great men; third, to apply to all the problems the method of critical 1 < J• A. Leighton’s review of G. W. Cunningham’s Prob lems of Philosophy; An Introductory survey, in philosophical Review, 34: 586-627, September, 1925• analysis and reflective thought .1 Rohrbaugh uses the metaphor of the introduction: When we introduce one person to another, we do not think of rehearsing the deeper facts lying back of each personality; we let them learn to know each other. Likewise, as we approach phil osophy, it is better to examine from different angles the issues belonging to the field, to in quire concerning the paths which a few highly respected individuals and movements have taken, thus pointing impartially to possible interpre tations...An elementary approach of this kind then does not aim to lead the reader to the very heart of its problems; nor do introductory treat ments of mathematics, physics, or any other sci ences. Investigators get into the heart of their problems only as they continue to live in their respective fields.^ Cunningham confronts the student with the historical material relevant to each problem, and leaves him to draw the conclusion he sees. He has done for the student the drudgery of collecting and ordering the materials; he allows the stu dent to use them in his own way: Instead of giving a separate summary survey of the main historical systems of philosophy, as is sometimes done in introductory texts, 1 have undertaken the more difficult (but I think more fruitful).task of weaving the relevant histori cal material into the consideration of the prob lems as they severally arise. This promises more for the student .3 Editor S. T. Lampreeht makes a point of the fact that 1 Patrick, o p . cit., p. 65. 2 Rohrbaugh, o£. cit., pp. vii-viii. W. G. Cunningham, Problems of Philo sophy; An Intro ductory Survey, p. 3 the kind of problems that are interesting to people are the "current problems which force themselves insistently on the attention of thoughtful people,^ and in the same connection commends "subject-matters that are of current .import to p .American students#" Hocking*s understanding of the value of the problem. approach is that it gives the student what he wants, namely, answers to his questions, and so is consistently interesting: The second way is by direct attack upon the prob lems of philosophy: what is the mind? how is it related to the body? is the behavior of human beings a part of the machinery of nature? is there a soul? does it survive death? what are these qualities we call good and evil? what have we to do about it? how much, if anything, can we know beyond what we call science? The answers to these and other such questions constitute a m a n ’s phil osophy: these are the things he wants to know .3 The problem approach answers to a mood of impatience and good courage in the student to plunge directly into these questions, with the best light today available, and nocking believes in taking advantage of the courage while it is strongf M e N u t t ’s hymn of praise to the problem method includes the claim, important if true, that "it changes routine monotony into expectancy” in the student. California Associates, o p . cit., p. v. 2 rbid- > P* v i * rx u Hocking, op. cit., p. viii. 4 koQ.>uit# 5 w. Study, p. 6 . S. M c N u t t , The Story of Philosophy Told in Problem 66 Also, "the problem method of approach motivates and enriches the life of the student " . 1 The promising claim that he makes for it is that it vitalizes the tool sciences which have to be drawn upon to solve a given problem by making them serve a de sired end— the solution of a real problem .2 Summarizing: Some of the authors so far quoted exhibit an astonishing and anomalous conception of problems as external to people and resident in philosophical literature. lems are universals, the people are particulars. are there, the people are here. The prob 'The problems The pedagogical puzzle is how to introduce a particular here to a universal over there, or how to insert a cosmic difficulty there into an atomic con sciousness here. One formula (Bohrbaugh’s ) is to have the stu dent v/alk around the problem and view it from different angles. Another (Patrick’s) is to give rough equivalents for its lang uage and exhibit its constituent parts, with summary statements of solutions offered. A third (McNutt’s)is to furnish the stu dent with the title of an historical problem and refer him to literature in which he is to discover for himself both problem and materials for its solution. Other authors speak of problems as forcing themselves upon people, or as difficulties already in the minds of people and pressing for an answer, 1 > P* 2 Ibid.# PP- 1 • in this way of looking at the matter, the student is already involved in the necessity of philosophizing, for he is an element in its problems* But in the first way of looking at it, he has to cultivate an interest in it, as in the Foreign Missions* b) Development of student’s interest. Nothing is more obvious about the first species of problems approach than that it is a memory process, for, as Kennedy has pointed out, the aim is to ”inform” the student that certain problems exist and then "acquaint” him with all the extant theories about them. These are materials to be committed and given back in recitations. in the second species of problems approach,the stu dent "follows” the philosophizing of the author without being led to a definitive conclusion, or in the formal problem study method of McNutt learns to unearth, formulate, collect mater ial on, and come to a decision about a problem as the result of discussion, reading, and writing. With Hocking the problems are in the students, but history supplies the solutions for the student’s choice; with McNutt the teacher supplies a title, the student discovers the problem and materials relevant to its solution in philosophical literature, and himself passes judgment; with the others, both problems and solutions are presented to the student. A. H. Jones speaks of the learning process as ”an 68 n exposure to greatness."-1* c) Besults of the problems approach— what the studen has been introduced to. Of course, the student has been informed about prob lems and acquainted with solutions. But the important result is not a mere "schooling in opinionsy but rather "an exposure to greatness '1 as a result of which we anticipate "that the heterogeneous interests of life be unified, that new and wider prospects be revealed, and that the mind be enriched and steado ied for daily tasks." However, the results of such an ex posure to greatness are very problematical, yet should not be foregone: If we bear this in mind, we shall not be greedy of results which are evident to the student, or which even the teacher can see with definiteness— for when and where greatness shall take, or how it shall work on lesser lives we rarely know .3 Strange that a philosopher should not think to examine the validity of a principle so equivocal in its effects. The stock claim for the problems approach is that it liberates the mind from the thralldom of set factuality and prejudice and opens up new vistas of possible realization, by giving the student an understanding of the inconclusive- 1 A. H. Jones 1 review of Cunningham *s An Introduction to Philo sophy, in Philo sophical Review, 29: 5 0*1^5, September, 1920. 2 h o c * cit. 3 hoc. cit. ness of available evidence on ultimate problems owing to the inexhaustible extent and richness of the universe *1 "The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its p un certainty.” Hibben wrote his The Problems of Philosophy explicit ly to precede and prepare for the history of philosophy: One who is undertaking for the first time a course in the history of philosophy finds himself natural ly at a loss to understand the relations between earlier and later periods of thought, and therefore wants a proper perspective; accordingly he fails to appreciate the drift of things* to all such an in troduction to the main problems, and general tend encies of philosophical discussion, should prove an invaluable assistance in interpreting the evolution of thought historically*3 bumming up: the problems approach ideally eventuates in a liberalized and broadened mind, unified in its interests, enriched and steadied for daily tasks, ready to interpret the evolution of thought historically* These results were achieved by the studentfs being in formed about and acquainted with problems and solutions which constituted an exposure to greatness, and,in the case of McNutt,more prosaically provided also materials on the basis of which the student came to his own decision about the prob- 1 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter XV*, The value of philosophy. 2 I*>icL., p. 243. 3 Hibben, o£. cit., pp. v-vi. lems. With some writers problems are difficulties outside of students and they offer a mutual resistance; with others, problems are outside students, but clamor for attention; with still others, problems are inside people like a hunger call ing for food from the outside. 2 . uharges that the problems approach is not suited to its purpose. aj In the matter of starting point— engaging the stu d e n t s interest. Jones’ criticism is that the attempt to bring philoso phy down to earth and link its problems with the affairs of life has in one case resulted in too obvious and external a linkage to trap the s t u d e n t s imagination and hold him long. Me esqplieitly makes this criticism from the platform that ...the b e g i n n e r s demands on philosophy are fun damentally the same as the t e a c h e r s , viz., that the heterogeneous interests of life be unified, that new and wider prospects be revealed, and that the mind be enriched and steadied for daily tasks .1 Kusso lists the type of problems which have no inter ests for the student because archaic: The introductory course called the .problems of .Philosophy is still more futile. The old problems of ontology and cosmology, the tabula rasa, P a l e y ’s jones’, o p . cit., p. 505. 71 watch, the billiard-ball universe, psycho-physical parallelism, the Ding-an-sich, and other bric-abrac and heirlooms of philosophy have lost their charm. They are the antiques of philosophy and have their place in the history of the subject .1 The platform from which Russo makes this criticism is apparent in the following: Unless philosophy addresses herself anew to the problems of life, it will remain what it has been throughout the twentieth century, the sterile and exhausted soil of the sciences .2 Marvin criticizes Dubray for not limiting himself to those problems which are in closer or more apparent re lation to life .3 Hudson believes that the reason why it is so not ably hard to induce students to do independent thinking is that "the problems with which we confront them do not seem to them worth while." 4 And the reason why the problems do not seem to them to be worth while is that they "do not arise out of concrete situations with which they are themselves 5 involved or with which they are familiarly interested." For -*• S. Russo, "Course in Philosophy for Junior Colleges," Junior College Journal» 7: 257, February, 1936. 2 Ibid., p. 258. W. T. M a r v i n ’s review of C. A. Dubray's Intro duo to ry Philosophy; A Textbook for Colleges and High Schools, in Journal of Philosophy, 10: 446, July 31, 1913. 4 J . W. Hudson, "An Introduction to Philosophy through the Philosophy in History," Journal of Philosophy, 7: 573 October 13, 1910. --------------- ---5 Loc. cit. 72 example, in itself the metaphysical problem of the one and the many, or the problem of teleological criteria in ethics is not "likely to heighten the pulse of the average sophomore.”**H u d s o n ’s criticism is made from the following platform: But the conditions are changed when the problem is made to emerge from an absorbing concrete social conflict or a compelling national crisis, historic or contemporary* It is not an artificiality thus to relate philosophy, philosophy from of old was born of just such concrete situations *2 This point of view is emphatically asserted in H u d s o n ’s study of the results of a questionnaire involving thirty-five teachers of philosophy: There is a general insistence that the problems shall be presented in connection with presentday issues and solutions, and that they should first emerge through a Socratie questioning of the student’s own attitudes toward life* As a typical reply puts it: "Introduce the student to philosophy through his stock on hand* Begin where the students are and grow into philosophy v/ith them. Drag the problems out of them; they are already infected.”3 Wright commends Leighton for his admirable choice of topics on the ground that they are "the very ones which, in the experience of the reviewer at least, undergraduates in 4 their first course most wish to know something about.” 1 Loc. cit* 2 L o c * cit* 3 t l• W. Hudson, ”The Aims and Methods of Introduction Courses; A Questionaire, ” Journal of Philosophy, 9: 33, January 18, 1912. 4 W. K. W r i g h t ’s review of d. A. Leighton’s An Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 28:216, March, 1919. 73 Lafferty rebukes Robinson for substituting philoso phical riddles and technicalities for real problems: The so-called problems into which Parts IX, III, and XV are divided are not real problems. Conse quently there are no solutions to them and thus they are given the appearance of eternal problems. They are the dialectical difficulties of idealism. Dialectical difficulties lead only to the bikering evidenced by this book; real problems present goals of cooperative human progress.**Lafferty states the platform of his criticism thus: In an age engaged in reviewing the foundations of its science, the place of that science in its human life, the readjustments of its social structure re quired by technological advance, the nature, pos sibilities, and necessities of a good life in its world...there is need for an introduction to living philosophy .2 Summing up: the problems approach has failed to en gage the interest of students when it began with problems too external to the student’s life, too archaic, too many to be covered, out of apparent relation to life, not worth while to the students because not emerging from concrete situations with which they are themselves involved or with which they are familiarly interested, riddles of technical philosophy instead of real problems capable of solution. The criticisms are made from the platform that the problems of the introductory course must not be external to 1 T. T. Lafferty’s review of D. S. Robinson’s An Intro duction to Living Philosophy, in journal of Philosophy, 3&: 821, April 13, 1933. 2 Loc. cit. the student,but must emerge from concrete situations with which they are familiarly interested, that thus they will seem worth while to the student and be a suitable starting point; that all philosophy is b o m of such concrete situations as absorbing con crete social conflict or a compelling national crisis, historic or contemporary; that the problems should emerge through a Socratic questioning of the studentfs own attitudes toward life, his stock on hand. b) Development of studentfs interest. When the same text-book appears to two different re viewers to exhibit a radically different plan of execution and order of materials, it must be admitted that the relatively sub tle continuity which the one reviewer missed and on the basis of which he condemned the book would very likely be missed by the student also and fail to achieve the effect it intended in him. Tuttle sees the dialectical style of the author in the problems he suggests to the studentfs reflection, and praises the result as not being material to commit and recite. He com mends the author for the suitability of his method to stimulate the student to form habits of philosophical thinking rather than to acquire a smattering of all the manifold tismsf.'1* A.Balz, on the other hand, sees in the book an exhibi- ^ J . R. Tuttlefs review of J • E. RussellTs A First Course in Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 23: 93-94, January, 1914. tion of a perverse, even though inevitable, condensed maimer of presenting conflicting philosophical solutions— perverse in that the very form of exposition predetermines the issue for the student• Where Tuttle saw the dialectical movement, Balz notices only the absence of historical background which ■j would prepare the student for each view more naturally. In short, where Tuttle saw an interesting because tantalizing and suggestive development of problems, Balz (and probably the student) see only material to be committed. c) Results of problems approach— what the student was really introduced to. Balz criticizes the approach as lending itself to making philosophy artificial to students, and mediating doc trines suspicious because they seem to reconcile TTwhat must seem, from the very form of presentation, so patently irrecon cilable^. He asserts further that "for the pupil the issue is apt to be predetermined by the esqposition of alternatives^. And the result is a misconception of the aim and nature of philo sophy: 1 A. Balzfs review of I. E. Russell fs A First Course in Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, IS: £22-223, April 15, 1915. — 3 Loc. cit. The study of philosophy may appear to him to be a search for the best solutions that history affords, rather than a search for the problems to be solved . 1 Overstreet points out the tendency of theproblem approach in one case to convince the student of the author’s solution instead of remembering that the student is not yet prepared for conviction and needs rather to be made vividly aware that there jLs a problem and given some notion of its scope and difficulty. Otherwise, In the first place, the student fails to see what the real difficulty of the problem is; and in the second place, he marvels that most of the thinkers of the past, have childishly blundered in matters of very simple moment. Tawney points/out a pedagogical difficulty Involved in making the judgments of common sense not only the starting point, but also the justified conclusions of philosophy: In thus hoisting the plain man into the position of a philosophical authority we are apt to mislead students into an attitude of distrust and scorn, not only toward all historic systems of philosophy, but also toward the very attempt to think clearly about real things. De lighted with this very interesting championing of the plain m a n ’s view of the world, It is just possible that the student will afterward hear nothing of any other philosophy. The teacher may find himself forced to defend the attempts of such men as Plato, Aristotle, and Hume. ^ Kennedy’s criticism reveals the dilemma of the advo- . cit., ^ Balz, ojd pp. 222-23. ^ jj. Overstreet’s review of G. S. Fullerton’s An Introduction to Philosophy in Philosophica1 Review, 17: 218, March, 1908. 3 G. A. Tawneyfs review of G. S. Fullerton’s An Introduction to Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 4: 357, June 20, 1907. cate of the problems approach, for just as the attempted indoctrination of the student miscarries, so an attitude of strict impartiality fails of its objective by taking all f,contagion" for philosophy out of the introduction: For what subject would not be dull when presented in texts which read like brief encyclopedias? .And especially this subject which is so much more than mere subject-matter., If philosophy is the love of wisdom then to teach philosophy is to communicate more than knowledge. Clarity and impartiality and thoroughness are not enough. The teacher of philosophy must be careful not to remain a professor, for only philosoph ers can introduce us to philosophy, just as artists alone can introduce us to art .1 Summing up: the criticisms are made from the plat form that philosophy must not seem artificial to students nor mediating doctrines suspicious, that the form of exposition must not predetermine the issue for the pupil, that the pupil is not ready for conviction or making his mind up until he has been made vividly aware that there is a problem and has some nation of its scope and difficulty, that taking as o n e ’s prob lem the justification of the judgments of common sense is apt to mislead students into an attitude of distrust and scorn, not only toward all historic systems of philosophy, but also toward the very attempt to think clearly about real things. Of course, this attitude will not bring students to advanced 1 Kennedy, ojd. cit., p. 368; see also, R. T. FI sw ell i n g ’s review of Cunningham’s Problems of Philosophy, in The Personalist, 6 : 308, October, 198^. 78 classes in philosophy nor advertise philosophy flatteringly to the general public. And finally, strictly impartial intro ductions to philosophy are too dull to communicate a love of wisdom. Returning to the matter of developing the student’s interest, one sees how easy it is for a reviewer (and a fortiori for the student) to miss the significant continuity of the book as the result of the inevitable form of presenta tion, for the condensation necessary in a text-book calls for unnaturally rigid contrasts between divergent views, and gives the impression of being matter to be committed rather than problems to be grown into and felt. Harking back to the matter of starting point, one finds that if it is pedagogically risky to attempt the justi fication of the judgments of common sense, as Fullerton was criticized for above, it is also reprehensible to start from common sense judgments for the purpose of transcending it, for this generates pseudo-problems which are insoluble and which give philosophy an air of artificiality. The students are said not to be interested in the dialectical difficulties, riddles, and technicalities of idealism, lafoich are external to their lives, but rather in problems which emerge from concrete situations with which they are themselves involved or with which they are familiarly interested, which thus seem worth while to them, and which are capable of solution; such situa- 79 tions as absorbing concrete social conflict or a compelling national crisis, historic or contemporary, tod the way to ijtake such problems emerge from such situations is by a Socratic questioning of the 3tudentfs own attitudes toward life, his stock in hand. This procedure addresses philosophy to life instead of limiting its interests to the bric-a-brac and heir looms of past philosophic housekeeping. The guiding principle is that the beginner1s demands on philosophy are fundamentally the same as the teacher 1 s; and this principle suggests that since the teacher was not content to adopt the viewpoint of another, but considers himself a philosopher by virtue of his having achieved his own understanding of the world and life, so ought he to suit his instruction to the business of aiding each student to achieve his own understanding instead of accept ing the teacherfs outlook or of being unwittingly led to scorn philosophy before he is in a position to judge of its value. For the admitted goal is that the student understand, not that he accept, or make a choice between transparent alternatives, or prematurely scorn philosophical .literature and the clarifi cation of ideas. Comparing this summary with the summary of claims made for the problems approach on page 69, one sees no difference of opinion concerning the objectives to be sought, but con siderable difference in the matter of starting point and development. That is to say, the problems approach is crit icized in its character as an instrument or tool. The attempt to start with problems external to the students miscarries .disastrously, the exposure to greatness really occurs only when the student is in a position to realize the greatness. A program which of set purpose undertakes to justify the judg ments of common sense and takes that as its problem will sat isfy or displease some students just as it satisfies or dis pleases some teachers of philosophy; and the same may be said of the undertaking to transcend common sense in a system of idealism. Only the principle that problems should be elic ited from the student’s own stock in trade and from situations of concrete social conflict or compelling national crisis, his toric or contemporary, remains— elicited by a Socratic ques tioning of the student’s own attitudes toward life. There has been a cancelling out of the various teacher-originating routes of development as leading to results satisfactory, when successful, only to the teacher concerned because flattering to his vanity, and there remains only the general principle that the student follow his own lines of growth to a better understanding of his own attitudes toward life. The problem apparently is to get him to become conscious of those attitudes and of the conflicts possibly involved in his desires, beliefs, theories, knowledge, purposes, and so forth, and then set about clarifying and bringing order into that situation— not into a special problem abstracted from its context in the life of Plato or the history of ureece, or in the life of the teacher. 81 In short, not a problem and process of growth which is teachercentered or book-centered, but one that is student-centered* CHAPTER V PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF THE APPROACH THROUGH A GENERAL SURVEY OF PROBLEMS AND SYSTEMS Under the title of survey of philosophy approach are included works like jLulpe’s which are encyclopedias of phil osophic information; not works which present the whole field of undergraduate special subjects in a b i r d 1 s-eye view* The aims are analogous, but works like n u l p e ’s profess to give a report of the field of philosophy alone, while the usual under graduate orientation course gives a report of non-philosophical fields or of both philosophical and non-philosophical fields* 1* Claims that the survey approach is suited to its purpose. a) In the matter of starting point— engaging the stu d e n t s interest. Kiilpe courageously assumes that he is dealing with the kind of student who is trying to gain some real preparation for the study of philosophy: ...to find out what has been done in the past, to get a vocabulary of technical terms, to understand the reasons for the divergence of the schools, and the significance of the supreme efforts of our own time towards the advancement of philosophical science .1 b) Developing the student’s interest. The process of being introduced to philosophy is a matter of reading and storing in o n e ’s memory the survey of opposing tendencies and changing definitions .1 In this way the student can be better ’’sped upon his course” than by the p approach through a single system. c) Results of the approach— what the student has been introduced t o • Kulpe claims the student has knowledge, a vocabulary, 3 and understanding. The author’s survey of opposing tendencies and changing definitions has inevitably impelled him to indi cate what seems to him to be the probable solution or explica tion of the questions under discussion,4 so that the survey ap proach has something of the stimulating quality of the single system or indoctrinating approach. The understanding is ap parently that, just as the survey has impelled the author who thinks for himself, so will it inevitably impel the student who (he assumes) thinks for himself, to indicate what seems to him to be the probable solution or explication of the ques tions under discussion. 1 Ibi d ., p . 5. 2 Ibid-, p- 4. 3 Loc- cit. 4 Ibid., p. 5. Another result of reading this accurate report of what the main business of philosophy has been in all times is that it alone can correct contemporary judgments that philosophy is nearing its end and stands condemned as a useless superfluity-judgments made in ignorance of what philosophy is and what it m e a n s -1 Summing up: the survey or orientation approach is the approach by formal presentation of facts to be committed in preparation for the student’s subsequent attack on the prob lems of philosophy- Mo mention is made of training the mind> but only of stocking the memory with knowledge and a vocabu lary, and there is assumed to be no difficulty about the re p o r t ’s ability to give the student an ’’understanding” of the reasons for the divergence of the schools, and the signifi cance of the supreme efforts of our pwn time towards the ad vancement of philosophical science- It is asserted that the survey ’’cannot but impel” anyone ’’who thinks for himself” to arrive at a solution of the questions treated- There is here no consciousness that thinking for oneself is done on differ ent levels, some of which are beyond the capacity or the de velopment of given individuals. This possibility is what throws a shadow over the claim that by such a survey alone can contemporary misconceptions of the aim and nature of phil osophy be dispelled. 1 Ibid-, p. 4- 85 2. Charges that the survey approach is not suited its purpose, a) In the matter of starting point— engaging the stu d e n t s interest, Wenley criticizes works of this type on the ground of its "appeal to more advanced students only."'1' Nor should a single book aha to serve both beginners and the advanced, but two kinds of introduction are required: One for beginners and subordinated to the plan of telling ’what is the nature of philosophy, i.e., what is the aim of philosophic thinking, * and de signed to point out the way in which one may one self attain to philosophy...; another to be used on the Jiulpe prescription as a species of tonic by students somewhat more advanced . 2 Mrs. Langer vividly depicts the expectant beginner’s deflation and surrender in face of the mass of material to be covered: The study of philosophy seems enticing to many people...but for the beginner, and the autodidact especially, the subject is almost hopelessly com plicated from the very start by the mass of unorg anized, jumbled material that confronts him. He finds innumerable philosophies, but nothing that he can identify as philosophy; he meets with a crowd of opinions rather than with a body of know ledge. At this point, text-books are of little help, for they all expound these collected opin ions and leave the innocent student to choose be- -** R. M. W e n l e y ’s review of 0. K u lpe’s Introduction to Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 7: 351, May, 1898. 2 Loc. cit. tween doctrines which all sound equally peculiar* If the text-book expresses an opinion, the reader fears that he is being lobbied for one of the con tending factions. Every doctrine is refuted by some other, every problem is solved in half a dozen different ways and yet survives, essentially un solved— the study of philosophy, as it presents itself to the novice, has presumably no end, and certainly no beginning.^ I'he criticism that Bobinson makes of three other types of introduction applies with peculiar force to the survey ap proach; namely, "they do not give any attention at the outset to the student’s own philosophy . " 2 All problems approaches and single system approaches are implicit rejections of the survey approach as too compre hensive for the beginner to cover. b) Development of the student’s interest. Barrett significantly points out that an author’s mere description and exposition of what others think or have thought are not sufficient to introduce "the student to that spirit of reasoned inquiry which is the essential characteristic of all philosophical thinking . " 3 He makes this criticism from the following platform: If there is to be even the beginning of a genuine knowledge of philosophy’s purpose and method it must be won through an expending of effort to under 1 Langer, op. cit., p. ix. 2 Robinson, op. cit., p. 3 Barrett, op. cit., p. v. 8 . stand the significance of problems, to grasp re levant issues, and to deal with them as best one can for oneself. Incidentally, from such effort alone can come not ohly profit, but any enduring interest.! c) Results of the survey approach— what the student has been introduced to. Barrettfs criticism of the results of the survey ap proach deals with the lack of mental training effected; The ever-present hazard confronting introductory or even somewhat advanced courses in the general problems of philosophy lies in the possibility that at their close, students who may feel a cer tain elation at having surveyed so vast an ex panse of human thought nevertheless, in fact may have gained no greater skill in analysis, no in creased ability in rigorous thinking, no heighten ed deftness or subtlety in the treatment of intel lectual issues.^ Hinman has essentially the same criticism to make in his observation: If the teacher throws the emphasis more strongly upon wholes, he may produce a very interesting catalogue of the vagaries of human opinion, but make little impression upon the serious personal thinking of the individual student. His men have then simply been attending a moving-picture ex hibition.3 The California Associates in Philosophy admit that technical vocabulary, employed by the survey, is unavoidable Loc. extt 2 h o c , cit. 3 E. L. Hinman, rfThe Aims of an Introductory Course in Philosophy,” in Journal of Philosophy, 7: 561, October 13, 1910. as for the advanced student* t7For the beginner, however, more essential than the letter is the spirit of philosophy . 71^ They also point out that wstudents misapprehend the o the nature of philosophy in survey or indoctrinating courses . 77 Summarizing: the survey is too advanced for the begin ner; its extent, complexity, and technicality either baffle him or, if he covers the ground, give him a feeling of elation un accompanied by increase of mental power; it does not give any attention at the outset to the student*s own philosophy; its purely expository form challenges only the memory; no lasting impression has been made upon him; he has misapprehended the nature of philosophy. Comparing this summary with the summary of claims for the survey approach on page 75, one sees in the survey approach an example of the doctrine of education as preparation for later activity; also the assumption that students possess greater mental power and cultivation than critics in this country grant to American students. The criticism that the survey approach does not give any attention at the outset to the studentfs own philosophy is based on the assumption that the starting point of any approach must be the student’s own philosophy. The ob jections that the survey approach is too advanced, too extensive, 1 California Associates, o£. cit.» p. ix. 2 Loc. cit. 89 too complicated, too technical for the beginner obviously are based on the principle that the student and not the content or even the teacher is the center of the course and that any approach has to begin with him where he is, proceed with him as he is able, and not set a priori a single goal to be at tained by all students* but consult the general direction and quality of result implicit in each student. CHAPTER VI PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN CLAIMS AND CHARGES CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF THE APPROACH THROUGH SELECTED TYPES OF HISTORICAL SYSTBIS The vehicle of the historical approach is the chrono logical story of all systems and system-makers, that of the single system approach is the single coherent system of one man or one school, that of the problems approach is certain selected problems with indications of their unsolved character in samples of contrasted solutions that have been advanced, that of the survey approach is the complete record of philoso phical activity arranged formally according to divisions of philosophic subject-matter and types of systems, that of the approach through selected types or historical systems is cer tain types of system that recur in every age and represent complement airy points of view which taken together are thought to give a view of the whole* The historical approach and the problems approach emphasize the open character of philosophical questions; the single system approach and types approach dwell on the practical demand to come to definite conclusions* Some advocates of the types approach use "pure” types, simplified for pedagogical purposes, others use historic systems* 1. purpose* Claims that the Types approach is suited to its a) In the matter of starting point— engaging the student’s interest. Hooking shows how the Types approach combines the best and eliminates the worst features of the historical and the problems approaches: By selecting certain types of world-view that re cur in the history of thought, the appalling mul tiplicity of systems is reduced. O n e ’s primary interest is in the validity of the world-view, not in its historic role; we are, in fact, attacking the problems of philosophy for their own sakes. At the same time, we are becoming acquainted with representative thinkers; and under conditions which are, at least in one respect, more favorable than in the historical series. I’or we meet them when our own concern with a given philosophic problem is at its height, and their thought may most readily come to the aid of our ownl In contrast with H o c k i n g ’s ’’pure” Types, Miss Galkins believes that tTthe problems of philosophy are, at the outset, best studied as formulated in the actual systems of great thinkers . ” 2 b) Developing the student’s interest. Miss Calkins sees an advantage in the fact that ’’the historical sequence of philosophies, from Descartes’s to H e g e l ’s 5 seems to coincide, roughly, with a logical order.” This is the period and group of systems she selected for study. 1 Hocking, op. cit., p. ix. 2 Calkins, pp. cit., p. vii. ^ L o c . cit. And this business of following the logical order of the systems she speaks of as "hammering out the meaning of Spinoza, of Kant, 1 or of Aristotle,” of comparing passages to get at their com mon significance or divergence, of estimating the different statements of a philosopher with reference to the date of their formulation, of wforcing the student to take different points of view?” so that he himself overcomes his narrow, dog matic, and uncritical outlook. This, she contends, is any thing but floating around in a sea of vague abstractions. For Hocking the process is one of the student*s.recog nizing one of his beliefs as belonging to a certain Type that he sees it for what it is and for what it leads to. so 3 His job is to follow the exposition. c) Results of the Types approach— what it introduces the student t o • Ualkins view is listed above under b). Hocking lists four results: It is the work of the Types to give us the neces sary means first of self-defense— and then of selfpossession, the discovery of our own affinities in the world of thought, and, at the best, the solu tion of some of our restless questionings .4 1 I b i d ., p. 7. S Loc. cit. 3 hocking, op. cit., p. x. 4 Loc. cit* It is difficult, however, to appreciate the signifi cance of these promises without knowing the situation to which hocking has adapted his method of the Types. He en lightens us as follows: The chief advantage, however, is this: that for the great majority of our people, who are not devoting their lives to the study of philosophy, this way seems best adapted to pick up their thoughts helpfully where they are* Our heads, as readers and listeners, are full of fragments of philosophy, hailing from every quarter* Lvery in structor, whatever his subject,, conveys a philoso phy; the teaching of imglish, of history, of eco nomics, of science is at the same time a teaching of philosophy, if only because the instructor is a man and cannot help communicating himself via his subject. Likewise our editors, our novelists, our preachers and priests, our poets and play wrights, our politicians and men of business, are consciously or unconsciously injecting streams of philosophy into our mental veins. Our unrescued state is one of philosophic confusion: the theories we thus absorb in fragments do not agree. The first step toward sanity is an ability to recognize a pro posed view or belief for what it is, and for what it leads to. It is the work of the Types . . . 1 H o e m l e ' s view is more akin to Miss Galkins*, for he emphasizes the necessity of getting acquainted with other points of view: It is possible to entertain a theory without accept ing it...to hold a theory as an hypothesis and to explore it as such...Without intellectual sympathy it is impossible to acquire genuine philosophical scholarship, and the lack of this is always likely to appear in some narrowness and blindness of o n e ’s own v i ews . 2 1 ibid., pp. ix-x. 2 R. F. H o e m l e , Idealism as a Philosophy, p. 55. Slimming up: the Types approach meets each student where he is by enabling him to place his beliefs in their pro per philosophical setting, so that he sees them for what they are and for what they lead to. The process whereby he does so is a "recognition” of his beliefs in the context of a Type, and this recognition occurs as he follows the author’s exposi tion of the Type in its characteristic reactions to various problems, in this way the student becomes acquainted with re presentative thinkers under very favorable conditions, namely, when his own concern with a given philosophic problem is at its height, and their thought may most readily come to the aid of his own. This is an advantage over the conception of h o e m l e and Calkins, who speak of the student as "forcing" himself to become interested in other viewpoints, with Miss Calkins, too, the student wins his rewards not by "recognizing" his beliefs in a book as his attention is pleasantly led by engaging ex po sit ion, but by hammering out meanings, comparing and evaluat ing them, in the works of the classic philosophers. Again, the student gets what he wants by the Types approach— namely, the answers to his questions, in the approach through historic systems he gets much self-discipline in logical reasoning, and breadth of intellectual sympathy and understanding of the mutually corrective character of different systems. 2. Charges that the Types approach and the approach through historic systems are not suited to their purpose. 95 nocking deals with t?purew Types rather than with his toric systems because the latter have three disadvantages for Mocking*s purpose of enabling students to place their beliefs: We shall be aiming to study pure types, extreme of their kind, and therefore not precisely identical with the outlook of any contemporary mind, which is likely to be sophisticated, composite, *eclectic*, holding a mixture of types in which each view is mitigated by some ingredient from another. These composite philosophies may be nearer the truth than the pure types; but they are (1 ) not so good as types, (2) not so consistent, and (3) not so valu able in finding our bearings. Tor winning our own truth, we would better work with pure colors than with mixtures .1 nocking hardly expects anyone but an initiate to ap preciate the order of succession of his Types ,2 and the ques tion arises whether it is likely that the average student will see more in his book than reviewer Malz saw in Fullerton's 5 book— namely, an array of irreconcilable opinions. uditor S. T. Lamprecht is of this view in the follow ing statement: When an introduction to philosophy tries to a*diieve neutrality and to avoid dogmatism by re viewing all the historic types of philosophy, the outcome is only too often the opinion, as I have heard people say in reminiscence about their undergraduate courses, that *it makes no difference what one believes because all opin- 1 2 3 Hocking, o£. cit., p. 23, note. •> P • xi • GjPid supra, p p .165-66. 96 ions have alike been sponsored by some great thinkers and opposed by others.T Thus courses in philosophy issue too many times in...a confusion that retards fresh inquiry .1 Lafferty makes the following severe criticism of Robinson, whose book, except for a first part, exemplifies the Types approach: Realism and pragmatism are significant not by their opposition to idealism but by their in sistence that problems be solved .2 ...the so-called problems into which Parts II, III, and IV are divided are not real problems. Consequently there are no solutions to them and thus they are given the appearance of eternal problems. They are the dialectical difficulties of idealism. Dialectical difficulties lead only to the bickering evidenced by this book; real problems present goals of cooperative human pro gress . 3 ...conclude on a note of pessimism. Por I can not escape the feeling that the student may very easily finish this text in a confusion of theories and counter-theories, rebuttals and surrebuttals, and with a brief finale, Twell, what of it.f This is accentuated by the very fairness of presentation and by the wealth of detail. Is there no choice but this confusion, or a super ficial eclecticism or the sedative of dogmatism?^ On page 64 above may be found the first part of the platform from which Lafferty makes his criticism. He adds: 1 California Associates, o p . cit., pp. v-vi. 2 Lafferty, o p . cit., p. 221. 3 Ibid.. p. Loc. cit. 220 . But the purpose of that introduction is not the production of technicians in philosophy; the pur pose of that introduction is the production of a civilized and educated philosophy of life.-*The California Associates point out that the lack of preparation of science students is at the root of their scandal at the conflicting answers of philosophy; they do not see that the subjective side of our ideas is as instruc tive as the objective (truth) side. It is not strange then, that the student fre quently emerges from an introductory study of phil osophy, convinced that there is little to it but the clash of competing systems, or a bewildering assortment of intellectual patterns, between which he can only choose in an arbitrary and subjective w a y .2 Carr insinuates that Ho eking fs approach through the Types was inspired in the main by the consideration that "the young people today who take philosophy want credits , " 3 for its gentleness makes it as innocuous as "the general knowledge books of our grandparents* generation, which portrayed the various races of man with their strange but picturesque man ners. The Types, like the races of men, All are equally lovable and each in some way specially commendable. There is certainly 1 Ibid*, p. 2 S1 2 California Associates, o£. cit., p. 381. 3 H. W. Carr*s review of Ho eking *s Types of Philosophy in Personalist, 11: 133, April, 1930. ^ Loc. cit. 98 variety enough yet we feel it could not have been attractiveness of this kind which drew Socrates, Spinoza, and Hegel into the philoso phic path.l Summing up: it is questionable whether the average student will see in the Types approach the author’s intent, and if he does, it is questionable that he will agree that the argument leads him where, for example, Hocking urges, namely, to objective idealism in the last chapter. Garr doubts that this device will lead the student into the phil osophic path, since it bears no analogy to the kind of at tractiveness which drew Socrates, Spinoza, and Hegel into it. Others see either confusion or a superficial eclecticism re sulting from the wealth of detail, the unreal problems, the never-resolved controversy, and retarding fresh inquiry. Sci ence students, by their very training, are unprepared for the variety and discordance of viewpoints in such an approach, and condemn philosophy because not in a position to appreciate the peculiar reason for divergence of opinion. The approach is too gentle to be suited to introduce students to philosophy, and was inspired mainly by the necessity to enable students to get credits by passing the course. These criticisms stem from the following principles: the student ought to see or to be made to see the author’s 1 Loo. cit. intent in employing a device such as a method of approach; the author ought not to try to lead the student to the author’s philosophy; the student ought to be led into the philosophic path, which is not the special systems of Spinoza or Hegel or the specific beliefs of Socrates, but an imitation of the kind of thing they were doing, in consequence of which each developed a system; there must not be such wealth of detail, such unreal problems, and such contrasts of viewpoint as to confuse and bewilder students by reason of their lack of preparation for it, and retard fresh inquiry and condemn philosophy, for they are not yet in a position to judge it; finally, if students must be put in a position to seem to earn credits in philosophy and if this can be done only by adopting a device which is un suited to draw them into the philosophic path, even that is tolerable* Comparing this summary with that on page 85, one sees the following facts emerge: if the Types approach does not square with the kind of attractiveness that drew Socrates, Spinoza, and Hegel into the philosophic path, neither does Miss Calkins’ method of textual study square obviously with the kind of attractiveness that drew Socrates into the phil osophic path. Again, philosophical literature, or the phil osophic remains of historical philosophers, has been dis tinguished from philosophy itself. In other words, it would be a confusion to' identify philosophy with the literary by products of the philosophers. CHAPTER VII PRINCIPLES INVOLVED I N 'CLAIMS AND CHARGES CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF APPROACHES THROUGH FRE-PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT-MATTERS AND DISCIPLINES: SCIENCES, LITERATURE, KULTURGSSCHICHTE, RELIGION, LOGIC The assumption of the historical approach is that when the student has mastered the history of philosophy, he has attained not only the letter but the spirit and understanding of philosophy. The same is true of the single system approach, the problems approach, the survey approach, and the Types approach with respect to the single system, the problems, the survey, and the Types, respectively. Each is an approach to itself through Itself. With the approach through the sciences, however, there is a slight shift in emphasis from the terminus ad quem to the terminus a quo. The problem becomes less one of trying to bring a great subject down to a mean intelligence than of build ing a bridge between the mean intelligence and the great sub ject. Yet even that statement is a bit overdrawn, for the problem is usually taken as a job of building a special sub ject-matter out into leaping distance of philosophic subjectmatter, on the assumption that the student is familiar with the special subject-matter and thus will, with the running start provided by the swift survey of the special subject, 101 easily and triumphantly land in the midst of the philosophic sub ject-matter. And so there are approaches to philosophy through prephilosophic subject-matter, the various academic special fields, and the latter are treated as matrices of philosophic problems— the sciences, religion, history, literature— or in the case of logic, as the technic of philosophy, The center of attention is not what the student is going to end up with, but the aca demic subject-matter as leading out of itself into philosophy or the instrument for appraising phildsophy ; not the immediate attack on philosophic problems, but an account of how they are involved in and emerge from familiar academic subject-matter, or a description or illustration of philosophic procedure. The emphasis is still on subject-matter, but there is a tacit concession of the relative difficulty of different subject-matters and a recognition of the pedagogical value of leading the student from a less difficult subject-matter into a more difficult one, or of arming him for the fray, even at the price of sacrificing a considerable portion of the time that was of old jealously claimed for philosophy alone. In this chapter five kinds of approach through spec ial subject-matters are studied— the approach through the sci-: ences, through literature, and through ■Kulturgeschichte, through religion, and through logic. They have a place in this study because they fall under the plan to treat types of gen- 102 eral introductions which have been tried and discussed in pubi lications# A. The Approach through the Sciences• 1. Claims that the approach through the sciences is suited to its purpose, a) In the matter of starting point— engaging the stud e n t s interest* According to Hudson* s questionnaire study, the advan tage most stressed by advocates of this method is that it enables the teacher to show the inevitableness of the philosophic task, and at the same time to distinguish this task in aim and method from that of the scienees.l A second advantage listed in the same place is that "through an examination of the presuppositions of science" there is possi ble "the opening of an attractive and easy way to the probliems of' epistemology . " 2 b) Development of the studentfs interest* Dotterer says that the student will be led to adopt the genuinely philosophic attitude of calm, unbiased consideration by approaching the problems of philosophy by way of a survey— a survey of the principal achievements and perplexities of the special sciences* An important feature of this survey is that *** Hudson, op. cit., p. 34. 2 Loc. cit. 103 it provides results which are reflected upon and woven together, by comparing many insights, into a world-view, as contrasted with reliance upon "intuitions” or "mystical insights” , or upon authority of book or institution in matters of fact.-1Rohrbaugh commends Dotterer’s stand on this point with the words: "Philosophical investigation, if it is to be ret- spected, must proceed, as far as possible, in terms of accepted facts . " 2 For the same reason, Galkins points to H e g e l ’s scorn of the common view that philosophy consists in the lack of scien tific information and his severe condemnation of the "arm-chair philosophy” vfoich makes of metaphysic a "rhetoric of trivial truths." She follows up with the information that Paulsen’s assertion that philosophy may be reached by way of any one of the sciences is confirmed by the experience of the great philosophers. Des cartes and Leibniz and Kant were mathematicians and physical scientists as well as philosophers; and Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were psychologists . 3 .c) Eesults of the approach thro ugh the sciences— what the student is introduced to. According to Galkins, the approach through the sciences is the student’s only way to avoid certain pitfalls and perils which constitute the peculiar menace of the student of philo- Dotterer, op. cit., pp. 18-20. 2 3 Rohrbaugh, op. cit., p. viii. Calkins, pp. cit., pp. 6-7. 104 sophy: Because the systematic observation of phenomena is the peculiar province not of philosophy, hut of science, the student of philosophy is tempted to deal in vague abstractions, in lifeless generalities, often, alas, in mere bloodless words and phrases* And because he admits that his own study is, at the beginning, a setting of problems, a questioning, not a dogmatic formulation, he is tempted not to press for a solution of his problems, to cherish his ques tions for their own sake* The only way of avoiding both these pitfalls is to approach the philosophical problems by the avenue of scientific investigation, and from time imme morial. the great philosophers have emphasized this truth.! Dotterer notes that the approach through the sciences provides a subject-matter which is less stimulating to the emotions than the approach through problems of religion, and hence is better suited to lead the student "to adopt the genu inely philosophic attitude of calm, unbiased consideration * " 2 Rohrbaugh follows up with the observation that the natural outcome of the approach made on the basis of the spe cial sciences is ...a better understanding of the universe and of the various types of values involved in human rela tionships— not only as a goal in itself but also and chiefly as a means to greater appreciation and happiness.*^ 1 I b i d .. P- 6. P Dotterer, ojd. cit., p. 18. 3 Rohrbaugh, o p . cit., p. viii. 105 Robinson sees a valuable result in.the approach through the sciences in that it "brings out the relation of philosophy to the other aspects of culture with which the student is pre sumably more familiar."*** Burnham and Wheelwright speak of the discovery of the basic terms and propositions in each realm of discourse as an objective of philosophy, and indicate the scope of an introduc tory study with respect to this activity as follows: It is probably already clear that the discovery of these terms and propositions is extremely difficult, and that complete success is scarcely to be hoped for. In fact an introductory study can do little more than indicate the type of problem that arises . 2 Summing up: the approach through the sciences relates philosophy to other aspects of culture with which the student is presumably more familiar; exhibits the inevitableness of the philosophic task; provides in opposition to unaided common sense the only respectable basis of a world-view; proceeds by system atic comparison of many insights in the light of tested facts instead of by single "intuitions" or "mystical insights" or by authority of book or institution; in so doing, follows the ex ample of the great philosophers; avoids dealing with lifeless generalities and words, and the cherishing of questions for ques tions* sake instead of pressing for a solution; leads the stu dent to adopt the genuinely philosophic attitude of calm, un- 1 Robinson, pjo. cit., p. 7. 2 Burnham and Wheelwright, op>. cit., p. 21. 106 biased consideration by having subject-matter less stimulating to the emotions than problems of religion would be; leads natur ally to a better understanding of the universe and of the var ious types of values involved in human relationships— not only as a goal in itself but also and chiefly as a means to greater appreciation and happiness; indicates the type of problem that arises in the search for the basic terms and propositions of the various realms of discourse. 3. Charges that the approach through the sciences is not suited to its purpose. According to H u d s o n ’s questionnaire study, objections to this method are more outspoken and specific than to any of the others discussed. Hudson says further: No one considers this, taken by itself, a good mode of approach for the average class, although some think it commendable for students with spe cialty scientific preparation. Nevertheless, as many as twelve out of thirty-five deem it a valu able auxiliary method .1 Serious specific objections listed in H u d s o n ’s question naire study are as follows: a) Students are not at the outset interested in the presuppositions of science. b) Their knowledge of the sciences is too limited, except in isolated cases; for the special student in the sciences, who would be qualified, rarely cares anything about philosophy. 1 Hudson, Q£. cit., p p . 33-34. 107 e) The problems aroused by science soon suffer from abstractness# dj ...the very worst method, for it brings preco city and conceit .1 Dotterer points out that there are those who believe that the approach through the sciences is misleading, for ...science is on the wrong track. In particular, they hold, science has gone wrong in the matter of evolution. And, in general, these good people would condemn all conclusions of science which do not square with the letter of the biblical narra tives .2 Anyhow, these persons continue, reflecting and dis coursing on the results of the sciences is an inadequate method of arriving at a satisfactory view of reality: They seem to feel that science is able, after all, to give us but a superficial and inadequate view of things; and they hope, by means of "faith” or "intuition” or some kind of mystic insight, to gain a more satisfactory apprehension of reality than science gives us.^ Robinson criticizes the narrow outlook of this ap proach: A philosophy which is departmental in its basis and outlook is likely to result, such a philoso phy ignores the central problems, and falls short of that total interpretation of all aspects of culture which constitutes the heart of philosophy .4 1 L o c . cit. 2 Dotterer, op. cit.» p. 18. ® Ibid., p . 19. 4 Robinson, ojd. cit.» p. 7. 108 Calkins warns of the misunderstanding that imports scientific methods into philosophy: But though metaphysics may be approached from any point on the circumference of the sciences, it is not to be denied that certain inconsistencies and even fallacies have often characterized the sys tems of mathematicians and natural scientists who turn to philosophy. It is equally certain that these defects have been due to a confusion of sci entific with philosophic ideals, of scientific with metaphysical standards .1 Ward criticizes the approach through the sciences in one case for its "omission of systematic discussion of the social sciences."^ Summary: The principles on which these criticisms are based are the beliefs that an approach must start from what the student is interested in, what he already has know ledge of, and what does not soon suffer from abstractness; that an approach must not be narrowly restricted to one field of human interest; that an approach must not tend to permit or encourage confusion by the student of scientific ideals and standards with philosophic ideals and standards; that the beliefs of students, if in keeping with the tenor of the ap proach employed, will permit their participation in the ap proach, but if out of sympathy with the starting point,and truth standard of the approach, will preclude their participa tion in the approach; that precocity and conceit in the student ^ Calkins, op. cit., p. 7. 2 P. W. W a r d Ts review of R. H. Dotterer’s Philosophy by Way of the Sciences, in Journal of Philo sophy, 27: 303-304 May 22, 1930. 109 vtfho has learned them as the result of following an approach to philosophy marks that approach as the very worst, and ut terly unsuited to its purpose. uomparing this summary with that on page 96, one marks as salient facts the identity or the clashes of subjectmatters and methods which different students are interested in with the subject-matter or method of the science approach; and the consequent promise or failure of the approach. B. The approach through literature, a) Philosophical literature. The word "literature” in this connection is not ordi narily taken in an honorific sense. Bakewell, who in the pre face to his Source Book in Ancient Philo sophy suggests these readings as a possible substitute for the usual history text, evidently is thinking of philosophical literature in general, without discriminating between the felicitous and the crabbed. iMicholson, one-half of whose new introductory text is made up of readings, also has in mind only the writings of philosophers by profession, but he selects from their works also on the basis of their literary quality. "An introductory course,” he says, “in which the student does not actually read for himself from the great philosophers never seems entirely s a t i s f a c t o r y . A n d the possible reason for this is that phil 1 Bieholson, ojd. cit., p. viii. osophers are never more humanly appealing and inspired in ut terance than when, like other people, they show themselves deeply concerned and with their peace of* mind at stake over a familiar kind of ultimate problem, for invariably in sueh moving passages there is question of the p h i l o s o p h e r s almost staggering realization of the issues involved in a problem he has just had forced upon his attention, or in a solution at which he finds he has arrived, iuid if the student rails to see the philosophers in such moments, as the saying is, "with their hair down,H but only in their moments of dispassionate dissection of philosophic cadavers, their spade-work of textual study, their myopic grubbing of facts, or even their Jovian rendering of a decision, he is not likely to be inspired by the study of philosophy, for he fails to see that it makes a deeply felt difference to philosophers themselves. Collingwood expresses these sentiments in discussing the essential sameness of the philosopher’s interest with that of his reader; an interest in the process of self-dis covery: ...the difference between the w r i t e r ’s position and the reader’s, which is b o clear in historical literature, and is the cause of its didactic man ner, does not exist in the literature of philoso phy. rhe philosophers who have had the deepest: instinct for style* have repeatedly shrunk from adapting the form of a lecture or instructive ad dress, and chosen instead that of a dialogue in which the work of self-criticism is parcelled out among the dramatis personae, or a meditation in which the mind communes with itself, or a dia- in: lectical process where the Initial position is modified again and again as difficulties in it come to light. Common to all these literary forms is the notion of philosophical writing as essentially a con fession, a search by the mind for its own fail ings and an attempt to remedy them by recogniz ing them .1 ‘ Phis community of feeling and likeness of human con cern in philosopher and reader alike is what Will Durant had in mind as the natural starting point of philosophy for the beginner, when he wrote: We too have had the experiences they had, but we did not suck those experiences dry of their secret and subtle meanings: we were not sensi tive to the overtones of the reality that hum med about us. Genius hears the overtones, and the music of the spheres; genius knows what Pythagoras meant when he said that philosophy is the highest m u s i c .2 He conceives the beginner’s progress in philosophy as dependent upon the author’s maintaining that bond of sympa thy with the reader even as its complexion is changed by ad miration for the philosopher’s greater vision and power, and the reader finally attains to understanding: We shall see it (philosophy) not in its shrivelled abstractness and formality, but clothed in the liv ing form of genius; we shall study not merely phil osophies, but philosophers; we shall spend our time 1 R. G. Collingwood, J&l Essay on Philosophical Me t h o d , p. 210. p Durant, o p . cit., p. 5. 11© with the saints and martyrs of thought, letting their radiant spirit play about us until per haps we too, in some measure, shall partake of what Leonardo called ’’the noblest pleasure, the joy of understanding.”l While there is no certainty that the two-hundred percent increase in the sales of the philosophical classics after the publication of Durant’s Story gwas due exclusively to the interest aroused in philosophy by the Story, there is very likely what has been cautiously termed a positive cor relation present. The correlation, in most general terms, was between the number of copies both of Durant’s Story and of the philosophical classics, and an important ephemeral public interest in literature of the biographical and out line kinds— biography being philosophy in its very first and very last stages, its most humanly appealing stages, and out lines suggesting the royal road to knowledge and wisdom. T o r Windelband, however, literary excellence has the magic power of making the middle stage of professional phil osophizing intelligible to the beginner, of bringing it down to earth: The truth is that it is not so much the difficulty . of philosophy as the poor literary standard of phil osophical writers which perplexes the student. They cannot liberate themselves from academic formulae 1 I b i d .» p. 4. ^ Ibid., p. xii. us;; and attain a free and living contact with the thought of their time .1 However, Windelband goes on in the same passage to de fend the right of the philosopher to develop his own t e m i n o l o g y and concludes that one of the jobs of an introduction is to ac quaint the beginner with that terminology. Fuller agrees that Y/indelband’s Introduction is a work beautifully done, philosophically and literarily, but questions the pedagogical power of the literary magic evidenced: On the other hand, we believe it would be dif ficult to interest the average college Freshman or Sophomore, or even to make it understood by them.^ Windelband, of course, wrote his book for the educated German layman, and in the light of this fact, known to Fuller,; the following passage takes on the significance of the principle that a text-book is to be adapted to "the children" and not the children to the text-book: Perhaps this aim was not in the author’s mind. There are numerous distressed professors of philosophy who would, however, welcome such a book. We scarcely know whether to blame philosophy, the philosophers or the children. In the light of our own early college experi ence we are prone to sympathize with the children and to wait in h o p e . 3 It is in the discriminating light of such a principle Windelband, ojd. cit., p . 15. 2 B'.. TA-FlewellYng’s review of Windelband’s Introduction to Philosophy, in Personalist, 5: 67, January, 1984. 3 Loc. cit. 114 that the blanket claims for the value of philosophical clas sics such as the following one of Miss Calkins must be under stood: I cannot, indeed, too emphatically eapress my sense of the value of a study of texts, and my conviction that this Introduction, and any other should be used to supplement and not to supplant a reading of the philosophers.^And that of Robinson: In studying philosophy it is essential to go to the original sources .2 The dangers of indiscriminate reading or of requiring beginners to do reading indiscriminatingly in the philosophical classics are recorded by Paulsen in the following: More than once I have in later life made this same observation that the value of a certain book to a certain reader does not depend alto gether on its intrinsic importance, but quite as much on the fact that he happens to come across it at the right time. No matter how valuable in itself, if read before the proper time a book may become a serious impediment to further progress# K a n t ’s three Critiques have that effect, I fear, only too frequently. They are likely to repel the beginner, leav ing in his mind nothing but the impression that he is unfit for philosophy. That is why I deem myself lucky in having come upon the books I mentioned— L a n g e ’s "History of Material ism," Uber w e g ’s "Logic," and B e n e k e ’s works— at just the right m o m e n t . 3 1 Calkins, o£. cit., p. viii. 2 Robinson, 0 £. cit., p. 567. 3 Friedrich Paulsen, Friedrich Paulsen, An Autobiography, p. 188. 11‘5 Collingwood develops this key-idea of the exclusive appropriateness of student-centered reading plans in the fol lowing words: ..•in philosophy no one can get much good by read ing the works of a writer whose problems have not already arisen spontaneously in the reader’s mind. Admitted to the intimacy of such a m a n ’s thought he cannot follow it in its movement, and soon loses sight of it altogether and may fall to condemning it as illogical or unintelligible, when the fault lies neither in the wri t e r ’s thought nor in his expression, nor even in the reader’s capacities, but only in the reader’s preparation, if he lays down the book, and comes back to it ripened by several years of philosophical labour, he may find it both intelligible and convincing. These are the t^ro conditions on which alone a reader can follow or understand a philosophical writer: one relating to the reader’s aesthetic or literary educa tion or his fitness to read books in general, the other to his philosophic education as fitting him to read this particular book.3if lack of preparation, in this very wide sense of limited stage of development with respect to a particular book, is an unsurmountable obstacle to intelligibility in the reading of books (including text-books), which may be put away for future re-reading, it is all the more serious in the case of the oral devices of lecturing, reciting, and even discussion, for here the meanings are gone with the wind, and make no contact with problems spontaneously arising in the reader’s mind a year or two hence# 1 uollingwood, o£. cit., p. 216. 1*6 In the light of the principle stated above, then, which is simply the old apperception principle or still more ancient Scholastic aphorism, quicquid recipitur in recipiente recipitur ad modum recipientis, the principle of reading in the philosophical classics is significantly qualified, as is also Robinson’s well-meant advice in the matter of having stu dents write themes on the basis of readings in philosophical literature, and his suggestion that promising students cooperate ■i in the imitation of good models of the dialogue form. Paulsen issues the reminder that it is possible for the student to train himself in the "art of intelligent read ing.” This process, unfortunately for students victimized by the attitude that knowledge and understanding are effects pro duced in them by causes emanating from a point outside them, is self-initiated and self-sustained; an active and not a pas sive affair: I carefully perused, pen in hand, the entire series of P l a t o ’s Dialogues...The dialogue form, unlike the systematic form of presentation, does not enable the reader to grasp the purport of the discussion and the organization of its contents without any further effort on his own part, but compels him to work it.out for himself by paying close attention to the drift of the discourse and also to the little hints, which are not lacking, regarding the significance of the individual parts and their connection. There could be no better training in the art of intelligent reading . 2 1 Robinson, o p . cit., pp. 567 ff. 2 Paulsen, o p . cit. , p. 190. 1X7 The "pen in hand" is not only the symbol but the agency of growing intelligence: In a biological laboratory much can be seen with a lead-pencil. The same is true in philosophical studies .1 Reading with pen in hand would be a means of the stu d e n t ’s self-protection against indoctrination if the pen were a symbol of critical reflection to him; but it might also be merely a symbol of selectivity controlled by a specific task of class-room routine; and again it might be a symbol of pride in presuming to find fault with the expression or opinions of an author rather than in trying to discover his real meaning. So that there is no sure-fire virtue in it any more than there is in any other device. Intelligence is needed. .And guidance. Where Durant earlier used the language of sympathy and common concern of the student with the philosophers, Hudson uses a strong figure: Philosophers since Plato have not been greatly en cumbered with a literary style, and.philosophy proper can very well do without it. But an intro duction to philosophy can not. in introduction to philosophy, in the very nature of its task as de fined, should be a seduction 'to philosophy . 2 As effective elements of the process he instances the poetic imagination, dramatic instinct, pathos, ridicule, humor, “I p Hinman, op. cit., p. 568. I. W. Hudson, "Hegel’s Conception of an Introduction to Philosophy," in Journal of Philo sophy, 6 : 352, June 10, 1909. 118 satire, and keenest sarcasm of H e g e l ’s Phanomenologie. The question of the place of such methods in an introductory course has been taken up in connection with the discussion of indoc trination and special pleading in the chapters on the approaches through a single system, through the problems of philosophy, and will be treated in the next chapter. Other critics have taken up the matter of the appropri ateness of the very familiar manner in "telling” philosophy to beginners, two instances will suffice. Youtz notes that Larrabee has chosen an exciting central theme— the relation of philosophy, religion, and science— and expects it to produce an exciting book. But the subject loses all edge under his mono tonously chatty treatment. The book lacks the 1 dramatic essence' of philosophy which is thought. The other reviewer, D. M . , brings to light a point missed by Brightman in his joust with Fuller in the Personalist: No doubt it is a relief to substitute the refresh ing familiarities of professor Full e r ’s style for the dry, pedantic mannerisms of the academic tra dition. But in being entertained a student is not necessarily being instructed. There is danger that the very ingenuity of the* illustrations may cause him to lose track of t h e .argument, or that too much familiarity of stjrie may breed contempt for the content . 2 1 P. N. Y o u t z ’s review of H. A. Larrabee’s What Philo so phy i s . in Jo u m a l of Philo sophy, 26: 220, April 11,” 1§2¥^ 2 D. Bi.’s review of puller’s History of Philo sophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 35: 464, August 18, 1938. 119 This criticism stems from a principle which uollingwood expresses by saying that in the use of metaphors or imagery "the philosophical writer in especial follows the trade not of a jeweller but of a lens-grinder,"..."using them just so far as to reveal thought, and no farther."^- Dut the further signifi cance of Dm M . ’s criticism is that metaphors and imagery that are effective and transparent on one level of mentality become problems and distractions and occasions of witless perversion on a lower level, as is instanced in the field of music by "Swing" versions of Brahms* "Lullaby" as "Mr. Brahms Rocks the Cradle," and of Bach as "Mr. Bach Boes to Town." Assuming that the reader has a book which he is pre pared to read and desirous of reading, his first task becomes one of "using his activity to follow where he is led," 2 sub mitting to "the discipline of following the authorTs thought and reconstructing in himself the point of view from which it proceeds." Then, "Since the p h i l o s o p h e r s experience con sisted in, or at least arose out of, the search for truth, we must ourselves be engaged in that search if we are to share the experience." 1 4- But Uollingwood, o p . cit., pp. 214-215. S Ibid. , p. 215. 5 Ibid., pp. 218-219. 4 Ibid., pp. 215-216. 120 •..the attempt to comprehend without criticizing is in the last resort a refusal to share in one essential particular the experience of the writer; for he has written no single sentence, if he is worth reading, without asking himself fis that true? *, and this critical attitude to his own work is an essential element in the experience which we as his readers are trying to share .1*1 Accordingly, "Comprehension is inseparable from criticism in the sense that the' one necessarily leads to the other, and p reaches its own completion only in that process." "The critic must therefore work from within, His negative position is based on his positive."^ In sum, philosophical literature, to be effective as a teaching tool, must be selected on the basis of its intel ligibility and interest to the student, and the criterion of its suitability is'the prior spontaneous arising of problems in the mind of the student to which he recognizes the book as relevant and sympathetic and helpfully addressed, helpful in reasonable proportion to the effort required to understand it. The sympa thy is significantly a recognition by the student of a concern which he shares with the writer of the book— a need to under stand a common'problem. Problems as things which the philoso phic enterprise is concerned with are difficulties felt by 1 Ibid., p. 217. 2 ibid., p. 218. 3 Ifria*. P* 219. 121 minds, so that the task of finding suitable philosophic litera ture for beginners is a task of finding literature which answers to the difficulties felt by the individual minds concerned, on the various levels at which answers are seen by them to be answers to their difficulties, buch literature is of the nature of a confidant who anticipates or suggests, from his own experi ence, the expression of the reader's problem and talks with prop er concern and assurance about it. of the reader is demanded attention or active following of the self-revelation, but this interest cannot survive a didactic tone or unsympathetic treat ment, and may be wholly diverted from philosophic to other chan nels by a manner whose very familiar tone is misinterpreted, but assuming a continuity of sympathetic effort to understand the writer, the completion of the reader’s task is the adapta tion of the writer's experience and self-study to his own prob lem in its context in his own life, xhis is the point at which he decides what of the author’s story is applicable— true— to himself. What is helpful to the student is not the mere recital by the author of the conclusions he and other thinkers have come to, but the revelation of the process by which the prob lem was progressively clarified and understood. Ihe reader judges the conclusions by the reality and justice, to him, of the mind-process that led to those conclusions. Understanding is a business of his seeing sense in the way the author arrived at his position. In contradistinction to science, which "deals with those questions the answer to which we can he content to take at second hand," W. A. Brown points out, philosophy "deals with those questions the answer to which each man must give for himself."**' Or as Collingwood puts it, "What we demand of the historian is the product of his thought; what we demand of the p philosopher is his thought itself." People trust the logic which their battle with life up to date has equipped them with, whether that logic is the habit of scientific research or the habit of divining the motives of persons they have to deal with or any other attitude and way of handling the peculiar lifesituation facing them. b) Through the great literatures. The approach to philosophy through the great literatures or through any period or genre of literature was declared, by one-third of the replies received in a questionnaire study in volving thirty-five teachers of philosophy, to be "a valuable means among others, especially if used judiciously and discrimi natingly . " 3 1 W. A. Brown, "The Future of Philosophy as a University Study," in Journal of Philosophy, 18: 677-678, December 8 , 1921. s Collingwood, op. cit., p. 211. See also B. Blanshard* review of Leighton’s The Field of Philo sophy, in Journal of Philosophy. 21: 362, June 19, 1924. 3 J. W. Hudson, "The Aims and Methods of Introduction Courses; A Questionnaire," in Journal of Philo sophy, 9: 35, January 18, 1912. 122 Its specific use, according to several, is to relate the history of philosophy to the total life of a people; according to others, its value is in furnishing material and food for thought along the line of special problems under discussion.-** Its special significance is that it represents a re action to the teaching of formal philosophy to beginners: It is a shame to have students break their heads over conceptions and systems and imagine that is philosophy the first thing. It is a piece of good luck if they get through it all with a taste left for philosophy . 2 The disadvantages listed are not deterrent: Most literature is not philosophic enough— or is so diffuse that a beginner loses sight of the, philosophical problem. Most of those who affect literature seem to be usually devoid of philosophic interest. ...do not produce any adequate preparation for more advanced w o r k .3 Hudson urges more study of this approach, as he had done three years earlier in another article in which he pointed out the pedagogical value of this feature of H e g e l fs Phanomenologie, which ...searches out the philosophical meaning in volved in great literary masterpieces— master pieces in which the man of average culture is *** Ibid • * P • 3 4 . 2 ibid.•, p « 5 5 . 3 Loc. cit. already interested for their o m sakes. There is a happy tendency of late to connect philoso phy and literature in certain introductions. It is conspicuous in P e r r y ’s ’’Approach.” But they might be connected with a still more pre cise and significant method than has yet been attempted.! Brown points out that every teacher of literature who is worth his salt is doing just this very thing, G. p The approach through Kulturgeschichte. In this approach the attempt is made to show that the history of science, morality, art, religion, and political life in short, the history of institutions— is to be found inter preted and evaluated in the history of philosophy, and accord ingly provides the best stepping-stone to philosophy. The a p proach is an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the mere history of philosophy as a pedagogical method. See the discus sion of uushman on page 7 of this study. Hudson lists as advantages of this approach that it prevents students from mistaking philosophy to be ’’intellectual gymnastics performed in v a cuo,” it leads him to philosophy through familiar highways, and ”philosophy can best be made to emerge from a consideration of. the metaphysical implications J. W. Hudson, ’’H e g e l ’s Conception of an Introduction to Philosophy,", in Journal of Philosophy, 6 : 35E, June 10, 1909 ^ Brown, oj>. oit., p. 679 125 of the history of institutions .” 1 The familiarity of the student with history in the in clusive sense is predicated on the grounds a) that "history is a part of the student's curriculum from the grammar school" and is generally elected in college; b) that "history is in trinsically interesting to the average man;” c) that ”it is indirectly communicated through countless channels, through novels, poetry, newspapers, and conversation;” and finally, d) that politics is ”a perennial topic of conversation and a p quadrennial topic of agitation. Such an approach would be "psychologically adequate” 5 because made ”by way of a natural and cultivated interest.” And it would also be "philosophically adequate,” because the reader would ”be effectively introduced to that to which we wish to introduce him. 4 Of all the conceptions of what the introductory course should aim at, "there is one purpose among these purposes in dispensable to the attainment of any one of the rest, namely, the purpose of developing the power of spontaneous philosophic thinking . ” 5 1 J ♦ W. Hudson, "The Aims and Methods of Introduction Courses; A Questionnaire,” in Journal of Philosophy, 9: 35, January 18, 1912. 2 J . W. Hudson, "An Introduction to Philosophy through the Philosophy in History,” in Journal of Philosophy, 7: 571, October 13, 1910. 3 Ibla., p. 572. 4 Loc, ait. 5 Ibid., p. 573. 126 Philosophy has always arisen from conerete situations of absorbing social conflict or a compelling national crisis, or the like, ihid once the student has become accustomed not merely to philosophize, but to find life as he knows it and cares for it the subject-matter of his philosophizing, h© surely is effectively in troduced to the sine qua non of philosophy: phil osophy is indeed to him a life and all is grist for- the philosophic mill. Hot only history but contemporary events assume a new meaning .1 It is apparently a cruel thing to point to facts which would deflate such enthusiasm, yet Hudson himself concludes his article with an important obeisance to the facts but a commend able insistence upon the psychological principle he has.laid down. The facts and principle enunciated by Bakewell above on pages 31 and 37 together with the comment of this study, sug gest important limitations to H u d s o n fs projected approach through Kulturgeschichte. But Hudson regards the fact of the possible mis-choice of Kulturgeschichte as a method as something to be corrected by his very principle; he does not regard the method as the only way to introduce students to philosophy. My main desire is to emphasize by an illustration, which could well enough have been otherwise, cer tain conditions which any adequate introduction-to philosophy should observe and which none adequately do observe--principally the condition of connecting philosophy vitally with the studentfs average interest. Whether that interest be named as history, or litera ture, or football, or comic opera, or law is of course an important question of fact: but the paramount thing is to introduce him through his interests, whatever they are. Loc. cit. This for two reasons: first, because a m a n ’s mind w o n ’t let you introduce him in any other way; and second, because the very best service you can do for the good fortunes o f m e t a p h y s i c s is to show that it is not an abstraction snatched from the upper air, but. , .an abstraction working in and through life and so no mere abstraction at all . 1 The first of the reasons given above has to do with the student’s getting some good out of philosophy; the second, with the advertising he will give of philosophy to the public. They mark the bed-rock of principle on which the question of the suitability of methods of approach to philosophy may be dis cussed. Close at hand, of course, there is the quicksand level of planning the course for credits. With H u d s o n ’s treatment of the approach through Kulturgeschichte, the approach shifts from the original plan of tieing in a special academic subject-matter with technical phil osophy to the frank standpoint that in the last analysis it is not a question of linking subject-matters but a question of per sonal interests to be served, whatever their nature; and that the job to be done is a business or rinding material which will be provocative of philosophic thinking because it involves mat ters of personal concern to students at each o n e ’s stage of development. Hudson says this in a passage which he believes justly describes kulturgeschichte, and no doubt he was right— with reference to himself: 1 Xbid., p. 574 128 Every philosopher recognizes that philosophy grows out of the demands of life: the best way to introduce philosophy to living men is to lead them to discover it as implied in l i f e ,1 The point is that there are no demands in general just as there is no life in general and no average student, The demands of life are the demands operative in each personTs life, and the complexion and emphasis is different in each case. D. The approach through religion. Hudson indicates that none of the thirty-five teachers of philosophy who contributed to his questionnaire study relied on this approach alone. But several claimed, on the basis of experience, that the "best way to a realization of the meaning of philosophy is through the religious interest. Through this, they find, is best reached the life and thinking of the majorit^." Dotterer concurs that the interest in problems of reli gion is deep and widespread. "When religious questions are broached in the classroom, they are found, as a rule, to arouse intense interest." He considers it a helpful pedagogical device to show the analogy or logical connection between theological * and philosophical issues. 1 Ibid., p. 572. 2 J. W. Hudson, "The Alms and Methods of Introduction Bourses; A Questionnaire," in Journal of Philo sophy, 9; 56, January 18, 1912. Dotterer, o p . oit., p. 18. 139 His / objections to the method reveal that he believes philosophizing should not he attempted until the student is ready and able to make the approach through the sciences in mature fashion, according to scientific method* His objec tions are that .the emotional stirrings aroused by problems of religion are an impediment to the genuinely philosophic at titude of calm, unbiassed consideration, and should be used sparingly to arouse and to maintain interest in the drier problems of philosophy .1 His answers to religious objections to the approach through the sciences are given above on page 95. E. The approach through, logic. By the approach through logic is not meant the course in logic which traditionally was, and widely is, prefaced to other courses in philosophy proper; but rather the course in which logic is identified with philosophy or is summarily con ferred upon the student, much as a rifle is conferred upon the hastily conscripted war recruit, so that with this weapon he may immediately take issue with the problems of philosophy, all in one semester. Langer's conception of philosophy as a practice of seeing possibilities of interpretation rather than demolish2 ing literal propositions sharply marks it off from the older 1 L o c . cit. 2 Langer, op. c i t ., p. x. 150 formal logic. To this end she offers fta fairly extensive study of the logic of relations, which supplies a powerful instrument of metaphysical thought, and is, incidentally, the most elementary, restricted, and definite philosophical sci ence.”^ L a n g e r ’s position is that certain ...preliminary questions must he answered before we can even inquire intelligently into the great mysteries, such as the relation of body and mind, the structure of the world, or the nature of G o d .2 To the objection of nmany an experienced teacher 11 that tfto require logic as propaedeutic to metaphysics would kill the student’s interest and joy in the whole subject,” she replies bravely that this is ...probably true of the disinclined and indifferent student...for the pupil who must be cajoled into his study, anything as fundamental as relational logic is superfluous, for he will never use it; he will at best acquire a learned vocabulary and repeat some of the strange propositions he has heard. The serious beginner, however, will be quite satis fied to commence with a science that is recommended to him as an instrument of personal understanding... We do not ask whether the student (of physics) would not prefer to begin with engineering instead of geometry . " 3 The method of philosophy is logical analysis, which is to philosophy what observation is to science— "namely, the first 1 Log* o L o o , cit. 3 Ibid., p p . x-xi. 131 step in finding and formulating a problem and a means of test ing the answer .” 1 It is the only way ”to bring all things under clear concepts.. .whose rational connection with each other beg stows rhyme and reason upon the whole world.” The philoso p h e r ’s program is to find some concepts- tfso general that every thing in the world exemplifies them, that all things may be re3 lated by means of them.” By perfecting we transcend the tech nique of discerning structures everywhere, with their limita4 tions and points of view, and finally are prepared to read the history of philosophical systems not for the purpose of believ ing the strange doctrines met there, but for the pleasure of contemplating their conceptual content .5 Philosophy is practice in discerning structures and relations of progressively greater generality and inclusiveness and clarity. The Columbia Associates address their logic to the ”aveage man,” and endeavor to make clear to him ”the importance of thought in a life which is interested in the selection of the best.” 6 They recognize at the outset the very wide variation 7 in human ability to think, and admit that their book ”cannot 1 Ibid., P- 37. 2 Ibid., p. 53. 3 Loc. cit. 4 Ibid., p. 316. 5 I b i d ., p. 221. 6 Columbia Associates in philosophy; L. Buexmeyer, W. F. Cooley, An Introduction to Reflective Thinking, p. 15. 7 I bid., pp. 6 f f . expect to make men think, but it may make them desire to do so and aid them in their effort. This book is written to emphasize the part which thought plays in the formation of beliefs, and to stimulate its readers to a more lively real ization of the road to a more congenial world which lies open to those who do think. It hopes to point out some of the workings of thought and the habits of mind which- those who desire to par ticipate in the enterprise of knowing should culti v a t e .2 The method of treatment is by illustrations taken from the history of scientific and philosophic investigations: "Por the accomplishment of its purpose the book follows the method of presenting contrasting solutions of a series of problems.” 3 This is claimed to be ffa new approach” to the end sought by the older fomaal logic— "the increase of thought and the Im provement of its quality . ” 4 By watching the thought game of some of the masters perhaps the rules which they used will be better understood and followed by the novices than they could be if the rules were all read to gether in the "Laws of Thought.” The older socalled formal logic seems strangely technical -and remote to the student of the present d a y .5 in short, logic is presented inductively to the student, 1 Ifria. p. 16. s Ibid. p. 15. 3 Ibid. p. 16. 13Sor rather it is not presented at all but is exhibited in con texts and is given to the student as the problem of finding the inferential structure and research habits implicit in the accounts of model scientific and philosophic investigations* The selections are chosen to illustrate the steps in -Dewey’s analysis of how we think. tfMueh of the material which logic has treated in a formal way is shown in a setting so concrete and real as to bring it near to the actual thinking of the reader.” The authors are under no illusion as to the adequacy of reading or listening to an account of how we think, whether illustrative or merely descriptive. p practice in reflection. They insist upon abundant This illustration of critical reflection at work on vital themes is advocated by Adams and the other California Associates in their text, Knowledge and Society, Having in mind the majority of philosophy students, who do not pursue the subject beyond the preliminary stages and for whom the initial view of philosophy remains the final view, and not wishing them to misapprehend the nature of philosophy in survey or indoctrinating courses, the authors purposed to ex hibit its peculiar relevancy to the major tasks of human civili zation aside from recondite thoughts and reflections which h o c , cit, s Ifria.. p. 342. 134 demand sustained professional study.^ Its approach is that which historically has been the approach of all great instances of significant philosophical reflection, namely, current problems which force themselves insistently on the attention of thoughtful people. It assumes...that philosophy is not one subject-matter among many, but the art of reflection when reflection is thorough, sustained, and aware of its far-reaching implications. Philoso phy is not correlative with physics, theology, poli tics, or economics. Rather it is the sophisticated and subtle treatment of any subject-matter...Courses in philosophy can hardly add to a student’s informa tion in the way in which courses in physics and economics do (unless the courses in philosophy happen to be concerned with the history of philosophy); but they may help to show our physical and social problems in their human setting and may help to reveal how all our physical social investigations bear upon the mature and wise conduct, of an integrated l i f e .2 In the light of this extended passage it becomes clear that the objective of this approach is not more facts but the development of a habit of mind: love for the intellectual life,” "to cultivate in students a 3 ”the habit and enjoyment of reflection.”4' Information about philosophical principles and system atic points of view in the traditional literature "occurs here in the discussion of subject-matters that are of current im port to American students; it is part of the technique of 1 Ibid * 9 P • vii. 2 Ibid., p. v. rz 4 L o c . cit. > p* procedure rather than the end of investigation . ” 1 The book is a survey,, but not a survey in the sense of an encyclopedia of factual information about philosophical problems and systems. It is a !,reflective survey of m o d e m * civilization” whose objective is ”to show that a thoughtful approach to contemporary culture is at the same time a humane introduction to philosophy.” a Nicholson also conceives his Introduction as a ” suc cession of illustrations of philosophy understood” not as a system of ideas to be contemplated or to be memorized but an activity in which to participate... a movement rather than a monument. The purpose of the movement is to bring to clearer consciousness the vague ideas in the background of our thinking that give direction to our activities, theoretical or practical # 3 Burnham and Wheelwright conceive philosophy as an at titude and a technique .4 The attitude is synoptic as opposed to the specialized attitudes of investigators in particular fields, and its problem is set by the illegitimate extension of ideologies outside their own realms of discourse. Correction of these illegitimately extended partial points of view calls for appreciation or understanding of each from its own point 1 Loc. cit. 2 Loc* oit. 3 Nicholson, 4 Burnham and Wheelwright, o p . cit. p. 14. 0 £. cit. p. vii. 156 of view, followed by analysis that makes possible a viewingtogether of all partial viewpoints without being trapped by the insularity of any one v i e w .1 This analysis is the critical and dialectical technique which the authors expound in the first half of their book and illustrate the working of, on various philosophic themes, in the second half. In connection with the discovery of the basic terms and propositions in each realm of discourse the authors re mark that: ...the discovery of these terms and propositions is extremely difficult and complete success is scarcely to be hoped for. In fact an introduc tory study can do little more than indicate the type of problem that arises .2 The above exposition of Burnham and Wheelwrightfs posi tion is sufficiently extensive to indicate the lack of complete justice in the following appraisal of it by Mrs. Langer, who is aware of the character of their work as a text-book: (They) fail to realize that a strict use of logic in philosophy does not entail a method wholly, or even predominantly, analytic. Analysis of our com mon-sense ideas usually serves only to show that they have no consistent structure; philosophy, therefore, .is essentially a work of logical building— -not an „ analysis, but a reconstruction of our ideas of things. If a fellow-logician can fail thus to glimpse the real purpose and explicitly declared method of this book (synopsis 1 Ibid., p . 18. 2 rbid., p. 21 . rz Langer, S. K . , review of Burnham and Wheelwright’s Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, in Journal of Philo sophy, 29: 495, September 1, 1932. 157, after analysis), one could hardly hope for better results from mere beginners. Lamprecht’s criticism of Langer*s approach through symbolic logic is an accusation that Langer has in effect identified logic with philosophy and that the book should be re-titled, The Practice of Contemporary L o g i c .1 Pisch flatly says that the book is not suited for beginners and autodidacts, for it presupposes a knowledge p of the history of philosophy. Paine says of the Columbia Associates* book that. "a book like this introduction to Reflactive Thinking has value for purposes of reference or collateral reading rather than as a text-book"— collateral reading for a course in 3 formal logic. Of all approaches through logic studied in this sec tion it may be said that since they are materials to be read, their suitability for their purpose is subject to the same criteria as other reading materials. That is to say, the learning process must be kept distinct from the process of scientific investigation with reference to the various fields 1 S. P. Lamprecht*s review of Langer* s Practice of Philo sophy, in Saturday Review o f Literature, 7: 140, September £0, 1930. 2 m. H. Pisch .1 s review of Lang e r 1 s Practice of Philoso p h y , in Philosophical Review, 45: 325, May, 1934. 3 L. T. P a i n e ’s review of Columbia Associates* An intro duction to Reflective Thinking, in Philosophical Review, 34: 202203, March, 1925. which have been scientifically exploited and have yielded com municable factual data. The process of discovering and con firming facts is not the same as the process of teaching those facts. Applying this principle to the study of logic as identi cal with or propaedeutic to philosophy, one sees the necessity of teaching logic in a way accessible to the mentality of the particular students facing one in a class, instead of insist- . ing that they go back over the steps of the investigation that resulted in the logic they are being taught. The learning pro cess would be involved in an infinite regress if it called for a scientific approach to the approach to philosophy as well as to philosophy itself, in point of fact, when philosophy is viewed as a move ment not a monument, as a technique for opening new possibili ties of interpretation, as the restless play of reflection on any material, as the way thought moves in solving difficulties, philosophy is not distinguished from logic but is,identified with it, for these operations are simply descriptions of the way the mind works over its experience when it is the type of mind which is satisfied only by the ,Tlogical” way as the peculiar way of thinking which is real to it. Now, Mrs. Langer points out that the student whose mentality is docile to the suggestion that logic is indispen sable to dealing with the problems of philosophy will put up with the brute drudgery of mastering the rules of logic. This is 139 simply a recognition of the principle that what the student recognizes, or can be made to believe, as answering to his desire to know, that he will learn. What he recognizes as answering to his need pertains to the doctrine of interest; what he can be made to believe as preparing him to satisfy his need pertains to the doctrine of preparation. The doctrine of preparation in philosophy is under suspicion of assuming philosophy to be essentially a subjectmatter like physics or economics, and also of assuming that there is only one legitimate kind of philosophy, which it is the duty of the teacher to stamp on every mind. In the case of the advocates of the approach through logic, that sub ject-matter is the doctrine of the nature of the human mind as essentially the same in all persons and hence as bound to arrive at given results when confronted with (presumably) the same materials of experience to work with. If there is anything that strikes the eye in studying even logicians, it is the variety and incompatibility of their several views of the nature of mind and of logic, and hence . of the results they claim for their logics, for obviously the symbolic logic of Mrs. Langer is not the logic of the Deweyite Columbia Associates nor that of the Hegelian California Associ ates. iMor are the mind-ways of these good people as logicians the mind-ways of advocates of the many other approaches to phil osophy thus far discussed. The approach of each, as Sellars 14© . has said, 1 is determined first of all by his own conception of philosophy and then by his pedagogical ideas of how to teach that conception of philosophy. The moral of this chapter on the approach through logic is that logics too are types of mind-ways which determine‘ the type of philosophy a man will have, but that there is no one logical mind-way acceptable to all minds, nor (recalling the lesson of previous chapters; are the logical mind-ways, with their explicit doctrine of the nature of the mind, the only mind-ways which must be reckoned with in the teaching of philosophy. Tor the lesson seems to be that each philoso p h e r ’s mind-way is simply his sense of reality, born of his experience and of the kind of the situations with which he has had to deal in the business of living. His philosophy is simply the sense he makes of his own living, as distinguished from the sense another philosopher makes of his living. And since not only philosophers, but also students differ among themselves in the kinds of life situations they respectively face and with which they have learned to deal, it seems reason able that the teacher of philosophy should accord the same respect to each student’s outlook and sense of reality that he demands for himself, and conceive his task not as one of R. W. Sellars* review of D. D r a k e ’s Invitation to Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 30: 667-668, November 23, 1933. 1 141 making over the studentTs outlook and sense of reality or of replacing them with his own or P l a t o ’s, hut rather of help ing the student to understand the value and the limitations of that outlook and sense of reality and so become a philoso pher. The student whose mind-ways rim in scientific chan nels, the literary student, the history-minded student, the religious minded student and many more represent mind-ways that have been generated by situations facing students in their academic and perhaps extra-academic career, and developed by dealing successfully with those situations. They are what is structural and functional in the students * lives through training and as a matter of habit. The student is already a successfully going concern by the time he gets into philoso phy, in the sense that he has a sense of reality and a mind way which, together with specific factual knowledge, consti tute for him the starting point of philosophic activity and the judge of its worthwhileness and realness. 1*0 refuse to meet this starting point and to.respect this judge, and to insist on the student's adopting a mind-way incompatible with his own is to preclude the possibility of leading the student to what the philosopher himself claims to be philosophy, namely, an understanding of the 1 ife-attitude each one has and assumes to be the correct answer to what everything is all about. CHARTER VIII SIGNIFICANT TRENDS FROM IMPARTIALITY AND SPECIAL-PLEADING IN TEACHING SYSTEMS, TO ASSISTANCE IN SELF-STUDY The teacher of philosophy whose aim it is to develop in his students a spirit of openmindedness ordinarily resorts to the expedient of impartiality of attitude and utterance in his treatment of philosophic materials. He does not declare himself, or If he does so, does it deprecatingly, ful of great presences. On the other hand, as if mind the teacher who aims to satisfy his students* demand for answers to philoso phic problems ordinarily resorts to the device of indoctrina tion of his own philosophy. for his own system. He resorts to special pleading In this connection, the history of phil osophy provides the most convenient subject matter and contin gently flowing sequences for the former teacher, and the approach through a single system provides the most suitable moulding device for the second. The question of this chapter is whether there is reason to believe that the aims just stated are compatible and might both be sought. 1. The treatment of the historical approach in the first part of this study confirms the statement of Dodson that: As there is no magic in Hebrew literature through which readers of it are infallibly made good, so there Is nothing in the history of philosophy, 143 which, regardless of the way in which it is taught, inevitably produces those large, judicial, comprehensive views at which philosophic instruc tion aims. It may be presented in such a way as to leave the impression that it is the record of a series of futile and profitless efforts.^ Hocking points out that the keenly troubled state of the student who has been introduced to philosophy in the form of its history is due to his lack of preparation for the im partiality of the teacher, which he misinterprets, and is some thing which cannot wholly be attributed ITto the mental idleness g of flabby souls who wish results without labor." The principle of self-help, in the form of throwing the student wholly upon his own resources in solving his own problems, is incomplete. And so Hocking raises the question ...whether, without falling into any of the vices of orthodoxy (i. e., indoctrination), we cannot do what the instinct of our students seems to require of us, and present philosophy as having something to say both objective and sayable .3 This, incidentally, is the procedure of every writer of introductory text-books in philosophy, and in studying Hocking the reader has a representative example of the kind of thing each author and teacher does at the outset of work ing out a teaching program. The result of each such attempt G. R. Dodson, "The Function of Philosophy as an Academic Discipline," in Journal of Philosophy, V, 17, pp. 454459. 2 W. E. Hocking, "What Does Philosophy Say?” phical Review, 57: 136, 1928. 3 rbia., p. i3v Philoso 144 sets the objective for the course or book and determines the arrangement of material, to the extent, at least, that the. author*s intent endures through the arranging. Hhis statement may be confirmed by reference to any of the standard introduc tions, which start out with a definition of philosophy either accepted without question or inductively achieved— but in either case, purportedly setting the direction and determining the selection, arrangement, and presentation of materials. Hocking* s answer to his own question is an attempt to find a basis of ■unity in philosophy. He significantly accepts the problem of the unity of philosophy as a persistent problem, not as an achievement, and thereby lays upon every teacher and text-book writer the job of tackling it— before they can claim to be philosophers; for he is concerned with philosophy as something objective and sayable, so as to have a content to teach. He attacks the problem not, as he says, by trying, as Simplicius did, to find a common multiple of the systems he severally accepted, nor by trying to formulate, as Stace does with Hegel, a sort of historical common divisor, nor like Fichte by attempting an apocalyptic vision of the great day of philoso p h i c a l unity, but by revealing the ...views about the universe which are assumed or postulated by the philosophical enterprise itself, so that every philosopher by his activity, if not by his doctrines, acknowledges them.1 1 Ibid., p. 140. Assuming that philosophy is an examination of beliefs, he goes on: ••.it is the necessity of understanding which drives us to philosophy; and whatever interprets the world to men will be to them "philosophy," whether we ac knowledge it as such or not. With this understanding, X submit that every one of us as philosopher requires at least three presupposi tions: First, that things have a meaning. Second, that we human beings are competent to grasp that meaning, or some of it. Third, that it is worth while to do so, and ought to be attempted.1 Hoeking ends his development with a myth whose lesson is that each traveller (philosopher) is able to catch only a few disconnected fragments of the meaning of the universe, which he works up into a song with the aid of his imagination, and sings it to men. The polyphony of all songs produces the sym phony of the universe. It is this conviction of the meaning of philosophy that fathered Hocking*s Types of Philo sophy. The Types are what is peimanent and objective and sayable about philosophy, a content and at the same time a pedagogical method. What Carr says, on page 88 of this study, of credits as ultimate motive of the method is not the whole story, although his criticism of the appropriateness of the method of approach to philosophy stands, 1 » P* 141. for the reason he gives# To those readers ahle to followr the book, it would serve— if suitable follow-up work in class were required— to enable each reader to identify and collect the fragments of his own philosophy and go on from there to more and more coherent and clear formulation of it, which is what every philosopher does when he writes a book, including an intro duction to philosophy# summary on page But, as pointed out earlier in the 89, the book alone is likely to be just so much subject-matter to the beginner, instead of being a tool# He takes it literally as the answer to his demand for phil osophy as something objective and sayable; for him it is organized matter instead of the vehicle of meaning. It does not follow from the demand of students for philosophy that is objective and sayable that philosophy is a subject-matter that can be conveyed to them by book or by word of mouth# A careful reading of the quotations from Hocking above will reveal that just as the philosopher claims to have attained to philosophy by reason of his uncovering of the presuppositions and hence of the meaning of the philosophic enterprise, so in the case of each student philosophy will be attained not as the addition of things sayable never heard by him till now, not by the addition of more facts, but by reason of his uncovering the presuppositions and meaning of his be liefs, his examination of them, his need to understand. The teacher of philosophy had to do it for himself; T1: • so does 147 the student. But it is not a matter of throwing the student wholly upon his own resources. It is simply a recognition of the fact that philosophy for him must emerge from his own re flection on his own beliefs and necessity to understand, and that the job of the teacher is to assist in the delivery, as Socrates would say. The philosophy which is objective and sayable is the studentTs formulation in connected discourse of the philosophy which he exemplifies and enacts in his person and total activity. Any philosophy from the outside which challenges that philosophy challenges his person and, since nothing is more real to a man than his own convictions, is by no means objective to h i m , however sayable it may be. Hocking is in principle,.if not in fact, in accord with this argumentation in the statement, quoted above, that ...it is the necessity of understanding which drives us to philosophy; and whatever inter prets the world to men will be to them tTphilosophy,tf whether we acknowledge it as such or not. The aim of openmindedness, then, miscarries when sought through its stock historical approach, as we have seen that it does from an attitude of impartiality in the teacher or book, and again gives rise to the problem of discovering what philoso phy Is as something objective and sayable. But this aim in^.turn, In its vehicle, the Types approach, also miscarries, and brings to light the principle that what the necessity of understanding which drives us to philosophy concretely drives us to is the formulation, by each man, in more and more clear and coherent 148 fashion, of the philosophy incarnate in his person and enacted in his thinkings and doings. Alone, existing text-books will not effect such a formulation, but with the aid of certain devices to be discussed later they may. W. A. Brown has roundly debunked the historical approach as philosophy reduced to the status of a specialty among other curriculum specialties, driven from its original quest of wis dom by the trade interest— the philosopher’s need of showing that there is some particular thing that he can do that nobody else can do, in order to justify the salary which he draws— and by the game interest, the interest of doing a thing for the sake of showing how well he can do it irrespective of the end to be accomplished by the doing of it. In the philosopher it is the interest of thinking for thinking’s sake, of defining and redefining, analyzing and reanalyzing, controverting and recontroverting not for the sake of getting anything in particular accomp lished by this elaborate paraphernalia but for the sake of showing that you are cleverer than the other fellow at the game you are both playing.1 Brown believes that these interests have their place in philosophy as elsewhere in life, but that ^of themselves they are not capital enough on which to run the business of philosophy in a modern u n i v e r s i t y . H e calls .for a return of philosophers to its ancient function--that is to say, to what it was trying to do, not to what It actually did: 1 Brown, o p . cit., p. 675. 2 Loc. cit. 149 It is the old service with which philosophy be gan, the service of teaching men how to look at things in the large and to establish standards by which to measure values and appraise differ ences.^* As to its relation to other curricular aims: What philosophy must do for the university stu dent is not to set up a rival study to compete with those who are teaching religion and history and law and other similar subjects in a philoso phical spirit, but to provide that unifying point of view, which will enable the student to utilize to the full that which they have to give to him.^ iMor is it limited in its activity to students, but to be effective with them must enlist the willing cooperation of teachers from all departments of the school: As the philosophical classroom ought to be for the undergraduate student a clearing house of the different ideas which come -to him from the different classrooms, so the philosophical de partment ought to be for the faculty as a whole a clearing house of the different theories and problems which emerge in the varied fields of university research.3 Such a faculty movement, he points out, proved practic able in the Seminary on Jurisprudence, given by Dean Pound of the Harvard L a w School under the Department of Philosophy and Psychology of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of that Univer sity. 1 LojC. c i t . 2 Ibid., p. 679. g Ibid., p. 680. See also Dodson, ojd. cit., p. 456. 15© The significance of the discussion thus far is that the starting point and matrix of problems in the introduction course is the aggregate of materials which the student carries around with himself from the different academic subjects he is engaging in, as well as from his total past. .2. The single system approach is the stock device for satisfying students* demands for answers. and fifty-two On pages forty- nine the reader can find reasons for doubting the wisdom of one man or one b o o k Ts undertaking to settle the funda mental problems of many students once and for all. And the blanket reason is that no such thing actually happens. However, pressure is exerted upon the teacher from an other side, namely, by the equal though opposite failure of the attitude of impartiality on the part of teacher or book. And so the advocate of the single system and the fugitive from the historical and problems approaches take counsel each of the other and turn up with a formula for extracting a mitigated use fulness for the single system approach. What has happened is a recession from the stand that the introduction to philosophy is the introduction to a single system through that single systen, and the adoption of the single system as a means to an end other than itself, in short, it is a dissociation of philosophy from a particular system, while retaining that system as an ap proach to philosophy. The beginnings of such a change of heart are seen in 15P such statements as reviewer H. T. C . fs: Trying to force facts into a system is sometimes good for the facts as well as chastening for the system. You come to see what the facts may mean, and question the evidences.1 Smith speaks of the value of mastering the single sys tem— for the student capable of such discipline— as a power of self-orientation: A critical understanding of the best contribu tions to human thought of a single age, or in many cases of a single man, takes logical pro cedure, and comprehensive gathering of material, with reflective weighing, sorting, comparing— all processes which require sustained effort from students throughout an appreciable period of study. But a student capable of undergoing this discipline emerges from it with a power of self-orientation utterly different, because useful, from the superficial chart of orienta tion supplied by the syllabus of the O r i e n t a tion course.”2 Since there is here no insistence upon the studentTs being subjected to a particular philosophical system to the exclusion of all others, the above suggestion may be regarded as a mild instance of the doctrine of preparation as opposed to the doctrine of interest. But in the case of ecclesiastical regulations requiring the teaching of the system of St. Thomas in all Catholic colleges and seminaries, the doctrine of pre paration is present in full flower, or full virulence, depend H. T. C., o]D. cit., p. 161. 2 Ethel S. Smith, ftPhilo sophy and Practical Education,” Personalist, 15: 29-30, January, 1934. 152 ing upon the point of view. The pedagogical function officially assigned to Aquinas * system may be stated in the apt figure of St. Basil the Great in his address to the Christian of the ancient university of Athens. students St. Basil informed them that their young minds were like new cloth about to be dyed with the patterns and colors of supernatural truth, but that like n e w cloth the natural powers of their minds needed to be treated with the solution of the best earthly truth of ancient Greece, in order that the dye might "take," for it would only take hold when minds and characters were prepared for it. This theologi cally ancillary role has been assigned to neo-thomism. Yery cautious interpreters of the provisions of the Codex Juris Canonici point out, however, that while the uodex enjoins upon Catholic faculties the teaching of St. T h o m a s ^ system, it says nothing about the necessity of accepting the system as true.'*' The advantages of the exclusively instrumental role of the single system approach are clearly set forth by Dodson: It has long seemed to me that as a means of effect ing that organization of the mental life which is a condition of normal growth, the student should be encouraged to study some one system well. If he becomes for a time a disciple, so much the better, for he will then knov/ one system from the inside, and he will have set up a pair of ordinates in the flux, by reference to which all other systems can be understood. E. A.‘M o o d y Ts review of L. de RaeymaekerTs Intro duction a l a Philosophie, in journal of Philosophy. 36: 77, February 2, 1939. 153 He who never sees plausibility in any world view, who has no sympathy with any, understands none. But he who has once entered into a system, can then get at least partially out of it, and make the necessary concessions to other views, so that the danger of partizanship and fanatical discipleship will be escaped.! Dodson goes on to say that whoever follows this method must decide on the system to be used as a point of departure* Me lays down no specific principle of what is to guide the teacher in this selection, other than to say that •••if he selects one of the physical or mechanical philosophies, his task is to supplement or expand it so that life, mind and purpose action shall have a natural place in it...on the other hand, if one begins with one of the great moral philosophies, that of Aristotle, for instance, the problem is reversed; it is to find a place for physics, in any event, there is no question of final solutions. What is to be aimed at is the production of an awareness of the cosmic setting of human life, a widening of the intellectual horizon to the utmost, a knowledge of past efforts at unitary views suf ficient to serve as a protection from philosophic diseases, an understanding of what the great prob lems are. and the awakening of the deathless desire to know.2 Ihe difficulties attaching to this approach are the same as those attaching to the attempt to indoctrinate students with the system, and perhaps even more formidable, for the can did admission that the students are being inducted into a sys- Dodson, og. cit., p. 458 Loc. cit* 154? tern which the author or teacher himself does not wholly be lieve in will not make the task of teaching very promising; and there is danger that the realization on the part of some students, that-the system they are learning is utterly re jected and perhaps ridiculed by the kind of people or thinkers who have prestige in their eyes will kill what initiative that remains in them. The instrumental use of the single system has even less chance to be successful than the attempt to indoctrin ate it, for it is a resented attempt to force the doubtfully valid mental pattern and outlook of one person upon another who already has a mental pattern and outlook that gets him through the d a y ’s work pretty much to his satisfaction. dust as in the case of the historical approach, then, the approach through one system underwent a change involving a shift from the system as both end and means to the system as a mere means of setting up a pair of ordinates in the flux. But since learning philosophy is not a mere matter of picking up a ready-made technic or a set or instruments, but an at tempt to understand, and since understanding is always a mat ter of each person’s experience and grasp of it, the attempt to give a man tools instead of the understanding he wants will meet with resistance from him. The fortunes of the single system approach, then, fare the same as the fortunes of the historical approach. The strictly individual source, direction, and quality of growth 155 of the philosophy of any person at all is well put by H. G. Brown in a paper in which he indicates the role of other minds in the formation of a philosophy* To the attitude that all that is necessary is to affiliate with a prosperous sect on the ground that if its master knows it all, all is well, he objects that we cannot remain inactive just because Sandow is strong, or boast of our cleanliness because our doctor takes baths: An attitude towards life is not a thing that can be borrowed from someone else, but must be in dividually achieved by integrating impulses and de sires with knowledge of fact into a consistent pro gramme of action. It is essentially an acquisition of healthy-mindedness, and most men are afflicted with the ailment for which philosophizing is the remedy. Philosophizing is a personal need and, like proper exercise, is an individual matter dependent upon mode of life, environmental conditions and inner state. The man who has not a philosophy lacks a coherent character and through mental conflicts is wasting in futile frictions those energies that ought to be expended in full freedom of living. The philosopher by occupation, like the physician, can not effect a cure by the extent of his -own knowledge, but only by what he can stimulate his patient to do for himself. As a man may become well by his reaction to those things with which a skilful physician brings him in contact, so he may be aided to find himself through reacting to the reflections of a philosopher.^ The answer to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter may be indicated as follows: both the spirit of openmindedness and answers to the student’s questions may be sought by the teacher and, perhaps,by .the book which stimulate 1 H. C. Brown, ,fThe Problem of Philosophy,” in Journal of Philosophy, 17: 281-300, May 20, 1920. 156 the student to discover himself— his answers are his own formulation of his own very convincing desires, impulses, pur poses, and stock in hand, and his openmindedness is the grow ing realization of the sketchiness of his answers and of his consequent need of the help that the teacher, can give, since he has gone through the same kind of experience himself, and has learned through sympathetic understanding of many other philosophers how to assist in the unfolding of mentalities widely differing from his own as well as mentalities similar to his own. In short, answers and attitude have to be sought by the student and encouraged by the teacher on the level of each student, instead of dispensed by the teacher from the level of the teacher and of Plato. CHAPTER IX SIGNIFICANT DEVICES EMPLOYED SUPPLEMENTARILY TO SELECTED AND ARRANGED READING MATERIALS Besides philosophical and pre-philosophical subjectmatters, other devices of instruction are to be found in existing text-books of general introduction to philosophy. And it is with them that this chapter deals, with an eye for the principles governing their use— principles sometimes explicitly stated, but again sometimes simply exemplified in the devices. These devices reflect the Insufficiencies of mere subject-matters to do the job of the general intro duction to philosophy. Cushman conceives all devices that he uses as "memory hooks11 on which to hang the facts of the history of philosophy. Under this heading he lists not only the student*s "good geo graphical knowledge, some historical and some literary know ledge,"^ but also "summaries, tables, and other generalizations ^ Cushman, o p . cit., vol. 1, p. vi. & Loc. c i t . 3 Ibid., p. v. 158 including geographical maps and (in the chapter on Nineteenth Century Philosophy in volume II)' diagrams. Rogers is inclined to deprecate the use of summaries* as'spoon-feeding the student, hut admits that although bad in theory, the summaries are needed in practice, in text-books— to save the teacher disappointment. On the other hand, Gilbert is averse to mechanical aids such as maps, tables, diagrams, and summaries, and to all at- tempts to bring philosophy down to the level of the beginner. p Love joy observes that summaries are bad when written, as they are in Thilly's History, in a crowded note-book style, and give the impression of being series of logically unrelated rz propositions. densation. This is a charge of unintelligibility due to con If the original matter were itself unintelligible be- •causg of its intrinsic difficulty, the summary would only deepen the mystification of the student. Where the main text is, how ever, intelligible in itself, the summary would profitably gather up the ideas for the student— especially if he were read ing material so diffuse as to provoke such a comment as Youtz's: "What is chiefly remarkable in this section of the book is that **• A. K. Rog e r s 1 review of H. E. C u s h m a n s A History of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 20: 1911. 2 Katherine G i l b e r t s review of Cushman's A History of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 29: September, 1920. Beginner *s 6, March, Beginner's 505-506, 3 A. 0. Lovejoy's review of F. Thilly's A History of Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 12: 272-277, May 13, 1915. 159 the author finds something to summarize at the conclusion of each chapter***" But summaries do not, even when successful, make the material they summarize suitable to introduce beginners to philosophy, unless philosophy is mere information. And the point of convergence of the various chapters of this study does v not favor that identification. The connection between philoso phy and information is that philosophy involved recognition of the meaning of knowledge for the interests of selves or persons. Knowledge, meaning, recognition, interests do not exist in print# but only in individual minds, as conditioned by those minds* Only cues to knowledge and to meanings exist in books, and the suitability of those cues to elicit philosophy or recognition of the relevancy of certain facts to the interests of different minds is determined first of all by those interests and then by the ability and willingness of those minds to recognize the relevancy of the facts in terms of the written cues supplied. Where summaries are able to meet this test of suitability, they will serve a philosophic purpose; otherwise they merely pre sent a problem for memory* This same judgment may be passed on outlines of text books, as in G-amertsfelder and E v a n s ’ Fundamentals of Philoso p h y , and on the device of a net-work of cross-references in a Youtz, ojo. cit. p. 220. 160 text-book, as in F e r m ’s First Adventures in Philosophy, which makes the book a philosophical directory. Of F e r m ’s book, re viewer H. A. L. has made the comment; The student who is to go adventuring with Pro fessor Ferm must be capable of finding the meta physical, the systematic, and the theological, adventurous.1 After so much carefully-indexed ’’learned argu ment,” however, one wonders whether the really adventurous soul would not flee tag-affixing forever, even to that alternative ’’chaos in ? thinking” which the author professes to abhor? This is only a way of formulating the principle that the teacher of philosophy, if he is to teach philosophy, must teach it on the student’s own terms. Lexicons of philosophical terms, as in Brightman’s In troduction, glossaries of the same, as in F u l l e r ’s History and footnotes with the intent to clarify terms, as in Cushman, all 3 are subject to the same law. Even an immanent approach to the meaning of philosophical terms leads the student who follows it to philosophy and not just to the satisfaction of an assignment or of curiosity only if it serves to effect a recognition of the relation of knowledge to the interests of the person con cerned. Ryan subscribes to the same principle in the matter of 1 H. A. L . ’s review of F e r m ’s First Adventures in Philo sophy, in Journal of Philo sophy, 34; 193, April 1, 1937. 2 I b i d .. p. 194. 3 J. W. Hudson, ’’H e g e l ’s Conception of an Introduction to Philosophy,” in Journal of Philo sophy, 6: 11-13, June 10, 1909. 161 appropriate titles in reading lists or references at the end of each chapter or of bibliography at the end of the text: The references .cited are neither .complete nor mandatory. Every teacher has his -favorites among reference,, works, and is guided in the selection of them by the capacities of his auditors and the resources of the college library. The device of putting questions, exercises, reflections at the end of chapters in text-books is ordinarily intended **to test students1 comprehension of the text, but primarily to open doors for his further s t u d i e s b u t serves also ’’for o 3 mental discipline” ;^ ”and as a basis for class discussion.11 But the kind of philosophizing that really is philosophiz ing because relevant to the personality problems of students at a critical age of their development is not a business of finding answers to questions other people have thought up in connection with the mastery of a subject matter-unless those questions have a familiar ring to the student who reads them, so that the search for their answer in the text serves the purpose of clearing up a philosophic problem of his own. Questions testing knowledge of material, exercises, reflections are at best anticipatory and suggestive of the formulation of problems already dimly and vaguely, or clearly and definitely, felt by the student— much in the sense that in reading Shakespeare one is struck, in -*• Cunningham, 2 Stuckenberg, o p . cit., p. 342. 0 £. ojd. cit., p. iv. cit., p. v, and Columbia Associates, 3 Nicholson, ojD. cit., p. viii. 162 different passages at different readings, by his apt, concise, jewelled expression of human conflicts and riddles and is al ready half-way along to their solution or reconciled to the common plight of m e n . . At worst, test questions and exercises repel by their lack of philosophic promise. The clearest indication of the insufficiency of mere selections and arrangements of philosophic subject-matter to introduce novices to philosophy appears in specific chapters devoted to instructing the student how to study philosophy, what to look for, what to try to do, what to beware of doing. Over street mentions the value of this foresight in his review of Fullerton;! so does Tawney.2 The refrain of all these asides to the student is essentially the same: philosophy is not mere memory, not mere imagination, not mere method, not mere content, not mere discipline--but rather, clearly defined understanding by the individual of his world in its unity and multiplicity and value; and books must be used accordingly, taking note of the inevitable incompleteness of all philosophies, occupations, the special pre styles, methods, motivations of different philosophers, the development of problems and of answers, the universally pro fessed, but variously conceived concern for truth alone* Fullerton devotes all of Fart VI (three chapters) to ! H. A. Overstreetfs review of G. S. Fullerton’s An Introduction to Philosophy, In Philosophical Review, 17:217-19 March, 1908. 2 G* A* Tawn ey’s review of G. S. Fullerton’s An Intro duction to Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 4:356-59, June 20, 1907. 163 this task;-*- Hoernle, an important first chapter;^ Stuckenberg, an extended and important final chapter;5 Robinson, all of Part One, entitled, wOrientation,11 and intended to cover, in connec tion with Part Two (11Ideal ism”), a semester* s study;4 Hocking, a valuable first chapter, to whose program he returns In the last two chapters, for the purpose of telling how and of showing 5 how one formulates his philosophy of life. Robinson, wisely taking nothing for granted in instructor-users of his text, add sr. an important appendix entitled 11Supplementary Work, Mwhich contains instructions on how to use his book in connection with specifically mentioned source-books and with other specified devices of oral and written nature. Such advice to teacher and student alike bears witness to the concern of the authors mentioned that philosophy be not confused with philosophical literature on the one hand or with mere mental calisthenics on the other, but be understood as the progressively clearer vision of the meaning of things--the unity of understanding which can be mentally distinguished, but not really separated, into the process of understanding and the mean* 1 G. S. Fullerton, Introduction to Philosophy. ^ R. F. Hoernle, Idealism as a Philosophy. 3 J # H. W. Stuckenberg, Introduction to the Study of Philosophy. of 4 D. S. Robinson, An Introduction to Living Philosophy. 5 W. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy. ** Robinson, op. cit. 164 ings understood. They testify to the continual need of both teacher and student to be/reminded of the end to be sought and misunderstandings and distractions to be guarded against--mainly against mistaking the means of instruction for the end of instruction. Among speech devices for introducing beginners to phil osophy there is the opportunity provided by class meetings. To use this opportunity exclusively for lecturing is either to sup pose advanced students present or to pretend to be able to read the minds of students for what they expect of philosophy. Marvin says, ”The ideal introductory course in systematic phil osophy seems to me to be not a lecture course nor a series of recitations, but a critical and systematized discussion--a Socratic discussion, if you wil l . ”'*' This presupposes— just what he claims--that he intends his text to furnish the student with a problem and enough information about the problem for him to o take a n active part in a discussion in class. This makes his book ”not exactly a text-book,” to be expounded and accepted. that is, not a book of texts It may be asked whether a d i s cussion on an assigned problem taken from a book of the history of philosophy,.is rightly termed ^Socratic.” Socratic dis cussions originally arose not from books which provided prob lems and solutions, but from conversations on street corners and on other informal occasions, and the intent was to clear ^ W. T. Marvin, An Introduction to Systematic Philoso p h y , p. ix. 2 Loc. c i t . s Loc. cit. 165 up meanings of important words and to trace the consequences of current beliefs and policies as advocated by specific per sons. Discussion is a device which may be employed on m a terial useless to the particular students facing an instructor as well as on material valuable to them because answering their philosophic problems. Hinman sounds a warning against fostering debates and discussions on minor matters which give rise to puppy-dog bickering.'*’ Hudson calls for discussion engineered so as to make philosophy emerge from studentsf 2 points of view, and prescribes Socratic questioning as a means of getting problems from the students themselves. After the problems are gotten, and not before, should students be sent to books for help; this is the proper use of books. YJhen the problems are made to emerge from class discussion, "the class becomes a group w i t h a common problem, enlisted in the search 4 for its solution." The catch in this method, Fisk goes on, is that "it is far easier to deliver a lecture than to conduct a successful discussion hour, and the latter takes far more 5 preparation than the former. Preparation not in selecting a 1 Hinman, o p . cit.» p. 3. 2 J. W. Hudson, "The Aims and Methods of Introduction Courses; A Questionnaire," in Journal of Philo sophy, 9: 12-13, January 18, 1912. 3 Ibid.. p. 4. 4 A. G-. Fisk, "A Functional Approach to Philosophy," Junior College Journal, 8: 75, November, 1937. 5 Ibid., p. 76. 166 problem and collecting solutions, but in trying to set a trap for a kind of problem which the teacher, in his knowledge of his students, has reason to believe they will bring to class with them on a given day# students. Problems are difficulties felt by Robinson's plan to divide students into discussion groups after completing each part of his text, with one group defending and the other attacking the type of philosophy under consideration in a discussion contest or debate, promises success only if the students have been led to feel the abstract issues involved as integral with the concrete problem with which the study of the type began— if it did actually begin with such a problem.^ Even the selection of capable leaders for each group will not make the discussion live if it deals with what is no problem to anybody present. The problem will merely be one of using up the class-hour. Goldenson makes a number of interesting suggestions on the basis of the assumption that philosophy, like other subjects, should be evaluated in the light of its contribution to the development of the individual student. 2 The present investiga tion has found support for this assumption in the discovery of reasons why that is the only way philosophy can be taught. Briefly and generally, the reason is that philosophy is simply the individual mind's becoming conscious of the meaning of its ^ Robinson, o p . cit. 371. p R. Goldenson, "Some Approaches to the Teaching of Philosophy," Progressive Education, 14: 323, May, 1937. 16*7 experiences and knowledge for its interests and purposes in the world it faces* Goldenson*s program for "drastically revised approaches to the subject" "stem from one change: shifting the center of gravity from the study to the student." A too general "world as a whole" and a too narrow set of classic systems will then be subordinated to the ongoing experiences of individuals* The aim will be to cultivate philosophic thinking prima rily, not so much for the examination of traditional arguments as for the formation of personal outlooks* Moreover, this process will not be restricted to any traditionally prescribed area, but will arise from a critical approach to any subject whatsoever.^ Significantly, all his suggestions are suggestions for class discussion, and are "based on a conception of the re latedness of experience— by which I mean the experiences of in dividual persons, not experience in general."2 By almost the mere mention of such terms as happiness, evolution, intuition, God, or puritan a class discussion of meanings can be started, which can be directed in such a way as to make the students see the necessity of examining and clarify ing their convictions. The fundamental relation, Goldensen points out— and the present study grounds what in his paper is a mere assertion, supposedly self-evident— is "not that of teacher to student, or of student to classic authority, but of ' the student to his own meanings as revealed in the presence of ^ Ibid^, p* 524. 2 Loc. cit. 168 other active minds.”1 Such an inquiry can become "a search for presupposi tions and a search for implications (what ideas are based on, and what they lead to)*” He lists as a value accruing to discussion of such a concrete problem as how successful our technics are for study ing individuals, the discovery of the value and limitations of such technics; of such a problem as how art is related to sci ence, the discovery of the unique qualities of experiences of art and of science in their proper setting; the encouragement of flexibility and breadth of view as a result of constant emphasis on alternatives and on thinking in terms of the pos sible; such discussion is "creative in its effect, since those who engage in it will rely more and more on their own resource!” again, "they will also have a definite sense of contributing something to the class, derived from independent thinking;^ Informative books would not necessarily be ignored; but they would fall into place as references or as sources of suggestions when the class discussion needs supplementing* Their use would naturally in crease as the work progressed; but they would tend to clarify and substantiate independent thought rather than forestall it, as text-books notoriously do.5 1 cit* 2 rbid., p. 335. 3 Loc. cit* 4 L o c * cit* 5 Loc* cit. 169 His last claim is that "the habit of searching for al ternatives and the ability to think carefully and express mean ing accurately can .be carried over to any portion or sphere of existenceThis is really a superfluous claim, for the very business of entering upon a philosophic discussion at every class meeting is a business of discussing problems of meaning often enough to make looking for meaning a habit with the stu dents, so that they increasingly w i l l , and not just can, look for meaning in their experiences* However, the stimulation to thinking must always be made to eventuate in a judgment— "judgment that results from no mere weighing of words or logic, but from a direct encounter between suggested ideas and existing states of mind, feelings, and points of view, however inchoate and inarticulate they may u be." The exercise of judgment can be evoked by pointing out the moral aspect of the meanings discussed. Goldenson makes three concrete suggestions: first, direct the attention of students to kinds of people with whom he must live— the pes simist, the pagan, the hedonist, the esthete, the ascetic, the materialist, the individualist; characters in literature. Stu dents have a stock of information from which to draw, in this L o c . cit. 2 Ibid*» P- 326. connection— their everyday experience and acquaintance with literature.*1. Second, to provide entree to more special at titudes and ways of thinking, guide a discussion from contem porary communism to Marx and to Hegelian method, or from Christian Science, Buchmanism, the revival of mysticism and other religious movements to religious beliefs and problems, or from common expressions like "planned economy,n "the man of action," and "wishful thinking" to a-discussion of pragmatism. B The principles back of all these suggestions are important— and incidentally, independent of the suggestions: All these tie-ups with current experience are preludes to philosophical problems of the tech nical sort. But they are more than mere preludes, and more than mere analogies and illustrations: the "high, abstract philosophy" is not to be re garded as the end, but only as a means. Its func tion is to elucidate and suggest, for the benefit of the i n d i v i d u a l s experience and not the other way around.3 Third, Goldenson suggests that "since the main cur rent of the student*s experience is within the college it self, it is here that undergraduate philosophy should go for 4 ways and means." He is here stating the principle that for effective teaching the school situation must be treated as the studentfs life and not just as the student*s preparation for 1 Loc. c i t . 2 Ibid., pp. 326-327. 3 Loc. cit. 171 life. This policy has the advantage of making every phase of the educative process the student’s appreciation and understand ing of his activities in school as intrinsic instead of merely instrumental and derivative values. Rewards, the longer de ferred, the more uncertain do they seem of attainment and in worth, and hence the more grudgingly and impatiently are tasks endured which only by the word of fallible teacher lead to them. But when attention is centered on the enjoyment and meaning of the school situation itself as the locus of interest, then the school situation becomes capable of generating philosophic prob lems which the student has an interest in solving as constitut ing an obstacle to his intrinsic interest in school life, and the school is in the unique position of being able to take ad vantage of its character as educative by providing students with a recognized opportunity to solve the philosophic problems which the very educative situation generates for them. G-oldenson presents three conceptions in this connec tion: first, the philosophy class as a forum for methodology; second, the approach to specific technical philosophic problems via other subjects; and third, the nature of a college as a source of problems and illustrations.1 His first suggestion is familiar though misnamed, as can be seen from what he means by it: From the academic standpoint, the student’s situa tion consists of pursuing many studies separately, 1 Loc. cit. usually without considering their wider mean ings or their ultimate function in suggesting terms on which he can live. But there is one place that is most appropriate for considering the significance and inter-relations of the many disciplines, and that is the philosophy class. i?or this special purpose, it can he regarded as a seminar, a forum, or a labora tory— in fact, a Platonic "receptacle” in which the methods and materials (but particu larly the methods) of other subjects stir and percolate and, finally, through the instru mentation of certain basic ideas, come to the surface as meaningful objects.In short, in such class discussion the student is pro vided with the opportunity and guidance to begin seeing the meaning of knowledge he already possesses for his life and interests. The problems emerge from his felt need to find such meaning— to make connections and resolve conflicts in his stock on hand of knowledge from various quarters, of interest, purposes, habits; to achieve unity and direction of person ality. tie can be bombarded with cues and suggestions from teacher, classmates, and text-book, but only he can see the connections or resolve the conflicts, because they are within him and the seeing and resolving are dependent upon his ability and willingness to see and to decide. The value of having a special time and place for dis cussion of these things is that "here the student can be re latively free from the entanglements of mere learning, and is in a position to survey the entire panorama of his experience.” B 17,3 That is to say, he has an opportunity, after being on the re ceiving end of education in content courses, to exercise the initiative of relating his knowledge and training to his.job of living— a relating that involves assessing their value to him, seeing their meaning for the good life. In the process of doing this, He can not only inquire how each of the mental ities goes about its work, but can use them as means of discovering his own Ways and his own capabilities. In this way, the philosophy class, when viewed as a methodological forum, can further what is in many ways the primary aim of college education, that of self-exploration.1 The nature of a college as a source of problems and illustrations suggests the college as a concrete example of the whole-part relation and brings up the problem of totali tarian versus cooperative communities. It also is the locus of the problem of time as concrete duration; it can illustrate the nature of deductive systems in suggesting the relation of the general aims and principles of the college to the particp ular aims of its graduates, and so forth. The significance of this extended consideration of u-oldenson is his confirmation and supplementation of principles brought to light earlier in the present study: his clear enunci ation of the principle of philosophy as student-centered rather than study-centered, his recourse to class discussion as the 1 L o c . cit. 2 Ibid., pp. 388-329. 17*4 pedagogical point of origin of problems, his emphasis on the kind of problems which not only start student discussion of meanings but stimulate the exercise of judgment and the coming to a decision which relates meanings with the concrete prob lem from which the discussion started, his insistence that "high, abstract philosophy" be not taken as an end* but made to elucidate and suggest for the benefit of the individual’s experience, his suggestion that college life be recognized as the locus of philosophic problems and as offering valu able illustrations of items of technical philosophy, as well as providing, in the philosophy class, a needed forum for the discussion of the philosophic problems that college life gener ates fo r student s . While Goldenson mentions jotting down terms in opposite categories in connection with a particular problem of class discussion, he lays no stress upon writing. But McNutt follows a complete and detailed program, involving the student’s selec tion of a problem, conference with the teacher for hints on how to get started on it, follow-up conferences on literature gather ed, reading done, and compilation of sources; writing the paper with an eye on the eight rules of procedure of the problem method, reading the paper to the class, and conducting a round-table dis cussion on it.-*- Another device he uses in his chapter on "Truth," written in blank verse, is to instruot the reader to study the ^ McNutt, oj). cit., pp. 5-6. 175 poem, write out the truths he finds in it, write an essay on his own ideas about truth, read and criticize the literature on truth selected for the chapter, write a poem on truth after the criticism of the class on the nature of truth, read his poem to the class, work out a definition for truth in one sentence This triple device of reading, writing, and discuss ing the same thing sounds promising in that the student is permitted and instructed to choose his own problem, and the author accords him personal assistance without reservation. Add to that the sophisticated attitude cultivated in the stu dent toward the books he consults, the insights possible in his careful preparation and writing of a paper to be subjected to class discussion, the further initiative, training, and in sights possible by the student*s chairmanship of the discussion of his own paper by the class, and the result may easily be prediet&blae as either great lovers or great haters of philoso phy, but certainly nobody indifferent to it. Pages 189 to 194 of McNutt*s text are left blank, except for a line dividing each page vertically, the left side with the caption^Problems” and the right side with the caption "References.” These blank pages are to be used according to instructions on page 188. Add other problems (other than the fourteen worked out by McNutt), collect literature, and 1 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 176 work the problems out independently of your professorfs help. Under Problems on the following pages write out complete statements of your problems pro posed for solution. under References list all of the literature you read on the problems, giving authors, titles, and pages. In short, McNutt has provided models of problem solving, detailed instructions of procedure, and offers personal assist ance in conferences. He has each student contribute to the writing of the text, at first in close dependence upon the in structor, later independently. Beside this solicitude, other devices appear weak. Dubray offers an appendix of 150 topics for essays, in the form of quotations from various literatures.1 Hinman's suggestion is indefinite, to the effect that student insight and reflec tion can be secured through carefully arranged studies culminia2 ting m essays. Lewis recommends a four-part notebook, one section dealing with Problems, a second with notes towards Solutions, a third division on the refutation of such common fallacies as may appear, and a final division on Philosophers, in which only clear and significant statements from philoso3 phers are put down. 1 u. A. Dubray, Introductory Philosophy, appendix. p Einman, oj>. cit., pp. 3-4-* 3 John Lewis, ”H o w to Teach Philosophy,” in Philosophy, October, 1932. 177 Robinson recommends assigning a written report to each student on a typical representative of each type of philosophy treated in his text, lie requires extensive reading in books of that philosopher."** as an alternative to this more formal written report on one m a n ’s philosophy, he suggests having those students who vrould be interested in doing so study models of philosophic dialogues (he names those of Berkeley, Santayana, Montague, Pratt), and then write a short dialogue, setting forth the var ious attitudes of the different types of philosophy on one or more of the great problems* or three gifted students* This is a cooperative job of two But he is in favor of any method, he says, that will make philosophy the subject of talk in students1 bull-sessions. 2 There is one significant device remaining to be dis cussed, and there is a difference of opinion about the idea of it. uushman observes: A good many years of experience in teaching the history of philosophy to beginners have convinced me that students come to the subject with four classes of ideas, with which they can correlate philosophic doctrines: good geographical know ledge, some historical and some literary know ledge, and many undefined personal philosophical opinions. Of course, their personal philosophical opinions form the most important group, but more as something to be clarified by the civilizing in- ■*" Robinson, 2 033. Ibid., p. 371. cit., p. viii 178 fluence of the subject than as an approach to the subject itself.1 Kobinson, on the other hand, is of the considered opin ion that: Perhaps the best introduction one can get to philosophy is to become conscious to the fullest extent of the philosophy he has when he begins the serious study of the subject, since this philosophy is shared by many, let us call it isveryman’s Philosophy.^ At the close of his book, in the supplementary Work, Robinson advises assigning an essay on the subject nM y Phi l osophy of nife” at the end of the course in philosophy, and gives detailed instructions on how to write such a paper. He advises awarding the philosophy prize of the year for the best essay among these. Again, nocking emphasizes the initial uniqueness of each m a n ’s philosophy: ...no matter what your philosophy is, it will necessarily be an individual perception, the report of an intuition of the world which cor responds precisely with that of no other person. Since each human being is both universal and uni que: universal as sharing a world of sense, of thought and of history with his kind, and unique as seeing these from a position and in a light peculiar to himself;— so is the principle of his philosophy universal and also unique. I would say it is unique first and universal afterward, ihat is, the life of each individual is at first 1 o Cushman, ojd . cit., vol. 1, pp. v-vi. Robinson, o£. cit., p. 8. 179 a summary and uncharable Intuition or reality: it becomes his business to find what that intuition means, and then to convey or express so much of it as he can. This is at once his duty and his happiness.1 Cushman believes with Robinson and Hocking that the raison d !etre of studying philosophy is the clarification of each student1s personal philosophical opinions, but he differs from them in the method of approach. He advises an indirect attack; he believes that the clarification of personal philo sophical opinions will automatically parallel the directly sought integration of the student’s literary, historical, and geographical knowledge with the history of philosophy. Hocking, on the other hand, would have the student use his Types for the purpose of identifying his own philosophical opinions so that he might deal then with them directly and formulate them in a coherent and critical fashion. Robinson also favors the direct approach to each student’s philosophy, although only at the be ginning of the course in the sense of Everyman’s Philosophy and only at the end of the course as a formulation of each student’s outlook on life. Hocking, Types of Philosophy, p. 455. CHAPTER ;X G. W. ALLPORT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATURITY OF PERSONALITY1 1. Problem of this chapter. From the point of view of present curriculum arrange ment, the first course in philosophy presents the problem of how to effeet a juncture in the student fs mind between the analytic, descriptive technics and literatures of particular sciences and arts on the one hand, and the integrative, criti cal technics and literature of professional philosophy on the other. From the point of v iew of the student, the first course in philosophy is in each case a means to a different end; and the administrative premium placed on larger and larger intro ductory classes necessitates the development of a versatility and showmanship on the part of the teacher which shall make it possible for each enrolled student to realize the end for which he enrolled in the course. The teacher is between the devil— the curriculum builder— and the deep blue sea of his students. His problem is to posit a cause— during the class hour— which shall produce the multiple, varied effect expected by each mem ber of the class— to drop the apple which one student will in sist on enjoying as an edible fruit, but another will be con tent to observe as embodying a universal law of motion. 1 Gordon W. Allport, Personality. 181 Fortunately for the teacher, there is such an apple. It is the interest that each student— especially the adoles cent— has in himself. Whether he loves himself or hates him self, he is intensely and continually curious about himself as something he never expected he was. He is just meeting himself, and finds himself very strange. He begins to be both ered about what everything is all about. He is acutely con scious of a lack of perspective that would let him see how things are related to one another and to the good life. bull-sessions center around that problem. His He feels the need to hold forth on it, and finds himself alternately baffled by the many-sidedness of the problem and pleased by ideas he d i d n ’t know he possessed. But he has to talk about it, and amateur treatments of it catch his eye in his casual reading in news paper, magazine, and novel. The man, woman, or god who will answer his comprehensive question in a manner consistent with his ideas and interests, he will listen to. But in the nature of the case, since he is the only one who knows his ideas and interests, he is the only one who can give that answer. The job of the teacher in the first course is to use appropriate means to get him to do so. It seems that the answer to what everything is all about is what is meant by the phrase ’’philosophy of life.” And if the teacher can learn just what significance attaches to being conscious of o n e ’s philosophy of life, he will be better IB 2 able to guide the student in his formulation of it. For it in turn seems to be a means to a further end; to involve the tacit assumption that the individual's future course of action can be more advantageously directed and more fully enjoyed if the field of his consciousness is enlarged to take in all his capacities and interests as self-conscious possessions. The.purpose of this chapter is to examine the validity of this assumption in connection with Allport's doctrine of the significance which attaches to making one's actual philoso phy of life a conscious possession, as against being merely series of habits built up by home and school and religious, etc., training. And also to discover whatever suggestions he may have on appropriate means of making one's functional phil osophy of life a conscious possession. 2. Allport on the significance of having a conscious philosophy of life. In chapter II, entitled, "Defining Personality," Allport1 marks off a man's philosophy of life from his "dis tinctive habits of thought and expression, his attitudes, traits and interests:'* In addition to separateness and uniqueness a human being displays psychological individuality, an amazingly complex organization comprising his distinctive habits of thought and expression, his attitudes, traits and interests, and his own pe culiar philosophy of life. It is the total mani- 1 Ibid., p. 34 183 fold psycho-physical individuality, commonly referred to as personality, that engages the attention of the psychologist. The phrase, "philosophy of life," appears on page 117 as an aspect or a function of the central nervous system in its role (in the biological theory of personality) as execut ing the demands of the autonomic nervous system in its adjust ment to its environment. But on page 120, where the biologi cal theory of personality is criticised as "over-simplified," Allport seems to distinguish the chemical from the personal aspect of the individual, and to align a m a n ’s philosophy of life under his personal or psychic quality in opposition to his chemical aspect, in contrast with habits and attitudes, o n e ’s philosophy of life here refers to o n e ’s conscious con trol over means to a chosen end.'*’ Granting that the chemistry of the body has much to do with the general cast of temperment, and that severe dysfunctions of the glands bring with them characteristic types of emotional disorder, there is still no reason to suppose that a speci fic and proportionate relationship exists between the chemical and psychic constitution of normal people. Tensions produced by glandular activity are absorbed into the more integral tensions that comprise personal motives. Suppose, for example, that there is a marked secretion from the adrenal glands. A vague emotional excitement will prob ably ensue; but the w a y in which this excitement is handled is a matter of deep-seated habits and attitudes, even of o n e ’s underlying philosophy of life. 1 Ibid., p. 120 184 In chapter VIII, entitled, ”The Mature Personality,” Allport develops this cleaning of philosophy of life in connec tion with his three general criteria for distinguishing a fully developed personality from one that is still immature. First, ,a man must have the capacity to lose himself in the pursuit of chosen objectives; second, he must be able to regard himself, his abilities, aims and interests objectively, detachedly, even with humor; third, he must have a philosophy of life. The role of the philosophy of life is unifying, integra ting:1 Since there is an obvious antithesis between the capacity for losing oneself in vigorous participa tion and the capacity for standing off. u ontem pi at ing oneself, perhaps with amusement, a third, integrative, factor is required in the mature per sonality, namely, a unifying philosophy of life. Such a philosophy is not necessarily articulate, at least not always articulate in words. The preacher, by virtue of his training, Is usually more articulate than the busy country doctor, the poet more so than the engineer, but any of these personalities, if actually mature, participates and reflects, lives and laughs, according to some embracing philosophy of life developed to his own satisfaction and representing to himself his place in the scheme of things. Allport makes an important statement in the words, Such a philosophy is not necessarily articulate, at least not always articulate in words; for it is possible to have a philosophy of life properly socalled without ever having formulated it in written or spoken words. The philosophy of J. S. Bach is articulate in his music, 1 Ibid., p. 214. 185 as is the philosophy of uhopin, Beethoven, Handel, and George Gershwin* The philosophy of Michelangelo is expressed in his sculptures; that of Edison, in his inventions. But a philoso phy of life is always at least to some extent a consciously formulated possession, a man's embracing consciousness of his place in the scheme of things. It is the program which he has developed and in some way expressed to his own satisfaction and according to which he is content to live. Allport'*' brings out the autonomy of the philosophy of life as a motive force in the mature personality as opposed to "The genetic over-emphasis of other dynamic psychologies that regard motivation as sessile to the roots of the past:” Which interpretation is correct? Are esthetic and religious philosophies of life due to a flatulent condition of the Id that "never changes;” or are they precisely the opposite, autonomous master-sentiments that give objective coherence and subjective meaning to all the activities of their possessor's lives? By now the reader is in a position to decide for himself. Again, on page 226, he says, referring to types of philosophy other than the religious: ...they too serve as autonomous systems wherein every detail tends to corroborate every other de tail under some fundamental conception of value. On page 227 he speaks of them as "dynamic formations:” By and large psychology has done little to give systematic setting to all these various dynamic formations that represent the apex of development in the mature personality. 1 Ibid., p. 227. 186 But what is a philosophy of life? It is, says Allport, a matter of desires, of ideals and goals imaginatively con ceived, desired, projected into the future, and sought.1 Intelligent and perspicacious planning for the future is always a significant feature of any mature life. The individual imagines things as they might be, even picturing his own personality as he would like it. This planning for the future determines the subsequent development of personality quite as effectively as do the forces of the past. It is not only the vires a tergo that create a style of life, but also the plans, ambitions, ideals, and images that mediate goals pro jected into the future. Every mature personality may be said to travel toward a port of destination, selected in advance, or to several related ports in succession, the Ego-ideal always serving to hold the course in view. That which lies ahead in o n e 1s life is at every moment dynamically taking shape, not merely by virtue of the push of this habit and that stimulus, but because the course of development is being steered in a certain direction by the Egoideal itself. ...without some sustained goals somewhere, a personality remains childish.2 Philosophy is a matter of the self's becoming conscious of its purposes and of their relations to its social and natural contexts; a consciousness of being distinct from other things and from society, but at the same time of being dependent on society While differentiation and Integration are under way there develops gradually an important core of selfconsciousness. Perhaps nothing contributes to the unity of personality as much as this subjective 1 Ibid., pp. 218-219. 2 Ibid.. p. 220. 3 Ibid. • P. 345. point of reference, by virtue of which the in dividual feels that there is coherence between his memories of the past and his plans for the future. Self-consciousness is necessary for self-esteem, for aspiration, and is a pre-condi tion of status in the social group (by which, in turn, it is profoundly modified). All these factors are unifying in their effects, gradu ally the self extends in such a way that it is closely identified with personal possessions, with other people, and with introcepted ideals and cultural standards. The self becomes the center of an orderly psychological universe. Whether the self is regarded as the innermost nucleus of all conscious ego-systems (Koffka) or as the interplay of all conscious states (James), does not greatly matter. In either case the self is the subjective moderator of whatever unity the personality may have. Philosophy is not a matter of mere memory, but a matter of harnessing memory to imagination in setting up and working toward goals dear to the Ego:"** In order to bind the past with the future, m e m ory must be supplemented by imagination, another unifying capacity of the self, with its aid the human being may plan his life when he is young, and spend years of concerted effort in pursuit of his chosen goals. Perhaps the most significant property of the self • is the peculiar inward quality of emotional life, represented variously as the principle of Egoism, self-esteem, the sentiment of self-regard, or as the "upward tendency of the Ego". Whenever the beloved ego is the object of regard, as it very often is, unity is enhanced, for at such moments all activities have a common point of reference.2 But the goals dear to the Ego are not necessarily self ish goals. Psychological integration of outlook, which is the ^ Loc. cit. 2 Ibid., p. 345-346 188 philosophical or maturational stage of the development of the personality, is achieved by any inclusive, consistent plan of activity:1 Such selfishness, however, is not the whole story. An individual who devotes himself to one mastersentiment, whose personality is distinguished by one primary Bestimmung (Buhler) likewise finds psychological unity, in fact the pursuit of ex ternal goals can be more consistently maintained than the opportunistic pursuit of selfish ends which of.necessity vary from time to time. This conception of intention as a principle of unifica tion is related also to the conception of the egoileal. (p.. SI8-S O } Whenever the ego-ideal is 'de rived by virtue of introception from the ethics of culture, it helps to hold the individual within a single course of development. Any Weitanschauung, however derived, by engendering intelligibility upon the diversity of experience, serves as an im portant unifying influence. Stating the case still more specifically, some writers find the unity of personality achieved in its life work. Burnham has pointed out that just as a concrete task (the Aufgabe) integrates available energy for the moment, so too, in the long run, a life work confers stability and con sistency.2 Philosophy ministers to the maturing personality by making it aware of what it wants so that it may marshall its forces to that end, hitherto dimly and inchoately sensed.3 iiere is a curious fact: the attainment of unity depends more upon knowing what one wants than upon getting it. Xt is the striving towards the known goal that confers unity, not the successful ar- 1 Ibid., p. 346. 2 Ibid., p. 350 3 Loo. cit. 189 rival. Love of learning— to take an example— is more of a unifying force than the possession of learning, so too is love of art, of money, or of fame. Unity of intention offsets failure of accomplishment; it is a matter of what a man loves, not of what he has or acquires. Attain ment may even he destructive of unity, for at tainment forthwith abolishes the unifying desire. Prom this point of view unity lies only in the struggle for unity. Philosophy is not a play with mere abstractions, but an attempt to understand a concrete problem of how to achieve wholeness of personality by understanding the concrete pur poses involved in o n e ’s life-work. It involves harmonizing the concrete aims that clash in most lives:1 Faust as the prototype of man, found that striv ing for completeness was not merely an abstract matter, fhe only practicable condition ofuunity that he discovered was the seeking of specific objectives related to a life work, when every moment of effort is directly or indirectly pointed to the same progressive series of goals, these m o m ents are then bound to one another, such an inter locking series of moments constitutes what Paulhan has called a "harmony of striving", and serves as the prime condition of unity in personality. The harmony is rarely perfect, for in most lives aims clash with one another quite as readily as they reinforce one another. Lasurski rightly warns against mistaking pseudo unity for true unity. The former is an illusory product of suppression and dissociation, "which consists in the fact that some inclination or group of related inclinations control all others, inhibiting them or suppressing them, men who are given to self-denial and asceticism, often serve as examples of this specious unity." A. Lasurski, "Uber das stadium der individual it at,T, P a d a g . 1 Ibid., p. 351. 190 Monog., 1913, jn'o . 14, 37. freudian psychology deals at length with the duplicity and lack of genuine unity in such personalities. Repeating the sentiment that the philosophy of life consciously possessed is to be the finishing touch to the m a ture personality, "conferring unity- upon it, Allport says:1 Spranger5s classification (of the six ideal types or x)hilo sophy of life) offers a start ing point for empirical investigations of those complex philosophies of life that serve more than anything else to confer unity upon the mature personality. On page 331 he uses the phrase ’’Foci of development” . Significantly he observes that Spranger’s six ideal types are too few. In other words, each person has a different philosophy of life as one of the qualities that makes him uni que in his personality. On page 336 Allport speaks of religion as ...the search for a value underlying all things, and as such is the most comprehensive™cTf all the possible philosophies of life...the authentically religious personality unites the tangible present with some comprehensive view of the world that makes this tangible present intelligible and ac ceptable to him. Psychotherapy recognizes this integrative function of religion in personality, soundness of mind being aided by the possession of a completely embracing theory of life. This statement would be more satisfying if the author gave a definition of religion in connection with it. to make it synonymous with philosophy of life. He seems Ho thing is clear er than that the philosophies of life expressed in Lucretius’ 1 Ibid., p. 230. 191 De Rerum Nat u r a , L i p p m a n ’s Preface to Morals, and D e w e y ’s A Common Paith, are as comprehensive as many popular brands of religion and stand for just as powerful and far-reaching master-sentiments as they do. But it seems useless to debate the worth of abstract categories, when the business at hand calls for the understanding of this and that person and his philosophy of life. It will depend upon the individual whether his religion is also his philosophy of life and master-senti1 ment, or only what Allport calls a "eompartmental interest” . When it is the latter, it is justly distinguished from the master-sentiment, which may be anything at all, as is left o to conjecture in A l lport’s question. ”What is his religion, and what his philosophy of life?” On page 504 Allport quotes the phrase, "Philosophy of life materialistic and mechanistic,” from a sketch of the per sonality and character of Professor D; and on the next page reveals that under philosophy of life he includes here D ’s attitude toward philosophy: Inferences extend beyond the direct evidence offered in the classroom; there are conjectures concerning D fs sensitivity to liquor, his at titudes toward bridge, politics, and philosophy. This is not at all a correct statement, for a m a n ’s philosophy of life may or may not include an attitude toward what is 1 Ibid., p. 226. 2 Ibid-» P* 393. 192 academically known as philosophy and philosophical literature. At best the adjectives "materialistic and mechanistic” give the proximate genus of a m a n Ts* philosophy of life. The brief schedule for a psychological interview on page 510 lists "philosophy of life” seventeenth and last among the topics to be covered* A passage of great significance to the purpose of this study, since it deals with the question of who has access to the philosophy that is to be made a self-conscious possession, is the section on the psychology of ’’Verstehen” , pages 539-542, Interpreting this theory, Allport first states the basic prin ciple as follows:1 It is only when the life and actions of another are intimately and intelligibly bound together that I understand h i m ,*.verstehen is,..the mental activity that "grasps events as fraught with mean ing in relation to a totality.” The difficulty is, how is an observer to discover that totality, in reference to which individual acts become meaningful? Allport continues:^ The answer lies in the discovery of the individ u a l ’s direction of striving, that is to say, in his constellation of personal values. Then follows a remarkable break in the sequence of pertinent suggestions concerning how to determine the individual’s direc tion of striving. Broad categories are suggested in which any 1 Ibid.. P- 540. Loc. cit. 193 individual philosophy of life would he lost:^ Dilthey had proposed three forms of Weltanschauung which serve as a basis for the unity of the personalities of great philoso phers. There is first the materialistic or naturalistic outlook (represented by Democritus, Hobbes, and Hume), secondly, transcendental idealism (represented by Plato, Kant, Fichte), and finally objective idealism (Goethe, Schopen hauer, Hegel). Such typical Lebensverfassunger pervade not only the writings of these philoso phers, but their personal lives as well. After this historical aside, Allport tells us how Spranger would determine the i n d i v i d u a l s direction of striving: A m a n ’s philosophy of life reflects itself in his speech, his conduct, his mannerisms; f,it is one with his character.** 3 What is this but telling the reader to observe fragments of behavior and then to reason by analogy (which really means binding these fragments to the lives of other people)— a process which the Yerstehen psychologist condemns for the 4 reason that it will never yield an understanding of individ uality? From this position to the following sentence there is only a bridge of wishful thinking: 1 Loc. cit. 2 L e e , cit. 3 Loc. cit. 4 Loc. cit. 5 Loc. cit. 5 194 As soon as an individual1s philosophy of life is known, his personal activities, which taken by themselves are meaningless, become understood. Allport’s own conclusions are that persons have no direct insight into the motives and conscious processes of other persons:*** No person can understand any other person com pletely, for it is impossible for one human being to share directly the motives, thoughts, and feelings of another. One person can judge another only by the latter*s total be havior:2 In summary, to secure the most trustworthy judg ment from first impressions (and probably from long acquaintance as well), it is necessary to have a gifted judge, applying his skill to certain overt and readily accessible traits in a subject who is himself not deceptive or enigmatic, That is to say, each person judges by analogy from (-ultimately) his own experiences. The behavior he witnesses, if it means anything at all to him, falls into a pattern of which he has experienced at least the elements, and his **under standing** of the behavior takes the form of imputing aims, interests, motives, feelings, and sentiments in a pattern which, he believes, approxi mates the personality of the person in whom he witnessed the be havior, When this reconstruction of the personality of another is done in the language of the pretentious psychological analy sis of a population for its common traits, and each step in the 1 Ibid., p. 499. 2 Ibid., p. 509. process of interpretation is made explicit, lie talks of infer ring the personality of people* When he sizes up a new ac quaintance during two minutes of formal introductions, hand clasp, and appreciative comment on the school set-up, he tends rather to speak of intuition and insight into his personality;. he is dealing with a present totality in perception rather than with an assemblage of ideas separated from an absent living totality of an original. There are several important points to be gleaned from the discussion thus far; 1) The personality of a student requires, for maturity, that he be able to objectify his modus vivendi to himself, so as to see it in perspective and if possible with humor. 2) He needs consciously to clarify and to integrate his modus viv e n d i , so that he becomes aware of its implications and possibilities and consequences; and so that he becomes an orderly personality, at least in anticipation, purposes with himself* 3) instead of a personality at cross It follows that it is either use less or seriously harmful to the personality of students to attempt, by dialectical or other means, to have them adopt a philosophy of life notably at variance with their actual modus vivendi;3' for a philosophy of life is simply o n e ’s modus vivendi formulated consciously, clarified, and integrated— not just 1 This is the tenor of a militant anti-epistemologist article by G. Stanley hall, entitled "College Philosophy," in g o r u m , 29: 409-422, June, 1900. He speaks of students whose outlook on life has been debunked by the teacher as "psychically starved," as victims of "precocious maturity, and senescent cephalization," pp. 419-420. 196 conceptually, "but with the purpose of unifying and coordinat ing one's theory with one's practice. 4) Each student, and he alone, has direct access to his own personality, can study it intimately, and formulate its features accurately. He alone, then, is in a position to work out his philosophy of life— bring it to light on paper, develop its implications, consequences, and possibilities; formulate its unsolved prob lems. 5). It follows that until each student has brought to light the problems of his philosophy, the teacher will only complicate the job of getting the student to understand him self if the teacher attempts to introduce him to the litera ture, the technics, and the vocabularies of professional phil osophy. To sum up: the significance which attaches to making o n e rs philosophy of life a conscious possession is that o n e ’s personality depends for maturity on this achievement. achievement, The in brief, is that a man comes into conscious pos session of his life aims, interests, abilities, and disabili ties— he becomes, at least in anticipation, unified in out look and single in intention. He comes to see the pattern of his life, and the consciousness of problems which are relevant to his interests and aims gives him guidance in his recourse to philosophical literature for solution of those problems. 3. Allport on how to make one's philosophy of life a conscious possession. 197* Does Allport have any suggestions concerning what means would be appropriate to make o n e ’s functioning philoso phy of life a conscious possession? Yes, he does; although the technics he advances are intended for the external ob server. however, they suggest means that each person may use in the study of his own personality. On page 370, in figure 27 (tfA Survey of Methods for Studying Personality"), Allport lists four types of personal records: diaries, systematic guides to self-study, personal correspondence, and thematic writing. 2 he gives the first important clue: Under the head, "Diaries", More intimate than social records are those docu ments prepared by oneself for the express purpose of giving vent to o n e ’s feelings and private thought. Special significance must be attached to diaries, These range in scope from semi-personal notebooks to intimate self-revealing autobiographies, often of great value as psychological data. Me goes on: More formal than diaries are the systematic guides to self-study. These may range from informal casually arranged questions to be answered by the subject in any way he chooses, to the standardized pencil and paper test. In the latter case, the technique is so specialized that it deserves separate list ing. Allport says of standardized questionnaires:4 "Sometimes they 1 Allport, o]3. cit., p. 377. ^ Loc. cit. ^ Loc. cit. 4 Lb i d ., p. 380. 198 are called tests of attitudes, sometimes interests, or opin ions , or traits.” And"** "Its (the standardized questionnaire's) final diagnosis depends upon the individual's report of his “be havior in many different types of life-situations.” As most persons do not keep carbon copies of their letters to friends, in which they most reveal their personal ity, this study omits reference to the third type of record, personal correspondence. The fourth type of record has more promise. p A method used especially with school children is ■fc*10 Aufsatz-method which in English may be called thematic writing, when a child is asked to write a school composition on such a topic as "What Hero I should Like to Resemble,” or "My Personal Ambi tions,” often a surprising amount of information comes forth. Some children favor religious, or philanthropic heroes, other athletic or domestic heroes. One adolescent girl chooses a movie queen as her ideal, another her mother, a third Jane Adams. In employing this method, however, it is necessary to determine whether the writer is giv ing mere lip-service to conventional teaching or is revealing spontaneously his own guiding-image. The method may be used likewise with adults who in writing, for example, on their dislikes or "pet aversions” may betray a number of personal traits, among them fastidiousness, prurience, paranoia, irascibility, or humor. The three methods of autobiography, systematic self- study by standardized questionnaires, and thematic writing should bring to light a student's personality, where he is and where he seems to be going, and what his daily living re veals as his de facto idea of what everything is all about. 1 Ibid., p. 381 2 Ibid., p. 377-378. 199 From this factual basis he can then begin a systematic and critical examination of the grounds, implications, and con sequences of his daily 1* 0 und and his ideas, in the course of which he may come to feel the need of recourse to philosophical literature and formal training in philosophy. But without such a preparation, he will not feel that need badly enough to sus tain his interest through the barren period of brute mastery of the technics of professional philosophy. The idea of this sort of approach is at least as old as Socrates, who endeavored to have individuals get thoroughly acquainted with themselves and their routine ideas and working beliefs. Mot by merely holding up a'picture of other p e o p l e 1s outlook on life, but by getting each person to appreciate the worth and realize the limitations of his own working ideas and habits can a teacher hope to make him grow in the direction of reasonableness, whatever reality may be, each person*s actual interests and ideas constitute what he thinks reality is and what he is meeting reality with, as a going concern. These are the facts for him, however much he may be academically impressed with facts which are not functional in his present outlook. 4. Flewelling on discovering other persons to them selves. There are many more passages in Allport dealing with 200' philosophy, 1 2 philosophers; ^ y) Weltanschauung, metaphysics, and the like, which in the interests of brevity will not be discussed here since the gist of them has already been given. But the point that emerges from Allport's treatment of the im portance of becoming conscious of one's philosophy of life may be fittingly reinforced by representative quotations pertinent to this study from Dr. R. T. Flewelling's book, Creative P e r sonal ityf It may be that our best contribution to social ad vance shall come through the discovery of other persons to themselves, ‘ bo fire the creative imagi nation of the young to successful effort is very often to make a far greater contribution through other lives than through one's own. No task in the community is more important than the discovery of genius to itself, and genius is not so rare a possibility as is sometimes thought, being simply interest with power to concentrate imagination and effort on a given end. bhe reason that so much faithful work in the world lacks the touch of genius and originality is because the in dividual has not achieved harmony within himself, he has not learned to tie up his dreaming with his doing.6 his (the teacher's) supreme value to the community lies not so much in the method or content of his teaching as in his ability to discover students to themselves.. By the power of suggestion he sends 1 i b i d .. PP. 33, 45, 138, 144, 169, 816, 837, 348, 349, 505, 533, 568. 2 I b i d .. pp. 41, 47, 131, 170, 173, 539, 540, 551, 559. 5 I b i d .. pp. 138, 144, 893, 346, 540. 4 Ibid., PP. 171, 178, 310, 348, 349, 351 (note), 501, 541, 550, 551, 558, 555. 5 E. T. Flewelling, Creative Personality, p. 898. 6 Ibid., p . 880. 201 individuals out to the careers for which they are fitted.1 fhe community of intent in these and the following passages with the psychological doctrine of Allport is apparent. if there is complete unity within the self, mental, moral, and spiritual, so that one is free from fears, inhibitions, and conflicts, so that one grasps situations through the n single eye” of pure motives, then is developed the greatest power of achievement Reflection is one of the main elements in secur ing unity of outer and inner self.3 It is essential then that the imagination should be set in the direction which we v/ish the outward life to take, if the imagination goes in one direction while we try to send external acts in the other, there will be serious conflict.^ When we note the cases of men who have profoundly affected not only their own age, but the ages that have come after them, we discover a curious simi larity in one respect. Self-discovery has come to each with the power of a great conviction.3 In the light of Allportfs thesis it seems that the power of suggestion which Dr. Flewelling speaks of would be found at its best and as most fruitful when an individual was made to realize the practical logic of his actual life, habits, and ideas--their implications for achievement and for frustration. 1 ibi d ., p. 279. 2 I b i d ., p. 277. Loc. c i t . 4 I M S - > P- 2745 I b i d .. p. 292. 202 There would be no justification for the teacher to harness students to his own pet ideas or to ideas alien to their own mental and moral make-up; but there would.be hope of doing good in making it possible for a student to become enthusiastic about his own possibilities and concerned about his own limita tions in the light of the life-situation which faces him. Summary: Allport regards the conscious possession of o n e ’s philosophy of life— self-Knowledge— as essential to the maturity of o n e ’s personality, conferring unity and a sense of direction under conscious control. And three of the means he lists for study of the personality by an external observer are suited to give the person who employs them on himself a selfknowledge'which can be made to yield his philosophy of life, in all its suggestiveness for thought and action, and in all its specific limitations. The teacher who can make a skillful use of the three methods of autobiography, systematic guides to self-study, and thematic writing will be the teacher who will most fruitfully suggest to each student what his possi bilities in living the good life are, on the basis of what the student has been made to discover himself to be. The teaching method of the first course in philosophy ought to be heuristic, not indoctrinating, scious expression, it ought to be designed to elicit a con in systematic and somewhat critical form, of the philosophy of life that is implicit in the student’s actual mode of living. 205 Of course, the aim is to give the student such a taste of the rewards of reflection that he will cherish it as the vessel of his well-being. CHAPTER XI SUMMARY. CRITICAL THEORY OF THE GENERAL INTRODUCTION COURSE: SOLUTION OF PROBLEM The general problem of this dissertation was to determine whether existing types of general introduction to philosophy are suited to their purpose. Of the preliminary questions into which this general problem was divided, the first two received their answers progressively in the principles brought to light in each chapter from the second to the eighth. The fifth question was answered in chapter nine; the sixth in chapter ten. The third and fourth questions find their answers in the critical theory of the general introduction course to be developed in the present chapter. The elements of such a theory have been sought in notions and principles elicited from the claims and criticisms of existing types of introduction to philosophy. These.notions and principles center about the aim and the learning situation in the first course. Ordered into a unity as an idea or theory, they will represent an explicated problem, that is, a practical situation made articulate by and to the m i n d ‘which can resolve it into a purpose conceived in terms of, and appropriately related to, the materials available for realizing it. Judgment of the suitability of existing types of approach will be 205 followed by studies of several feasible forms of a preferable type of approach. It would not be entirely true to fact to interpret the order of presentation adopted in the table of contents as a temporal sequence of the fortunes of the various approaches studied. However, since criticisms presuppose already exist ing approaches, it was possible to see just how unsatisfactorily long historical approaches were followed by telescoped historical approaches such as Rogers» and by approaches through selected systems and types of systems such as those of Calkins and Hocking. Hibben*s approach through the problems of philosophy followed upon his criticisms of pedagogical lacunae left by the approach through history, and the problems approach generally was preferred by those who sympathized with students* helplessness before and misinterpretation of the whole series of historical systems and the infinitely divisible historical problems. Again, chapter eight expressly dealt with two trends which are significant of the vaguely felt and imperfectly glimpsed basic conception of the introduction to philosophy underlying all claims and criticisms of specific existing approaches. These trends show how opposite types— the historical and the single system approaches— passed into modified forms in their convergence upon the same point, the interests of the learners. In fact, as each existing approach was studied, criticisms revealed more and more the glaring externality of 206 the conception of philosophy exhibited by them all. And this increasingly lamented but seemingly inevitable conception was found to be the result of identifying philosophy with philosophical literature or with the philosophy of teacher and text-book. Philosophical problems, process, and solutions were conceived as an achieved body of knowledge stored in books and in teachers and communicable by language. This deposit represented the level of knowledge, technics, and understanding attained by a tradition or by the race. The teacher and text book writer conceived their task as providing the student an opportunity to possess himself of it. In the first five approaches— through history, the single system, the problems of philosophy, the general survey of problems and systems, and selected types of systems— the emphasis is laid upon philosophy itself, so conceived. Its problems, method, and solutions are to be laid hold of directly and immediately. The teacher*s job is conceived either as helping the student to rise to the level of philosophical literature and jargon, or as trying by the magic of fine writing, of succinct statement, of selective exposition to bring that philosophy down to the level of the beginner with out its meeting the fate of all incarnations, namely, of failing- to be 'identified for what it was expected to be. The next five approaches— through sciences, literature, kulturgeschichte. religion, logic-— emphasize and devote most of the time to the matrix and methodology of philosophy. 207 They bear witness to the belief of their advocates that the very problems of philosophy (still the professional variety) will be felt and recognized as problems, and successfully attacked, only if their point of origin in pre-philosophical subject-matter is made clear, or if the logical structure of their solution is prepared for by acquainting beginners with the propaedeutic, logic. The emphasis is- upon the pre conditions of intelligibility of the very starting-point of philosophy— its problems— -and upon acquaintance with (little or no time for training in) the abstract forms of the professional process of solution of those problems. But just as the heights of philosophy discouraged beginners, and philosophy brought to earth disappointed them, so philosophy through pre-philosophy was seen to presuppose knowledge not possessed by the student or study and training whose reward is too long deferred, too dearly bought, or too uncertain in character and value. And so criticism, the willing genius of action, entered its blade between the soul and the spirit and turned up with a distinction between philosophy conceived in terms of the experience and mentality of mature thinkers and philosophy conceived in terms of the experience and mentality of adolescents. The necessity of this elastic conception of philosophy pulled like an undertow in the criticisms directed against the various approaches. The step from philosophy as content- 208 centered to philosophy as student-centered was seen to be the inescapable implication of Bakewell»s principle that periods of history which need exhaustive reconstruction for the student preparatory to his philosophizing are unsuited as approaches to philosophy for him. This criticism was seen to be predicated from a belief in the radical heterogeneity of individuals, which-is only slightly neutralized by the academic device of entrance requirements and graduated courses/ ^Jhen thus generalized, the principle does not just reveal the weakness of one method, but rather expresses the protean character of the subjects of the educative process— the "wide range of that variable, the psychological make-up of each student. In view of its potential diversity that one variable was found to have the unique property of determining the kind of materials which can relevantly be subsumed under another variable in the educative formula known as external a ids . Philosophy thus conceived was seen to be as numerous as adolescents themselves. But there is no choice. Besides being obliged to admit the disproportion between the studentts mentality and professional philosophy, and the inadequate or entirely wanting preparation of students for, or interest in, certain approaches to philosophy, critics were shown to employ principles which reveal the inconsistency of advocates of any one approach with their own understanding, claim, and practice of philosophy. After bringing out the necessity of dissociating 209 the concept of philosophy from a particular high level of philosophy in philosophical literature and teacher, because of the diverse limitations and interests of. the learners, this study called attention to the fact that even teachers of philosophy differ among themselves in their philosophies, and that each considers himself a philosopher not in virtue of ideas accepted from other thinkers, but in virtue of ; having arrived at a convincing understanding and attitude with regard to philosophical problems felt by himself. In the light of this fact, to identify the approach to philosophy with any given body of information was seen to be inconsistent ivith the teacher*s own understanding and practice of philosophy. This point is the unexpressed assumption in Windelbandfs criticism that teachers should not confuse what interests themselves with what interests their students, but should design their course to meet the expectations of the learners rather than their own. Again, it underlies Robinson*s criticism that the approaches through history, through a .single system, and through special philosophic disciplines are all liable to the same serious objection that they do not give any attention at the outset to the student*s ovm philosophy. It appears also in the discussion of the problems approach, which concludes with the statement that the beginner!s demands on philosophy are fundamentally the same as the teacher!s— a business of each finding his place in the scheme of things. 210 Once more, it turns up in the observation that a program which undertakes to justify.common sense will satisfy or repel some students-— and advertise philosophy accordingly— just as it satisfies or repels some teachers of philosophy; and that the same may be said of the undertaking to transcend common sense in a system of idealism. Finally, the' incon sistency of the teacher with his own fundamental conception and practice of philosophy appears in the study of the approaches through the various logics. Each teacher and professional philosopher prefers to be convinced in his own way. He tends to trust and to generalize the logic he has developed in dealing with his own life work--cases in point; De w e y ’s emphasis on the social criterion, Peirce’s upon the mathematical, James’ upon the individual. Why 'then ask the student to be convinced by the way of another’s mind? The significance of philosophical literature and of the professional philosopher was seen to lie not in what they are, but in the kind of thing they testify to. For the teacher the important thing is the kind of thing that the philosopher does, not the actual thing he does. Even Hocking’s principle that philosophy•must be something both objective and sayable was found, so far as the teaching of philosophy is concerned, to be not an absolute, but simply a function of the unique centrality of each person’s psycholo gical make-up in that person’s philosophy. Although objective 211 and sayable, philosophy is incommunicable. To beginners it is unintelligible in its professional state; unrecognizable in a "simplified” state; inaccessible or unwanted in its prephilosophieal state; conflictingly exemplified by its professional exponents in their conception and handling of its problems, method., and answers. It is obviously not any one thing, but rather a kind of thing. It is a peculiar kind of problem, of method, and of solution. In the nature and locus of philosophical problems, process, and solutions is found the idea of the general introduction course. Where there is a problem there is an aim whose non-realization causes dissatisfaction and un easiness. Where there is a method or process there is an agent who acts purposively. And where there are answers there is a mind satisfied that its aim has been achieved so far as available materials permit. What is the peculiarly philosophic aim which gives rise to the kind of problems, process, and solutions called philosophic? It was said that the beginnerTs demands on philo sophy were fundamentally the same as the teacherfs— an understanding of his place in the scheme of things. Again, it was said that the primary aim of the approach through the history of philosophy and, with some, through-the problems approach ?jas the production of openmindedness; that of the approach through one favored system, the production of 212 conviction or certitide, the supplying of answers. But it was found, in chapter eight, that the means used to effect openmindedness failed to satisfy students* equally pressing need for answers, and the single system approach was criticized as giving students answers at the expense ox making them the opposite of openminded. However, it was pointed out that the ideal expressed partly by openmindedness and partly by , intellectual satisfaction (answers) is simply the ideal of attaining a satisfying consciousness of o n e ’s'place in the scheme of things. This more abstract ideal has no necessary connection with the contingently flowing sequence of the history of philosophy and the attitude of impartiality on the part of teacher and text-book; nor with the cogent and inescapable argumentation of a single system and the success ful propagandizing suggestion of final conviction on the part of teacher and book. It is, however, necessarily bound up with each student’s reflex consciousness of his own function ing ideas of wrhat everything is all about, and of the sketchi ness and improvable quality of that self-consciousness and of those ideas. This conclusion is borne out by the study of the trend from the historical to the types approach, where the significance of the latter is seen to be its character as an aid to the student’s formulation of the philosophy of life which he actually exemplifies. It is also borne out by the study of the trend from the single system as an end in 213 itself, identified with philosophy, to the single system conceived as subservient to the function of aiding each student to set up a pair of ordinates in the flux* Another facet in the concept of philosophic aim is supplied in the study of the class as a forum in which students raise and solve philosophical problems generated in their minds by the very school set-up in which they are involved. Here the philosophic aim appears in the guise of a value-judgment sought under pressure of the necessity and desirability of continuing school life as an intrinsic interest. The aim is clarification of the students * aims and decision among values• Cushman was seen explicitly to state that the philo sophic opinions which each student brings to the study of philosophy— although he believes that such clarification must be sought indirectly. The study of Allport*s theory of the significance of philosophy for maturity of personality revealed the aim of philosophy to be a vision and understand ing of goals and traits actually functional in a person, a conscious program without which he remains a child, and to which he alone has direct access for discovering and fashion ing. The nature of this vision and understanding bf o n e fs place in the scheme of things appears to best advantage when discussed in each of the three phases between which it 214 fluctuates* These phases are not three separate things, but only three distinguishable moments of the unity of philo sophic consciousness. The first moment is characterized by relative instability and dissatisfaction, the second by activity calculated to deal with the source of this in stability and dissatisfaction, and the third by relative repose -attended by satisfaction. Since this analysis is generic and not limited to the philosophic enterprise, it is necessary to specify the character of a problem, a process, and a solution which are concerned with one's vision and understanding of one's place in the scheme of things. The discussion here takes the form of a theory of philosophic interest. Philosophy seems to be a late interest that emerges at a state in the development of personality at which the necessity of facing life as a responsible integer imposes the job of taking stock of one's interests and of ordering them for effective and satisfying living. The philosophic interest is the imperial interest of effecting a satisfying order among all one's interests. The test of what is satisfying philosophically is the sense of what is real. Philosophy, then, is concerned with clarifying and ordering one's interests in the real in the order of their reality according to one's sense of reality. A philosophic problem is philosophic interest in the moment of relative frustration. It is decidedly not the 215 same as lack of interest. It is thwarted interest in philosophic security in much the same sense as a pressing thousand-dollar debt represents a real though relatively thwarted interest in o n e ’s financial security. nature of a thwarted philosophic interest? What is the Philosophic interest is thwarted whenever o n e ’s interests are felt to be in conflict or when they are -so.few or operate so inadequate ly as to cause apprehension that one lacks effective under standing of o n e ’s place in the scheme of things. It is not the presence in the individual of interests which are potentially in conflict or too few or too inadequate ly functional that constitutes the philosophic problem. Such a situation would constitute a philosophic need but not yet a philosophic problem, for problems and interests have their exclusive locus in foro conscientiae. And really the need itself could be said to exist only in view of some aim with reference to which an individual’s interests are potentially in conflict or too.few or too inadequately functional. In the absence of consciousness of the unsatisfactory relation of o n e ’s interests' to a given aim there is no place for philo sophic interest, since philosophic interest is just that consciousness. Philosophic problems are a kind of self- consciousness which involve a relatively obscure and in distinct perception of o n e ’s true interest in a given situation, and an urgency to effect an order among interests that will permit the attainment of some end accepted as desirable, or to clarify the desirability of that end in the light of its possible realization, the cost of realizing it, or its relative value among alternative ends. Without such recognized and felt necessity there exists no philosophic problem. It arises whenever a new experience or a new type of experience is seen, disconcertingly for o n e ’s present understanding of his interests to conflict with past experience or to have no apparent relation to it. Philosophic problems are conflicts or wonderments which challenge o n e ’s understanding of his larger welfare. Anyone who is intent only on the incoming experience is either un wittingly or deliberately ignoring his philosophical status. If unwittingly, he has not yet experienced the philosophic interest in its phase as problem. If deliberately, he is living a solution, whether philosophically arrived at or not. The importance of being thus conscious philosophically is that it is the only possible point of departure for the philosophic enterprise of the student. This doctrine is the significance of the earlier insistence upon the existence of different levels of mentality exemplified by beginners and by professional philosophy; of the discovery that starting with problems external to students is philosophically irrelevant and may miscarry disastrously; of the observation that there are no interests or demands in general, no life or mind in general, no average student. That each student’s own philo sophic consciousness is the only possible starting point for 217 the philosophic interprise is also the essential meaning of the distinction between what interests the teacher and what interests the student; of the reproach that certain approaches fail because they do not give any attention at the outset to the student’s own philosophy; of the principle that philoi sophic problems must be elicited from the student’s stock in trade; of the principle that no mind will allow itself to be introduced to philosophy iri any other way than through its de facto interests, whatever they may be; of the principle that the fundamental philosophical relation is that of a student to his own meanings; of the rule that group discussion must start from a problem felt by those participating; of the advice to start with problems that elicit value-judgments; of the advice to look for philosophic problems generated by the students’ relations to the school set-up considered as an intrinsic interest; of the advice to use any device that will make philosophy the subject of talk in students’ bullsessions, where discussion goes on with reference to problems felt by those participating, or if not discussion at least a rough-and-tumble unburdening of each o n e ’s mind. Further relevant points made were that the student’s philosophical interest other things being equal, can be elicited by an attitude of real concern and urgency manifested by teacher and authors in treating philosophic issues recognized by the students as akin to those raised already or in causis by the studentTs own desires and expectations. Allport?s contribution to the meaning and importance of a philosophic problem is the concept of it as a conscious need experienced at that stage in the development at which each person experiences uneasiness over the obscurity, unrelatedness, or conflict of his interests and the need of understanding what responsible, satisfying self-hood consists in. In short, it is the dawning inclusive interest, following upon the development of many particular interests, in achieving psychological unity over and in terms of these partial interests, a unity representative of or anticipatory of practical unity, and a sense of direction under conscious control. The philosophic problem is an expression of the purposiveness of persons in their need to understand (spuriously, to rationalize, in the pejorative sense) the value of their interests, of the goals they seek, so that they know and savor what they are living for and what sense there is in it after all. The comprehensive need felt is for understanding o n e ’s purposes, and this undertaking is a matter of overcoming the obscurity and confusion which is detected in the meanings which a mind has set up for itself in dealing with its experience, and guides itself by. So much for the concept of philosophy in its phase as problem. The unity of philosophic consciousness which goes by the name of process of solution or learning process is 219 characterized by action calculated to deal philosophically with the source of the instability and dissatisfaction which mark the existence of a philosophic problem. There is no inevitability that anyoneTs consciousness of a philosophic problem will be followed by a philosophic process in that personas mind, especially in the case of beginners. The philosophic process is not a flight to authority or to the subconscious, for problems are not understandingly solved by plunging them back into their matrices; yet under pressure of time or of incompetence people fall into the habit of oracular intercession within or without instead of develop ing the philosophic habit of understanding their own pur poses . It was pointed out in the study of Allport that each person, and he alone, has direct access to this own personality and hence to his philosophic problems, and can formulate their features accurately and study them intimately. He alone, then is in a position to work out his philosophy, to bring it to light and objectify it on paper and in speech, develop its implications, consequences, and possibilities, formulate its unsolved problems. By thus making oneself aware of the pattern of o n e Ts life, one becomes conscious of.problems which are relevant to one*s interests and aims, and can have intelligent recourse to teacher, to philosophical literature, and to other external aids for solution of those problem. 220 But no external agency can bring o n e fs problems to light or attack them, and without seeing to it that each brings to light the problems of his own philosophy, the teacher would only complicate the job of getting the student to understand himself if the teacher attempted to introduce him to the literature, the technics, and the vocabularies of professional philosophy. reffi. Such merely external procedure would not be ad The philosophic process is decidedly a self-study, carried on with such reading materials as reflect and such speaking and writing devices as effect the objectified self. It is self-initiated and self-sustained study of self. More light is thrown on the nature of philosophic learning by the argumenturn ad hominem developed earlier in the present chapter. Since teachers and other professional philosophers consider themselves philosophers not by virtue of having adopted the views of other philosophers but by virtue of having achieved their own understanding of their place in the scheme of things, apparently the student can become a philosopher only by following suit. Each person's logic is simply his mind-way or sense of reality, born of his experience with the kind of situation with which he has had to deal in the business of living. Since students as well as teachers differ in the kinds of life situations they respectively face and with which they have learned to deal more or less to their satisfaction, it seems necessary to 221 admit that students as well as teachers differ in the kind of logic that is real to them and gives convincing results. Consequently if a student is to deal with his own problems in a way convincing to himself— and the concept of philosophy demands satisfaction in terms of o n e ’s sense of reality— he can be the only jjudge of what constitutes a satisfactory handling of his problems. The philosophic learning processes of students differ just as the logical structure of various professional philosophies differ. Now, philosophic satisfaction in terms of one’s sense of reality is not the satisfaction experienced in the function ing of blind feeling, of impulse, or of instinct. Philosophic is here synonymous with clearly defined, articulate, explicit, distinct, exact, orderly, consecutive, true to self. In the learning phase of philosophy attention and interest has shifted from the nature of the difficulty to the nature of the process by which the difficulty may be philosophically overcome, and the ideal nature of the philosophic process is expressed by the epithets chosen above. They express the characteristics of which philosophic satisfaction is a function in' all phases of the philosophic interest. The philosophic process is the process of making explicit and deciding the relative value of o n e ’s purposes. It is not a thing done once and for all, but a habit or way of facing and dealing with problems involving the welfare of selves— the ideally human way of understanding them or ordering them 222 in terms of one»s sense for the real. The study of devices supplementary to selected and arranged reading materials brought out the centrality of student-agency in this phase of philosophic interest. Rogers* concession to spoon-feeding the student by supplying summaries is clearly a face-saving expedient resorted to under pressure of mass education; it smells of collusion with minds to whom a show of memory work or a collection of authoritative opinions by students entitles the students to philosophy credits. It was pointed out that summaries, tables, maps, diagrams, questions, .reflections, footnotes, glossaries, outlines, lexicons, collateral readings, lists of problems in connection with readings done, net-works of cross-references, theme topics, assigned discussion subjects were suitable to the business of introducing students to philosophy only if they were related to their philosophic interests and enlisted the ability and willingness of different minds to use them philosophically. Such is the infinite variety of minds and philosophical problems that a whole library of materials would be largely irrelevant if the job to be done were simply and exclusively a matching process, a finding of pieces in book and teacher which are flawlessly congruent with a given student*s mind. But philosophy is not such a" static geometrical totality; and philosophizing is not a matching process, nor is it merely the registering of an effect produced from without 223 by an external a g e n t ; it is a cultivation of a sense for clarity, breadth, and order in judgments on one's interests. This conception of philosophizing as self-activity is especially in evidence in those passages, ranging from asides to whole chapters, in which writers of Introductions instruct the student how to study philosophy, what to look for, what to try to do, what to beware of doing. Here is unmistakable conviction that philosophizing is something done by_ each student, not to him. The same conception appears in Goldenson’s insistence that philosophizing involves the responsibility of passing judgment, of making up one's mind, of coming to a decision. Induction of general premises or rules must be followed by syllogism or application to specific cases, for philosophy is an attempt to arrive at truth. This belief is brought to focus in the conception of the class as a forum in which students raise problems generated by the very school set-up in which they are involved. The necessity and desirability of continuing school life thrusts upon them the responsibility of straightening out cases of conflicting interests by discussion for clarification of issues., leading to decision or passing of judgment in terms of relative values. McNutt’s device of having the student read, write, and discuss in connection with his research on a problem of his own choosing, with the ready counsel and assistance of 224 his instructor, is another exemplification of the conception of philosophizing as the student»s formulation and systematic resolution of his own philosophic problem. However, McNutt’s claims for this comprehensive device are:made in language which reveals no inkling of the abyss separating the mentality of beginners from the mentality to which the problems of technical philosophy are felt as problems; no awareness of the long, intense life within a philosophic tradition which is prerequisite to understanding the jargon, the key concepts, the peculiar drift of that tradition— no matter how recent and clear of print the books in its new editions, no matter how colorful and attractive their jackets. Philosophic problems are simply not the kind which permit of solutions or even of being understood by combing the authorities for opinions, adding the positive and negative answers, and concluding with the sign of the remainder. The growth of a beginner to the stature of which he is capable even within his own tradition is a growth which cannot begin with problems recognizable and materials manipulable only at its term;; & fortiori his branching out into alien articulate traditions. Nevertheless, McNutt’s device is invaluable in its character as expressing the need and providing the opportunity for the student to find his own philosophic problems, to formulate them, and systematically, by reading, writing, and discussing, to generate the understanding or degree of resolution of them 225 which his own intellectual power, experience, and the materials available to him make possible for him. Similar significance attaches to Lewis * recommen dation that the student keep a notebook, provided it be graced i¥ith a clarity and an orderliness effected by the student in his consecutive effort to state and explicate problems felt by him. Robinson dropped a hint to this same effect, when he said he was in favor of any method or device which should make philosophy the subject of talk in students1 bull-sessions; for in bull-sessions the philosophy is not a fixture installed complete in the students by a teacher, but a production, no matter how spasmodic and blundering, of minds at grip with a problem, each dealing with the problem as he sees it. Philosophizing begins with the appearance of a pe r s o n ’s vague urge and infantile random attempts to utter his modus vivendi to himself or a friend, to objectify it, as Allport says, to see it in perspective and if possible view it with humor. Philosophizing becomes adult and worthy of responsi bility to the extent that it becomes articulate as sense of reality. The indispensable and central agent of this operation is the student himself, aided by counsel and records of similar self-studies available in literature and in conference and discussion. His level of mentality, his study habits, his willingness to follow actively the written or spoken self-revelation of another and to judge of its relevance to his own case will determine the suitability of external aids to introduce him to philosophy. Paulsen had student-activity in mind when he spoke of the valuable self training in the art of intelligent reading which the dialogue form of philosophy provides the occasion for. But he emphasized the peculiarly individual character of that activity when he spoke of the danger to the student of trying to read the wrong books at the wrong time; he referred to Kant*s head-breaking Critiques. Collingwood, too* made the point that what is helpful to the student is not the mere recital by the author of the conclusions he and other thinkers have come to, but the revelation of the process by which the problem was progressively clarified and unravelled. The philosophical reader is the reader who judges the conclusions of an author by the reality and justice, to him, of the mind-process that led to those conclusions. His understanding is a business of his seeing sense in the way the author arrived at his position. This same thought was in the mind of W. A. Brown when he pointed out -that, in contradistinction to science, which deals with those questions the answer to which we can be content to take at second hand, philosophy deals with those questions the answer to which each man must, give for himself. As Collingwood put it, "What we demand of the historian is the product of his thought; what we demand of the philo sopher is his thought itself." People trust the logic which 227 their battle with life up to date has equipped them with, whether that logic is the habit of scientific research or the habit of divining the motives of persons they have to deal with, or any other attitude and way of handling the peculiar life situation facing them, philosophizing is for each person a business of making his sense of reality more articulate, clearly defined.,^ true to self. It is necessary to indicate the note of self-imposed discipline involved in the truly philosophic process, what ever the individuality of its experiential materials. Ikider no circumstances is philosophic learning to be confused with whimsical or blindfolded or prestige-induced selection of ready-made principles or answers, nor with aimless although beautiful reverie, nor with mere creative imagination, any more than with committing to memory. perceptual or contemplative. Nor is it merely It involves going to the trouble of bringing into the forum of consciousness all elements relevant to deciding a problem involving the welfare of the responsible self. The satisfaction of a particular interest such as the biological, the psychological, the musical, without reference to the bearing of such special satisfaction on the responsible self, occurs strictly within biological science, psychological science, musical creation or appreciation, respectively. But the satisfaction of the philosophic interest in its moment as philosophic process 328 involves judgment upon issues affecting the imperial self— on the basis of the understood degree to which the known subject and its objects provide content for, and at the same time limit, the conception of what is for the best (most real) welfare of the total self, actual (achieved under standing) and potential (understanding previsioned on the basis of the achieved). In short, philosophic judgment is passed in terms of what is understood by each to be the most ideal, because most real, self; and hence involves the self-discipline of delayed and orderly and exhaustively sought decision. To the extent that the learning process is of such a nature it is philosophic. Non-philosophic processes include reverie, suspension of judgment without effort to assemble materials for a judgment, jumping to conclusions, blind flight to authority of person, book, or institution. Imperfectly philosojjhic processes are exemplified by sentimental logics which emphasize the subject at the expense of objects, and mathematical logics which emphasize the objects to the deluded exclusion of the subject. Both types are 'untrue to the ideal (potential) self, and are only approximately true to each actual self. The direction of philosophizing is self-determined both in the sense of the regulative intent to realize the ideal (potential) self and the sense of being conditioned by 229 each self*s actual sense of reality. There is a tension between the actual self and the potential self— a tension arising from the desire of the actual self to arbitrate its philosophic problems in its own interest, for its own greatest satisfaction and well-being. The philosophic problem is a recognition of obstacles to that best satisfaction or well-being. The philosophic process is a business of throwing light on the obscurity, by ascertaining all claims and weigh ing them, in an effort to determine what is the best satis faction and in what it consists. It may be none of the interests now possessed, but an interest intimated and cultivateable. Thus the philosophic process is a deliberately cultivated interest in understanding what the best interest is at any given time and how to possess it and how other interests are related in value and instrumentality to it. Jamesf remark-*- that a man fttrusts his temperament” above his logic means that a man trusts the whole above the part, that is, he trusts a judgment toward which the whole weight of his experience inclines him rather than a judgment toward which a merely academically employed logic or special scientific method compels- him. The logic that is compelling to any man is the logic which cla.rifies his total experience, not the special method which stultifies or denies what he feels to be its most real part; and under total experience i William James, Pragmatism, p. 7. 230 must be included not only actual knowledge but also the implicit intent to assign to actual knowledge only that place and significance which belongs to it in the total real. This intent is what gives rise to the tension between the known real and the total real. to the total self. It orients the actual self To philosophize is simply to make this intent progressively more explicit and detailed. The journey from the actual self to the potential self is a matter of converging upon an infinitely distant point. The route to that point is different for each traveler, each is at a different point on his own road. The starting point and experience of each is unique and never shared or communicated. Flashes of greeting occur momentarily when the travelers come within hailing distance. The under standing which lengthy discourse among even sympathetic minds generates is usually mainly a greater understanding of self and a clearer awareness of the distance between the experience, logic, and outlook of those minds. The unity of ultimate intent to attain truth generates in each the present truth that modes of- experience and bases of judgment are disparate and distant, and that truth itself is therefore differently conceived by each. Now to set forth the character of the. third moment of philosophy known as the philosophic solution. It is the moment of relative philosophical repose and satisfaction as 231 opposed to the relative philosophical instability and dis satisfaction which characterized the philosophic problem, and as opposed to the orderly purposive movement which characterized the philosophic process. The central character of the philosophic solution is that it is a solution whose relevance to the problem of the person concerned is understood by that person. A philosophy of life, in Allport’s conception, is simply o n e ’s modus vivendi formulated, clarified, and integrated— not just as a system of concepts but as a coordination of o n e ’s beliefs with o n e ’s practice in a meaningful and realizable program. For Allport, maturity of personality and philosophy of life are the same thing. The mature person is, as mature, a subject who has cultivated the ability to envisage or intuit his interests as interrelated in value and instrumentality. He is self-endowed with the ability to generate light enough to encompass and order his interests in the order of their reality and hence of their value. To adopt blindly or to concentrate o n e ’s Y^hole attention on a philosophy of life notably at variance with the one of which his interests and habits are the vital exemplification could not be said to be getting a philosophy of life. Such a philosophy would be possessed verbally only, not vitally. It would be understood only in the sense of being recognized as a conceptual system internally consistent, 232 judged by its definitions, postulates, and inferences. But it would not be philosophy to anybody, for example, who would be repelled by the fact that it justifies or transcends common sense, that it is incompatible or compatible with science, scientific method, religion, religious intuition, social science, or ’ w ith the beliefs of persons who lack or have prestige in his eyes— or incompatible with anything else, including the learner!s ability to make sense of the discourse involved, and his awareness that there is any philosophic problem. Relevant to these conclusions also are the observations made in connection with the survey approach, where it.was pointed out that a suitable approach must begin with a student where he is, proceed with him as he is able, and not set a priori a single goal to be attained by all students, but consult the general direction and quality of result implicit in each student. The unique suitability of a philosophy for its maker only was also shown to be the truth underlying Hocking*s assertion that philosophy is objective and sayable, for this assertion does not necessarily identify philosophy with ideas external to the beginner. If, as Hocking claims, the professional philosopher claims his name by reason of his having uncovered the presuppositions and hence the meaning of the philosophic enterprise for himself, then each student can claim to have attained to philosophy not by the addition 233 of tilings sayable never heard by him till now, not by the addition of more "facts," but only by reason of having un covered the presuppositions and meaning of his own beliefs, his examination of them, his need to understand what every thing is all about. The discussion of the different logics which some philosophers identify with philosophy is significant of the fact that any beginner whose major interest is a particular way of doing things— mathematical reasoning, scientific method, divining the motives of people, religious intuition or feeling— will, tend to identify philosophy with the rationale of that major interest, so that other brands will simply not be philosophy to him at that stage of his philosophic development. The study of the issue of openmindedness versus answers as the end of philosophy resulted in the conclusion that they represent compatible and complementary aspects of the self-understanding that is the goal of philosophy in any mind. -They are simply each student’s reflex conscious ness of his own functioning ideas of what everything is all about, and of the sketchiness and improvable quality of that self-consciousness and of those ideas. They are not the kind of mental state that can be effected in a mind by an agent external to it. They are together a quality or habit only of those minds which cultivate it, a habit of seeing things 234 together, related as ends and means in the order of their value. Nor is philosophy a static homogeneous whole, like a picture puzzle, parts of which exist in the student*s mind and the remainder of which exist in the teacher or in books. Philosophy as solution is not all of one piece nor any one thing, but a kind of thing which remains in the mind which has generated it as the vigor and style of that mind. It is not philosophical literature nor mental calisthenics, but a self-produced unity of understanding, which can be mentally distinguished, but not really separated, into subject, process of understanding, and meanings understood. In the philosophic solution, as in the philosophic problem and in the philosophic process, the fundamental relation is between the student and his own meanings. Subsidiary only are the external relations to the teacher and the classical authority. But although merely subsidiary, the teacher is in dispensable. The fact that the student is the prime agent of his own philosophy, working with materials to which he alone has direct access, attacking problems which only he feels, with a sense of reality developed in terms of his unique experience, does not mean that every callow youth inevitably grows a consciousness of the philosophic aim and develops the sophisticated art of facing life philosophically. For that aim and that art are born of recollection* and recollection implies opportunity, time, and inclination to 255 get acquainted with, oneself* Class periods in which from two to five hundred students are present are the subtle opportunity offered by mass education for recollection* And the opportunity is further enhanced by the requirement that those present recollect the thought of somebody else. Yet what is being attempted— if it is— is really indispensable, namely, teach ing what philosophy aims at and how it proceeds. Somehow, by being told, by being shown, by studying and reporting on models, each student must be made aware of what a philosophical problem is, what philosophizing is, what a philosophical solution is, or he will have nothing to guide his own philo sophical activity. But even if philosophical illustrations give him a momentary idea of the nature of the philosophic enterprise, what is there to insure the persistent relevant use of it in his own life and thinking? What support of his philosophic morale would there be, in its feeblest stage, if his initial efforts were not seconded by the easy personal availability of a teacher who had prestige in his eyes? At this point it becomes appropriate to decide the issue of the dissertation as a whole: Are existing types of general introduction to philosophy suited to their purpose? The general character of existing types of general introduction to philosophy is that they present philosophy as an impressive carnival float whose theme is problem, Logic, or Solution (differently conceived according to the temperament, 256 occupation, nationality, religion, etc., of its maker or salesman). The effort of the advocate of any particular philosophy seems to be to get his students to agree that his philosophy is the truest to the nature of things, and to climb aboard his float and ride where it takes them— forget ful that whatever truth and reality may be, each person’s actual interests and ideas constitute what he thinks reality is and what he is meeting reality with, as a going concern. These are the facts for him, however much he may be academically impressed with facts and methods and ideals which are not functional in his present outlook. Neverthe less, philosophy as presented in the various types of approach in the text-books is a system of ideas external to the persons who have come to study philosophy. Yet, in contrast with what they show philosophy to be, at bottom all philosophers believe and at the beginning of the introductory course they all declare that the raison d ’etre of studying philosophy is the clarification of each person’s own philosophical opinions, as Cushman said. Cushman was seen to be of the opinion that these personal philosophical opinions are not an available method of approach to their own clarification, and that such clarification is to be sought rather through the integration of the student’s (presumed) literary, historical, and geographical knowledge with the history of philosophy. This opinion, mutatis 237 mutandis. is shared by all advocates of approaches through ideas other than each student*s own stock. The attack is indirect— a business of taking the student through a gallery of portraits with the coy promise, Now one of these pictures is a picture of yourself and y o u will recognize it| or with the portentous pronouncement, That* though y o u cannot now understand it, is a picture of what y o u and life really are. However, in Robinson and in Hocking*s approaches there is a belated attempt on the part of the text-book writer and the teacher to get a direct approach under way instead of assuming that the clarification of personal philo sophical opinions will automatically parallel the studentTs direct concern with other people*s ideas. For Robinson, suspicious of the effect of trying magically to hoist the beginner all at once into a world of unreal problems, methods, and solutions, takes the trouble to try to contact the student’s own beliefs at the outset, although he does so only generically, under the pathetic title, Everyman1s Philosophy. And at the e n d o f the first course he prescribes, with minute directions as is proper, how each student shall write an account of his own philosophy, lured, if possible, by the prospect of winning the y e a r ’s philosophy prize. Here is realistic awareness that the assumption of an automatic carry-over from watching other people clarify their ideas and purposes to clarifying o n e ’s own is over-optimistic. 238 Hocking, too, it has been seen, has designed his approach through the types of philosophy as a sort of trap for the scattered, unrelated beliefs of newcomers to phil osophy, by the aid of which they might identify their beliefs as leading them perhaps— heavens 1— elsewhere than to the true city of Objective Idealism, and if so, be forewarned. At the end of his Pilgrim’s Progress (really his own progress) he prescribes a written examination of conscience for each student, a formulation of the student’s philosophy. Why is it that none undertakes the directly sought clarification of each student’s opinions? Is not this direct attack the one exemplified par excellence in the literary remains of all the philosophers? Why is the clarification of each student’s philosophical opinions sought in the main in directly or as a final w e e k ’s application or imitation of other philosopher’s activity? Transfer occurs for sure only when it is directly taught, and is cultivated by the student as a habit. The answer seems to be the philosophy teacher’s un critical acceptance of the conditions of mass education for the teaching of philosophy to beginners. Driven to under stand the relation of those conditions to the aim of phil osophy, the learning capacity of the student, and the prestige of teacher and subject, the philosopher may now well inquire whether philosophy is the kind of thing which fits into the 239 picture of mass education. For it would be fantasy or charlatanry to simulate, with imposing apparatus, what simply does not in the nature of the case occur. One is not teaching philosophy if he simply hopes to heaven that his discourse will be followed in his students by an imitation of what his discourse exemplifies— if it does really exemplify philosophizing. He is not teaching philosophy if he conceives his task as requiring the memorization of the definitions and formulas of a canned system, and the handling of such propositions in logical form. He is not teaching philosophy if he conceives his task as debunking his student*s ideas, even if he substitutes his own for their acceptance. He teaches philosophy only in the sense that he somehow elicits from each student an awareness, evokes from him an expression, of his own philosophical problems, and carries him through to a judgment of how far his initial concrete problem is affected by the thinking he has done about it. In the light of the idea of philosophy developed in this study, even the beginner*s course should lead to the discovery of sense and meaning and relatedness in his habits of life, so that richness of appreciation and of understanding is added to habits of life already functioning. The problems of mass education have distracted the attention of teachers of philosophy from the fact that they cannot assume that this desirable effect is being realized by the teacher*s or 240 a book*s discoursing about matters whose relevance to the student’s life escapes him for any reason, including the reason that he was too thoughtless to ask himself from time to time why he was studying philosophy and what it was. To teach on this assumption is to lose the opportunity of doing the only thing which makes studying philosophy justifiable and relevant to each student. Too readily assuming that lecturing, reciting, debating, theme-writing, and reading books to be the only means available under the system of mass education, and neglecting to analyse the teaching situation in the first course and the idea of philosophy, teachers conceive their task as a business of transmitting their own philosophy, with the result oftentimes that they strip beginners of confidence and satisfaction in the bent which total previous training has given to their personality. Such a procedure is like disconnecting the belt from the fly-wheel of a machine, so that the built-up momentum and vitality is no longer harnessed to the work it is able to do. happens,- the student’s past is undone. integrates. When this His outlook dis His living and thinking and enjoyment remain superficial instead of being tied in with the workable wisdom back of his training that he could have come to under stand and enjoy. And he is left not more mature, but merely suspicious of ideas. But can existing indirect approaches to philosophy be 241 taught to groups in such a way as not to offend against the idea of philosophy? Only supplementarily, if what is merely a method of approach is not mistaken for the objective* for ' the idea of philosophy; if mass education be liberally construed as not ordinarily requiring that the group be engaged in a common problem, and if both students and teacher realize and proceed on the understanding that each student is the sole locus of the philosophic enterprise* The only teaching method that is appropriate is the teacherfs policy of making himself available to direct and second the varied learning processes of his students as seems best in each case with reference to each one's philosophical problems. This office is a matter of a personal relationship with a student in conference or conversation ad r e m . Depend ing upon the attitude and intent of others present, whether permitted to intervene or not, such a relationship will serve a philosophic purpose for them also. But such a policy is not a method; it is an art cultivated by the teacher, the art of making friends on the basis of common interest in the good and the true. A method is at best one incarnation of the idea of philosophy. Divorced from the consciousness of their basic aim or identified with that aim, approaches to philosophy repel students as a threat to their uniqueness as persons, as inviting friendship with a body without life. A method has 242 come to mean a mere fragment of an idea, an object abstracted from its context of purpose. So misunderstood, one method will fall short of the multiple situation it is mistakenly employed to meet. Only an idea can begin to do justice to a situation, for an idea exhibits the purposive principles which innervate and order any given corpus of materials. The idea of philosophy developed in this study is not to be mis taken for just another method. It is a structure of principles resident only in minds able to grasp it, a consciously possessed style directive of all methods. It calls for that preparation in and. enthusiasm for philosophy, that understanding of the philosophic teaching situation in the first course, that personableness, freedom, and support of the teacher which will enable him to cultivate a philosophic friendship with each student. Whoever employs existing types and text-books of general introduction to philosophy in accordance with the principles just outlined is using a suitable method of approach. Less canny use of special approaches and of given text-books may be fortuitously effective or even popular with students, but it can hardly be said to be worthy of the teacher who professes to be a philosopher, because it means carrying on a program whose idea is apprehended only obscurely, confusedly, and untruly to self. When existing texts and types of approach are found to 245 be unsatisfactory , their unsatisfactoriness will be trace able, if the present study has reached legitimate conclusions, to the breakdown of their users* assumption that they have a general usefulness* They lack general usefulness because of the personal nature of the philosophic aim, problem, process, and solution; because of the differences in literacy and in literary pleasure between writer and teacher and student; because of the varying susceptibility of students to the _ philosophic prestige of this teacher, this type of approach, this text-book, and this general interest (philosophy); and because of the special nature of philosophic instruction prescribed in what in Chapter Twelve are called proprietary institutions• The overcoming of any one or of several of these dis abilities in the face of a given group of students would involve close acquaintance with those students and their individual differences, and with quite a large number of the text-books and types and devices of approach studied in this dissertation. Close acquaintance that would be relevant to the idea of philosophy is not something predictable in advance or communicable by language, but is a quality cultivated by each instructor with reference to each student. It can be cultivated by the instructor who, trained in philosophy and in the idea of philosophy for beginners, undertakes, as every text-book writer undertakes, to make clear to himself 244 and to each student who faces him what philosophy is and does and how to become philosophical. . The distinctions and principles brought to light in the present study should serve to supplement and correct the comparatively restricted personal experience of the average teacher and text-book writer in the matter of selecting, arranging, and presenting literary materials and of utilizing available external aids to philoso phizing . The results of this study are not such as wholly to discredit existing types of approach and of text-book, but simply such as to exhibit the kind and degree of relevance existing teaching instruments have to the philosophic aim, to the conditions under which it can be realized with beginners, and to the opportunities for, and support of, philosophic activity that must be arranged if philosophic instruction is to be ah r e m . As for the implications of these conclusions for the curriculum planning and officious bookkeeping which character ize mass education in philosophy, it is fortunate for philosophy that the breach has already been made in primary and secondary education, so that administrators on the university level need only follow precedent. Administrators are gradually allowing themselves to be persuaded to wink at departures from types of program which, however sanctified by tradition, simply negate or pervert the objectives prescribed by the 245 administrator himself. However, whether caution or pedagogical inertia is responsible for the late attention given by philosophers to individual differences in beginners, it ivould have been just as uncritical to fall in line with changes found necessary in early stages of education as to ignore them completely. The special character of philosophy and the special stage of development of its students called for a special study, such as the present one; a study springing from the admitted un satisfactoriness of existing ways of achieving the special objective of its own field, and carried out by a student in that field. CHAPTER XII THE DIRECT GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY IN VARIOUS TYPES OF TEACHING SITUATION A certain habit of mind was required to discern the y general beliefs in terms of which critics passed judgment upon specific phases of the various approaches to philosophy, and also to work out the organic relations of these beliefs in an idea, for an idea is not a mere enumeration or serial aggregate of self-evident instructions. And unhappily a certain minimum intellectual candle-power will be required in the person who undertakes to utilize this idea in connection with the suggestions given, for he will have to understand it first. It will be difficult for the teacher of psychology or of social science, even with the inane re assurance of the administrator who inducted him into the department of philosophy, to bring to birth and recognize the general notions of the idea of philosophy and subsume under them the appropriate individuals. It will be difficult for him to grasp the significance of principles elastically ordered according to their degree of generality and spheres of application. He will lack the experience and the power to make the idea intelligible to himself and applicable by him. He will seize upon the abstract principle of greatest generality— the purpose to teach philosophy; but what that 247 means in terms of the available materials which at once limit and make possible its realization will not see day in his mind. Lacking the power to light the way before himself, how will he light the way-of his students? How can he exhibit philosophic enthusiasm, when the reality and value of his own purposes is clouded, indistinct, and uncertain? What force will his plea to seek truth have since it will be only too apparent that he has not experienced the value of finding thetruth about himself? Apart from an understanding of the idea or theory of the general introduction course developed in the preceding chapter a new approach will be capable of being employed to just as little effect and just as inappropriately as an approach whose designer directed its construction on the mistaken assumption of automatic transfer and of knowing better than the student the nature and inherent direction of his own beliefs. Without keeping in mind the important distinctions between a particular philosophy and the idea of philosophy, between this or that system of philosophy and the kind of activity it testifies to, between what philosophy is for the professional and what philosophy must do for the tyro just attaining miurity, between gathering a store of scientifically attested facts or opinions and achieving an understanding of the relative value ana possibility of realiz ation of o n e ’s interests— a teacher will neither see himself, 248 nor be in a position to teach his students, what it is absolutely essential for them both to know, namely, what they are trying to do, and how t h e 'available materials and activities are related to that aim as body is to soul. But to any teacher of philosophy who has made his purposes clear to himself— and no one else can give him his philosophy of the teaching of philosophy— the following account of the general nature of a direct approach to philosophy may provide cues for dealing with specific types of teaching situation- The concrete teaching situation within these specific types is so numerous as to be available only to the instructor who faces it. The distance between even specific types of situation and concrete situations gives rise to the problem that must be dealt with by the intelligence of individual instructors. Consequently a study such as the present cannot tell just how to meet a concrete situation in all its detail. The materials available— students, teacher, literary materials available, curricular set-up, and the like, are various and unequal in different situations. If teaching the general introduction course in philosophy means conceiving the objective (what philosophy shall be for the beginner) and utilizing available external aids or materials in terms of the psychological make-up of the students concerned, then the primary job of the course is to determine and follow the psychological make-up of each 249 student, for it is pivotal to the whole course. If the approach to philosophy must start from the student*s own philosophical problems and proceed in terms of the sense of reality already possessed by each student, then the student*s formulation of his own philosophy ought not to be put off until the course is almost over, but ought to constitute the student!s program all through the course. The most that can be done in that direction before the event is to indicate, on the basis of the materials brought to light, the conditions "under which beginners may be expected to have sufficient interest in philosophy to become philosophers. Such a discussion will comprise a statement of the forces which must operate to elicit and support the student^s intrinsic interest in philosophy. What these forces are and how important is their right functioning may be best shown by examples of their partisan use in what have been called proprietary or private institutions. It is only too painfully evident that, as George Boas has remarked,*^* in this country philosophy labors under the disability of being the exercise of professors who are paid to teach a funded body of doctrine. How reconcile the idea of philosophy with the command to regard and teach that philosophizing as erroneous which arrives at conclusions 1 George Boas, The Adventures of Human Thought, p. 419. 250 incompatible with authoritarian pronouncements? with the command to teach as uniquely philosophically true a system whose credentials are primarily the fact that it most cogently "demonstrates" certain beliefs vital to certain religious or political or economic movements? So conceived, philosophy is simply the instrument of propaganda and is prevented from being its judge. Yet, even so conceived, philosophy might possibly serve a valuable philosophic purpose* It might have the valuable effect of giving to students trained and moving comfortably in a given culture and tradition an understanding of the rationale of that tradition. Such a f m o t i o n , rightly undertaken, is the first job of philosophy sanely conceived; branching out into alien traditions should come later. A student thus initiated has had the chance to make himself articulate, to develop the ability to give reasons for the faith that is in him, whether that faith be religious, artistic, scientific, economic, or political. With some students, the undisputed prestige which such a faith enjoys in their milieu is sufficient incentive for them to study its theoretical bases. But such sheltered spots are not the rule, and the homogeneity of minds is mainly apparent. Out side these island worlds— which means sometimes, outside a pile of masonry— such students usually encounter difficulty in regarding as real either their hot-house philosophy or 251 certain phases of the world into which they have stepped, depending upon how completely their inoculation has taken. Some students are immune to start with, for any of the many reasons touched upon in chapters two to nine of this study. But in so far as a successfully inoculated student of philosophy so conceived remains in his insulated world physically or by mental ostrich-tactics, he has made the philosophic progress of having understood the rationale of the life to ivhich he chooses to limit himself. His philosophy has been an intrinsic interest, supported by the prestige which it and its teacher enjoy in his world, and developed with the aid of literary materials, discussions, conferences, and literary effort seen by the student as significant to his aim to understand his purposes. But without the fact of the undisputed and oftenaffirmed prestige of this kind of philosophy within a given circle, and without the student*s complete acceptance of the well-foundedness of that prestige and his being strongly impressed thereat, this brand-of philosophy fails to interest him. It slips into the category of completely external approaches, and as such is simply not philosophy for those of whose outlook it is not recognized to be the rationale, but simply a rationalization. And incidentally, to assert that any great system represents the rationale of an underg r a d u a t e d beliefs is to assert, ridiculously, that a parrot 252 is in possession of a content of meanings which the funded experience and ripe reflection of thinkers of the first water have taken centuries to develop. Such a system may possibly represent the ideal term of a member of a tradition’s philosophical thinking, but how shall the teacher of philosophy determine beforehand, or what competence has he, as philosopher and as teacher of philosophy, to prescribe what shall be the term of a student’s philosophical thinking? Is it at this point that it becomes appropriate for the philosopher to submit to the statesman and to the ecclesi astic and to the industrialist turned financer and directer of education? and teach only that brand of philosophy which his administrative superior finds to be in keeping with the trans mission of a tradition structural to civil or industrial or ecclesiastical society? And who is to determine whether this alleged necessity of a given philosophy is the case? Practically this issue is decided by the administrative superior, and practically (Kant assenting, Socrates dissent ing) such decision is accepted by teachers of philosophy either from conviction of the truth of the system of philosophy or from recognition of a broader philosophic outlook in the administrator than they themselves possess or by reason of having accepted appointment, in a proprietary institution. The second reason just mentioned is the reason of those who make a distinction between being a philosopher and being a 253 teacher of philosophy— a necessary distinction in places where the assumption operates that the teacher of philosophy need not be much of a philosopher himself, for in such places philosophy has deservedly -fallen into contempt, being confused with not knowing what everything is ail about. Even professional recognition among teachers has been forthcoming, under the general provision of academic freedom, of the right of administrative officers in proprietary schools to restrict the right of free speech of teachers within the limits of the institution*s special purpose. However, such professional recognition is accompanied by the stigma that the institution is professedly not concerned Y/ith the discovery and teaching of truth in all of its aspects, and henc,e by the penalty of being known as not entitled to public support in view of the school’s avowed intention to serve special interests rather than the common good. Practically,, then, the teacher of philosophy, by accepting an appointment in a proprietary school, thereby accepts the duty to achieve the idea of philosophy within the limits of the institutional tradition or purpose to whose transmission he makes himself a party, and of that tradition as defined or in some way indicated by the institution’s officers. 1 American Association of University Professors Bulletin. XXVI, no. 1, "Annual Report of Committee A", pp. 42-45. 254 Philosophy in such institutions suffers particularly from an evil generated partly by the irrelevant grounds on which students enroll in them and partly by each school»s identification of its special purpose with the common good. F e w students who enroll in an institution classed as an institution for the furtherance of special interests are aware of the special significance of the type of training they have let themselves in for. Nevertheless, in such a set-up any objection on the part of enrolled students to the brand of philosophy that is taught in conformity to official prescription, with the aid and in the spirit of approved texts, may rightly be regarded as unfounded and expressive of the students* ignorance of the significance of having enrolled in that institution. With reference to such students the teacher of philosophy knoT ws he is not teaching philosophy if he is faithful to his commitments to the explicitly special purpose of his institution. He is prevented from making a real distinction between a particular system and the idea of philosophy, for he has committed himself to teaching the identity of'the idea- of philosophy with a particular system. He can only point out that the total lack of philosophical interest of such students in the brand of philosophy he is prescribed to teach is due at least in fatal part to the fact that this particular system has no connection with the idea of philosophy for them, and hence no philosophic interest for 255 them. Of course, the expression of such a judgment would be treason in the eyes of officers of the institution. The alternative is unworthy of a philosopher and incompatible with the teacher’s self-commitment to the explicitly special purpose of the institution. It is to try to appeal to students’ esthetic or logical or historical interest by teaching the prescribed system, if possible, much as a teacher of literature would teach a poem or a teacher of mathematics, Principia Mathematica— as an artistic or architechtonic masterpiece. But, to repeat, this expedient is unjustifiable in one. who has committed himself to teach the system as philosophically true, unless the teacher has reason to believe or to presume that it is officially condoned. If such is the case, the teacher of philosophy is only nominally such, and philosophy is not the gainer but the loser, for it becomes associated in students’ minds with entertainment and games, which are mere matters of taste and skill. The decision whether a teacher of philosophy who does not accept the prescribed system as philosophically true can be considered a suitable teacher of the truth of that system- rests with administrative superiors. So does the obligation to inform themselves on this point, if an obligation exists. The teacher of philosophy in the proprietary school, then, finds his work suitably and effectively seconded by the prestige which his subject enjoys with reference to those 256 students whose experience and dominant aim make them susceptible to that prestige; but he finds his work with other students just as decisively blocked or even leading to a perverted notion of philosophy * He may start ’ w ith each student»s stock of beliefs, as outlined below, but he is committed to bring ing them into a prize court for confiscation in the interests of the country of the prize crew. It is a practical application fata volentem ducunt. nolentem trahunt. There remains the task of indicating the program of a general introduction course which could be conducted under auspices favorable to the essential idea of philosophy. It is a program available— ■theoretically— only to teachers of philosophy in public institutions where the instruction is aimed at the common good in terms of the truth in all its aspects. In such institutions, by contrast with the type referred to above, the teacher has accepted an appointment to translate into fact the essential idea of philosophy and is thereby debarred from the attempt to propagandize for any single brand of philosophy, including his own. He is committed to carrying out his program in terms of each studentfs philo— , sophical interest. Luckily for the teacher of philosophy, it is more interesting for adolescents to talk about their own philosophical problems than to rehearse the mental processes of other thinkers, because they are on familiar ground with their own very real 257 working convictions, than which there is no better argument* If a m a n ’s name is the sweetest music in his ears, then his voice and pen, formulating his attitude toward life, the reasons back of it, the results he expects from it, are the best guarantee of interest in the first course* The bull-sessioner and the soap-box orator bear witness to the interest of the layman in the things which the teacher of philosophy promises his students to treat system atically and critically. The teacher of philosophy has a professional monopoly on the subjects which a collegian never tires of talking about, but which he is never taught to talk about in a sustained fashion undisturbed by emotion. The collegian may not have a professional interest in the natural or social sciences or in art, but he always has a philosophic interest in what he knows of these fields. He is always curious about their implications for the good life in a way he can understand and feel to be real. His constant effort is to formulate a better and more satisfactory state ment of what the good life is. He is trying to state just what he is aiming at and what he considers v^orth while. The beginner in philosophy is at an age at which he experiences an acute need to know for sure just what every thing is all about anyway. What makes him curious about academic philosophy, if he is, is that it is asserted to give a clear and convincing understanding of what everything 258 is all about. With such an understanding and clear sense of what he does and wants and knows he feels that he can face life as a unit, a definite and well-ordered personality, an integer instead of a heap of fractions. For this is the g o a l - different for each person— toward which he gropes whenever he turns from collecting new facts in biology, psychology, history, literature, sociology, religion, and so forth, and asks himself how these things are related to one another and to the good life. The beginner, in desperation or in obedience to previous training, turns to others for the answer, not realizing that he already has within him the only judge, sense of reality, and decisive materials of an answer that he will vitally understand. Each beginner*s different mental content, slant, and sense of reality make him the sole possible developer of a significant philosophic answer, and the sole judge of the reality of the answer as far as his willingness to act on it is concerned. That answer is the direction in which his living and thinking are even now taking him. The only philosophizing he is really interested in at this time is the discovery of that direction, the factors which determine it, its possibilities, desirability, eventuation. By the time he got to college he had the elements of his fundamental philosophy already in him. They are his habits, his working convictions, his aims, his daily round of interests. They 259 are in a loose, chaotic state in his consciousness, although functional in his behavior; and the pattern of relations that their conceptual formulation would reveal is unsuspected and unappreciated. The job of the teacher is to have the student bring all this to light, to look at himself thus objectified, and to formulate these materials in as coherent and clear a fashion as they permit. This document tells the student, at any given stage of its preparation, his de facto answer to what everything is all about. It is by repeatedly re-thinking and re-working these materials that the student brings to light the problems of his philosophy, his burning questions. He uncovers connections, blanks, obscurities, contradictions in his fund of beliefs, habits, and aims, as is to be expected from their different sources. He is faced with the philosophic task of evaluating his aims in the light of his equipment, his beliefs in the light of relevant evidence, and the sources of his beliefs. In each person is a new and differently mixed aggregate of elements from his social and biological past; hence each o n e rs philosophy begins with his perception of the significance of these elements in the proportions in which they operate in him. As in a picture-puzzle, the pieces have to be put to gether in the pattern into which they actually fall by their structure, before their meaning can be seen for sure. The anticipation of what the picture is going to be is the peculiar 260 pleasure of philosophizing. It is the pleasure of discover ing for oneself what everything is all about, of seeing the significance and the goal of what one is doing and thinking. When the the student finds his bearings he himself feels back of his urgency of making obvious adjustments. This philosophic sense of urgency is the impulsion learning, and is a function of the aim or direction he perceives himself to be working toward. A book or an imprudent teacher can effect a violent, whole sale disposal of his beliefs, but self-criticism done system atically results in a gradual sloughing off of old ideas with new ones taking over their job as oner's purposes become more clearly'apprehended and defined. This type of adjustment in connection with philosophy is counselled by the idea of philosophy in its guise as prudence. It is understood, sought, and achieved surely because lighted up by o n e ’s purpose. The multiplicity and complexity of the variables that go into the making of each personality make the job of integration and of direction-finding unique in each person, and constitute a problem 'so nice and so indispensably constitutive of personality that no man will in the last analysis entrust it to another. It is the one large creative act that marks the change of a trained animal into a person, and each person realizes that it can be funked only at the price of remaining childish. The job of the teacher of philosophy is an advisory 261 and inspirational job, not a legislative or propagandizing one. He misses his calling if his inspiration and his advice— personal and .through such forms of student activity as reading materials, speaking and writing devices— are not ad reiBf He is a menace to the individual concerned if instead of consulting the further development of each studentfs possibilities he tears down and attempts to build up the student into his own or any one *s else image and like ness. On the other hand, he would fail both the individual and society if he neglected to effect the student»s under standing of his lim tations and narrowness of outlook. These two services set the job of the teacher of philosophy, in the introductory course at least. It is a business of getting each student to work out his own idea of the kind of thing philosophy is— on his own level, with reference to his own unique life-job, of which it is simply the clear, distinct, detailed understanding ; making him aware of the direction his life has already taken and of the necessity of attaining his objectives in inescapable dependence upon the context of physical, social, and spiritual fact and principle which he at once exemplifies and is caught in. The student whose god is science has much to start with, but not enough to live among men, for whole men must know the bearing of science upon social and spiritual values, and vice versa. The student who has confined his attention to social studies needs to be made aware of their physical and spiritual contexts, and the student of the Ideas needs to realize that he works only with dreams when he works apart from natural and social fact. But this is only a broad sketch or frame or myth to be made to appear to each student in the content of his own beliefs— the relation of his interests to the whole of his world. Philosophizing is not mere vocation-finding in the narrow sense, nor merely ancillary in the narrow sense, nor merely the development of a social philosophy in the narrow sense; any more than it is merely an attempt to master the rationale of a culture. Philosophizing is a business of each i n dividuals conscious ness of his purposes radiating out from himself as an individual to the social, physical, and spiritual environ ment in which and in terms of* which his purposes are going to take their form. It is a business of consolidating and extending the sphere of the familiar and the functional by rendering it intelligible in its value and instrumentality and intelligibility has reference to inclusive judgments of vital reality as opposed to single direct experiences of dramatic quality, as in art, or to experiences of being under command, as in religion. How make the student the subject and agent of such a program? Since the aim is to bring to light the content and direction of the studentTs interests, and since interests 265 develop over a period of time, it would seem that any activity of the .student which enabled him to recall the growth of his interests would constitute and further his working out of the idea of philosophy. The activity, to avoid monotony, must be varied enough, carried along simultaneously on several fronts, to keep the student directly making his own philosophy and at the same time following similar processes in others, so that he can quickly get his bearings on what he is doing by comparing his own efforts with those of others and vice versa. The central labor of writing a fuller and fuller account— in the form of an autobiography— of how he came to be the kind of person he now is, doing the things he does, having the interests, habits, and knowledge he now has, should be relieved and lubricated by opportunities for speaking about these things, for speech is easier than writing, although alone unsatisfactory because the meanings are gone with the wind. And from reading both writing and speaking receive inspiration as to content, form of thought and of expression, which make them more grateful and satisfying than when employed alone. Diaries, if available, provide materials for autobiography; thematic writing grows out of problems that appear in the course of autobiography. A notebook of commonplace daily decisions and of striking thoughts written down immediately will, over a period of time, provide 264 materials for arriving at a judgment of the value one attributes to doing or failing to do something that appears as a regular feature of o n e ’s daily life, and thus is an aid in clarifying o n e ’s real functioning interests as opposed to professed ideals which are realiy inoperative velleities. Such a notebook is a regular feature of the lives of members of religious orders who take progress in their chosen ideal of life seriously enough to plan it and check it; and recently Professor Paul Weaver of Stephens College, in an unpublished paper read at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference, 1959, outlined a similar recording device as a feature of his philosophic instruction. The read ing of biographical and autobiographical materials and the published letters of philosophers and other writers in their interesting and philosophical moments is valuable for illustrating to the student how philosophic problems emerge from the matrix of currents and themes in individual minds and are philosophically attacked by being understood in their relation to the.total experience of the minds concerned. Occasions for speaking and writing about what a given author was trying to do philosophically and how he went about it tend to bring to greater clarity the mere reading of such things, and to improve the quality of the student’s own self revelation. The very process of trying to formulate clearly and coherently the direction and meaning of the items of 265 knowledge, habit, convictions, and purposes he finds in him self is the philosophic task, on his level, of making sense of and resolving conflicts in his daily round. As he proceeds in such statement of what he thinks everything is all about, he feels the need of talking about it with his fellows, with his instructor, and with the authors of books that seem to him to make sense. And as long as that feeling of personal need can be kept alive the student perseveres in his philosophic attitude and endeavor. As Goldensen said, philosophizing is a matter of clarifying o n e ’s own meanings, and in the philosophic chagrin which a student can be made to experience at being pushed for a statement of simply what he means and why the instructor has found his most effective pedagogical lever. In this connection it is desirable to point out that the philosophic friendship between instructor and student which was spoken of earlier is not to be thought of as a watery sentimental Alphonse-and-Gaston relationship, with student and instructor on the' same level. The philosophic interest of each is directed not to the person of the other but to the truth achievement and-truth intent of the other, and since these qualities are presumably in a richer state of exemplification and cultivation in the instructor than in the student, the philosophic regard of each for the other will be unequal. Other things being equal, the instructor’s philosophic 266 influence on his pupil is a function of the difference in philosophic potential which the pupil can sense to exist "between himself and his instructor. The strength of the student*s regard for his instructor is the measure of the extent to which he will push the latter in testing the latterTs philosophic vigor and the measure of his docility in accepting and working out the directions of his instructor. The philo sophic understanding between them is not an understanding of face-saving but one of complete candor, of trueness to self, which involves willingness to be pushed to o n e ’s best statement of meaning and truth and if necessary to admitting and defining the point at which one falls short of it. All this in the interest of being true to o n e ’s idea of philosophy. Where philosophy is elected by the students and where a relatively homogeneous group faces the instructor— say, all law students, all science students, all medical students, all fine arts students— the task of the teacher is simplified to a certain extent. For a student who has chosen his field comes to philosophy presumably to make clear to himself the rationale of that field, for his own greater understanding and satisfaction. The philosophic enterprise for such students starts from and works out from each student’s experience and grasp of his field and of all his interests. Such students will be aided by biographical and autobiographical materials of men in their own fields, as well as by such materials in 267 the general history of philosophy, to work out their own autobiography and outlook. But for these people as for any others it remains true that the philosophy of a person’s life cannot be taken over from another person or from a book in toto, but simply represents the tissue of purpose and fact, clearly and thoroughly worked out, which constitutes a person’s understanding of himself and of his place in the scheme of things. It is incommunicable, as is o n e ’s personality. Where such a homogeneous group faces the teacher, but by curricular prescription, much depends upon whether the prestige of philosophy in that institution, or the personal prestige of the teacher of philosophy, or both, makes the prescribed course also a matter of the students* intrinsic philosophic interest, even when the teacher can in other respects be true to the idea of philosophy. However, prestige in a philosopher does not inevitably operate to philosophic purpose in his students, for it can be so all-determining as to make its victims (or its benefactees) believe more in the reality of an unattained and faith-conjectured ideal than in the reality of the interests they now enjoy. Where this over-, effect takes place, where the actual sense of reality is ignored in favor of a faith-accepted version of the true total (potential) self, all contact with philosophy has been lost. Only when there is a vital tension between an actual sense of reality and a potential sense of reality— a tension 260 created by some understanding of the direction and organic growth of the present sense of reality— can philosophy be involved. Where a teacher enjoys the prestige— which means, is so known by and so knows the student as— effectively to suggest to him the direction of growth implicit in the student»s own life and thinking, so that the student recognizes the justice of the suggestion, prestige has served a philosophic purpose; the philosophic interest has been elicited and engaged. Where the instructor knows for sure just what everything is all about, he will be likely to affect his students unphilosophieally, because he will teach his own opinions as identical with philosophy and as communicable information. Where students interested in several or all fields, or even students of widely different preparation in and grasp of the same field, are permitted to enroll for a general introduction to philosophy, the activity of the teacher of philosophy toward the group as a group is almost precluded. Even telling what philosophy is and pointing out examples of philosophizing in o n e fs speech and in literary materials is addressed to no one in particular. One arrow has to hit every inch of the target; philosophic buckshot or shrapnel does not exist. Wholly individual contacts become necessary, because such radical heterogeneity obtains that the concept of prestige itself is stripped of all apparent 269 connection with the assumption of a common-to-all criterion of philosophic truth. For prestige is related to the f m o t i o n ing interests of people and speaks with effect and reality only to those functioning interests. Prestige is operative not exclusively in terms of the remote ideal of total truth, hut in terms of each person*s psychological distance from that total truth, and that psychological distance from the total truth and the vital tension between them are different for each person, and the situation is complicated by the different major interests of people, so that they live each in his o i m world. Prestige is a matter of belief^ people believe differently and are affected accordingly. Addressing a group, an instructor in philosophy gives a single impression interpreted variously by different students. Only by deal ing with them individually can he, by virtue of his experience with direction the philosophic growth of many different minds, be philosophically inspirational and directive to widely different minds— minds widely different in their major interests. Yet even in such a motley crew the instructor may find the lack of common vocational purpose or of shared experience partly compensated by an encouraging literacy among his students. Where students are articulate, they offer the possibility of being lured— seduced, in Hudson*s phrase— into that minimum coherent formulation and appraisal 270 of their interests and purposes which there is time for in the first course to which students tend with fierce restraint to limit themselves. Where such skill already exists and is savored, it can find in the philosophic enterprise its greatest stimulation and its greatest challenge, for its subject is closest home and most familiar yet least known and most mysterious. But where reading, writing, and speaking are painful, slow, inaccurate, and incoherent, the language skills foundational to philosophizing themselves remain to he laid; and the double or quadruple job facing the aspirant is formidable even to one elect. And where there is no acquaint ance with the mother languages of philosophy, it only complicates instead of clarifying the studentfs self revelation to suggest that he divide and rule it according to the traditional partition of philosophy, and thus make contact with the inspiring self-revelations of the great. It is not the instructor of philosophy, and it may not even be the students themselves— although they are pretty well permitted to call the tune to ?jhich they shall dance in their previous education— who are to blame for coming to philosophy (or to the age at which responsible self-hood is indicated) so unskilled in the human art of literacy that * they neither have nor can talk and write coherently about their distinctively human interests and aims, and look upon 271 concern with and proficiency in those skills with an air of superiority which is denied the plants and animals whose mode of life they exemplify by choice. Faced with such primitives, the teacher of philosophy is practically limited to calling, attention to what he is and stands for with reference to the civilized living of which they enjoy only the physical advantages. He can only point out that because they do not function with ease in civilized ways above the physical and aggregational levels, they have no enjoyment of them, and are cut off from understanding the desirability of something, they have never experienced the desirability of. He can only point out that civilized living is not something that just happens whether people know what it is or not, or whether they really want it or not; that it is a business of knowing and seeking the things that satisfy now and in the long run, for the individual and for the group; that the aim of education is to give people such facility in all the elements of civilized living, such enjoy ment of its returns, and such an understanding of its nature and goal that people learn to prefer that mode of living because of its superior benefits all along the line; that philosophy is simply each person*s awareness of the extent to which his continued participation in the benefits of civilized living implicates and is dependent upon his use of his intelligence. 272 In this connection, the philosophizing which is relevant to the philosophic interests of the over-privileged will appear to be reactionary rationalization to the under privileged, and that which is relevant to the philosophic interests of the under-privileged will appear to be radical revolutionism to the over-privileged. The philosophizing of the over-privileged will, if true to the idea of philosophy, tend to an understanding of the limits to which human beings permit themselves in given times and places to be used as means; and the philosophizing of the under-privileged will tend, if true to the idea of philosophy, to an understanding of the degree of participation in the benefits of civilized living which concerted intelligent effort can use the physical and institutional resources of the community for. But in each case the tendency is toward realism in the interests of idealism, toward the factuality which limits at the same time that it provides the only materials for and renders possible the realization of purposes or values. It is appropriately the teacher of philosophy, as concerned ex professo with the common good, whether within the individual or in the group, who^ offers opportunity to disparate elements of the (assumed and intended) democratic community to come to a full consciousness of their respective statuses in the group life, of their inter dependence, and of their being at the mercy of their under- 273 standing of their purposes as individuals and as a group. Each teacher of a special subject-matter serves a different interest in his students, with the result that the student, before he begins systematically to philosophize, reflects the special interests of his several teachers. If, as at present obtains, each teacher is required to stay within his field of competence in the class room, the student is simply a shelf of pigeon-holes, some on the way to being filled, others empty and overlooked. Added to the natural unrelatedness of these spaces in the mind of the student, there is the ignorant practice of some teachers who convey by word or attitude the impression that life is only physical science or only social science or only mathematics or only religion or only art. Two things are needed effectively to overcome this anti-civilizing and anti-philosophic teaching condition. The first concerns teachers themselves. It is the recognition and exemplification to students and public by teachers of the pressing truth that one-sided views of life are fatal to civilized living. Such recognition and practical action must work from the inside out, from faculty to students; it is possible through departmental and interdepartmental conferences or professional activities of a faculty as a whole or of representative members of several departments or colleges or schools within an institution and even between 274 institutions. This kind of recognition and its effect on the teaching of special fields builds up the prestige required to elicit the interest and the imitation of students, who, not having vital experience of the value of consulting their larger welfare, are not moved by verbal reasons of the teacher of philosophy. Then, with the way for such breadth of view and of action paved by teachers themselves, the opportunity must be presented to the students to do what the partial program of non-philosophic classes forbids, and that is to talk, write, and read about the mode of life they are already living in all its phases, and thus to come to a recognition of the importance of intelligently developing each phase. Besides the opportunity presented in limited fashion by class meetings, a forum club in which students from all departments are encouraged to contribute to the clarification of purposes provides occasion for those participating to learn not to disparage or to dis card important elements in their previous training, but to treat each element with the objectivity that its importance for their lives, inclusively understood, demands. This constant reference of their thinking to their own lives as a whole is necessary if they are ever to realize that all the arts and sciences— not just one or some— grew out of life needs and are significant only by reason of their satisfaction of those needs. 275 In this fashion only will they appreciate the folly of denying facts in one field merely because they cannot be investigated by the method of another field; and the wisdom of working with the materials at hand instead of living in hopes and conjectures. But without the cessation of ignorant propaganda within special fields for the unique importance of those respective fields for civilized living, and without teachers* public exhibition of their articulate conviction of the necessity of cooperation and mutual recognition for the common good, the teacher of philosophy will work almost in vain with students against the abuse of prestige by teachers of special subjects. It is his sad task, a scandal made inevitable by the smallness of his colleagues, to point out to students the ignorance, the unrealistic attitude, and the potential disastrousness of unphilosophic specialists and teachers. The philosopher is the Jeremiah, the Cassandra, the Calamity Jane of education. But the teacher of philosophy, besides fulminating against evils,, must induce students to accept the responsibility of saving themselves, and must provide opportunity and inspiration for them to be saved by their ability to prevision and experience apprehensiveness of evils as threats to their larger welfare. It is his peculiar job to inspire and provide occasion for students to 276 ■understand the need of uniting what has been merely methodologically separated, of distinguishing and order ing things which have been confused, and of assigning proper limits to what has been too enthusiastically generalized. He will do so effectively if besides pleading with his students to prefer the interests of the whole to those of the parts, he takes issue with partial viewpoints among fellow teachers, and brings attention to the superiority of his concern for the common good either with the cooperation of his colleagues or in the teeth of their refusal and continued preoccupation with partial truth. In sum, the direct general introduction to philosophy is each student’s self-formulated attitude, outlook, and program of life, conscious of its purposes and assumptions, of its criteria of value and reality, of its implication in and dependence upon the context of physical, social, and spiritual fact. Supporting the s t u d e n t s intrinsic interest in his total welfare and his progressive clarification of that interest are external aids whose relevance to their job is a matter of the student’s having achieved a certain literacy and of the instructor’s possessing or vindicating for himself and his work sufficient prestige to induce the student to employ these external aids in bringing to light what his larger welfare consists in. These aids are auto biography, a notebook of routine decisions and striking 277 thoughts written while the student is still under their influence, a diary, thematic writing arising from points of stress in the autobiography and notebook, use of class periods for illustrating to students and for their report ing on how philosophic problems arose and were philosophically attacked in suitable biographical and autobiographical materials, use of class periods for discussing philosophical problems generated in the minds of students by their implication in the school set-up, holding philosophical forums in which students invited from several departments of the institution discuss the relation of their respective special fields to the common good, engineering or calling attention persistently to the necessity of a similar cooperation among representatives of special subjects in the faculty, and the easy personal availability of the teacher of philosophy to students singly or in groups for conference or for mutual stimulation on philosophical topics. Most of these valuable features are to be found in a device advanced by McNutt and critically estimated in this dissertation. It exemplifies the truth that philosophic weapons may be found in reading, tested in speech, and put to work in writing; found in speech, tested, in writing, put to work.in reading; found in writing, tested in reading, and put to work in speech. Add to this the important conclusion of this study that the materials of philosophic problems are to be found only in each self, in the tension which exists between the actual self and the potential self, a tension which in one connection is the tension between single interests in each self and the total welfare of that self, and in another connection the tension between the private good and the common good. It seems to follow that where a student could be led to employ McNutt’s comprehensive device for finding and attacking a philosophic problem in accordance with this idea, the maximum truly philosophic interest could be generated, for it combines individual with group activity and teacher aid in admirable fashion. But each instructor must judge in the presence of all the factors facing him in a given place, time, and student group whether or not, and to whom, strong meat may be served instead of pap. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS Adams, G. P., W. R. Dennes, J. Lowenborg, and other, Knowledge and Society, a Phi1osophicaI Approach to Modern Civilization. New York; Apple ton*Cfentury Company, 1938. xiii, 417 pp. Allport, Gordon W . , Personality, a Psychological Interpretation. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937. xiv, 588 pp. Baker, Albert Edward, How to Understand Philosophy. Doran, 1926. New York: Bakewell, C. M., Source Book in Ancient Philosophy. 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J., History of Philosophy. 4th Edition. Holt. New 109 pp. Weber, Alfred, History of Philosophy. 5th French Edition,1892, authorized Translated by FraSc Thilly. .New York: ScribnerTs 1909. xi, 630 pp. TWindelband, Wilhelm, An Introduction to Philosophy, translated by J. McCabe. London: T . Fi'sKer“Unwin, 1921. 365 pp. Wolfenden, John Fredrick, The Approach to Philosophy. E. Arnold, 1932. 236 pp. London: 284 B. PERIODICAL ARTICLES Albee, E., “Meaning of Literature for Philosophy,” International Journal of Ethics, 20:1-10, October, 1909. “Annual Report of Committee A , ” American Association of University Profosoora Bulletin, XXVI, number 1, pp. 42-45. Antz, E. L., “Philosophy Recommended to Teachers,11 Peabody Journal of Education, 9:80-3, June, 1931. Arkush, A. S., “Dead Philosophy in the Lecture Hall,11 Education Review, 69:14-16, January, 1925. Bahm, A. J., “Should Philosophy be Taught in High School?11 Texas Outlook, 19:9, December, 1935. Bode, B. H . , “Why do Philosophical Problems Persist?“ Journal of Philosophy, 15:169-77, March 28, 1928. Brase, H . , “Philosophy-Conscious Students,11 (In Eastern States Association of Professional Schools for Teachers, Proceed ings, pp. 170-76, 1936). Brightman, E. S., “Philosophy in American Education,” The Personalist, 1:15-28, 1920. Brown, C. E . , “Philosophy, the Guide of Life,” School and Society, 37:697-701, June 3, 1933. Brown, W. A., “The Future of Philosophy as a University Study,” Journal of Philosophy, 18:673-82, December 8, 1921. Buckingham, B. R., ^Relation of the Curriculum to the Text book,” (In American Educational Research Association, Reconstructing Education through Research: Official Report, pp. 146-50, 1936.1 Corson, F. P., "Philosophy for the Liberal Arts Colleges,” Association of American Colleges Bulletin, 24:224-5, May, 1938. Crothers, S. M., “Wanted: A Philosophy for Social Workers,” National Conference of Social Workers, 1926, pp. 30-35. 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T., "Educating for Wisdom," The Personalist, 4: 265-266, October, 1923. ______, "Educational Skulduggery,” The Personalist, Sum mer, 1938, pp. 229-240. ____________, "Our Dogmatic Age,” The Personalist, 9: 81-86, April, 1928. ____________, "The New Task of Philosophy,” American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow, edited by H. M« Kailen and S. Hook. New York: Lee F u m a m , Inc., 1935. ____________, "The Present Dilemma of Civilization,” Section iv, "Education", The Personalist, 13: 165-177, July, 1932. , "Why a School of Philosophy?", The Personalist, 10: 157-161, 1929. Friend, F. W. and J. Feibleman, "Barrage for a New World,” Menorah Journal, 20: 97-104, 1932. Gillis, J. S., "Wanted: A Guide, Philosopher and Friend," Cath olic W o r l d , 125: 360-9, June, 1927. Ginzberg, B., "Can Philosophy Come Back?” , Nation, 135: 190-1, August 31, 1932. Glover, I. R., "Making Human Phonograph Records,” Review, 15: 260-2, March, 1936, Kadelpian Goldenson, R., "Some Approaches to the Teaching of Philosophy, Progressive Education, 14: 323-9, May, 1937. Hall, J# S., "College Philosophy,” Forum, 29; 409-22, June, 1900. ~ Hammond, Josephine, ”0n Being Asked What is Education,” Personalist, 6: 90-97, April, 1925. Hess, S. E., "Philosophy— An Extra-Curricular Activity,” Junior College Journal, 9: 80-83, November, 1938. Hiiiman, E. L ., "The Aims of an Introductory Course in Phil osophy,” Journal of Philosophy, 7: 561-569, October 13, 1910. Hocking, W. E . , "Philosophy and Religion in Undergraduate Education,” Association of American Colleges Bulletin, 23: 45-54, March, 1937. ~ , "What Does Philosophy Say?” 3 7: 133-155, 1928. Philosophical Review, Horne, H. H., "College Students on the Study of Philosophy," School and Society, 16: 725-8, December 23, 1922. Hudson, J. W., ”An Introduction to Philosophy through the Philosophy in History," Journal of Philosophy, 7: 569574, October 13, 1910. "Hegel’s Conception of an Introduction to Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, 6: 345-353, June 10, 1909. "The Aims and Methods of Introduction Courses; A Q u e s t i o n a i r e J o u r n a l of Philosophy, 9: 29-39, January 18, 1912. Jacobs, L. B., "Eighteen Criteria for Choosing New Textbooks,” Clearing H o u s e , 11: 485-6, April, 1937. Ker, W. P., ’’Popular Philosophy," Hibbert Journal, 10: 370379, 1911-12. Lawson, D. E., "Technique of Teaching to Think,” Education Administration and Supervision, 24: 277-81, April, 1938. 287 Lewis, John, f,H o w to Teach Philosophy,” October, 1932. Philosophy, McCormick, J. P., "Philosophy in the College Curriculum," National Catholic Education Association Proceedings, 164-74, 1930. Meyers, 0. P., "Philosophy for Semi-Professional Students," Junior College Journal, 7: 157-41, December, 1936. , "Philosophy in the Semi-Professional Curricula,” Junior College Journal, 3: £60-3, February, 1953. Michel, Virgil, "Towards a Vital Philosophy," New Scholasticism, 11: 128-139, April, 1937. Miltner, C. C., "Objectives in Teaching Philosophy," New Scholasticism, 11: 350-357, October, 1937. Monroe, W. S., and A* Marks, "General Methods of Teaching Evaluated: Results of Research,'" Education Adminis tration and Supervision, 24: 581-927 November, 1938. Montague, W. P., "Philosophy in the College Course," Education Review, 40: 488-498, December, 1910. Muirhead, J. H., "The Place of Philosophy in American Univ ersities," Philosophical Review, 56: 209-15, 1927. , "What is Philosophy Anyhow?" Personalist, 8: 15769, 1927. O k e m , Ella C., "Importance of Method in Teaching Philosophy," Junior College Journal, 8: 134-138, December, 1937. Overstreet, H. A., "Can Philosophy Come Back?" Freeman, 8: 523-5, December 12, 1923.. Packard, S. R., "Textbook Curse," Social Frontier, 3: 11819, January, 1957. Partridge, G. E., f,Philosophy in the College,” Genetic Philosophy of Education, 295-302. Paulsen, F., "Instruction in Philosophy, Its Past and its Future," Gesammelte padagogische Abhandlungen, edited by E. Spranger. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1912. . _____ , "Philosophische Propadeutik," Encyclopedic Handbook of Pedagogics, W. Rein. 288 "The Future Tasks of Philosophy," The Culture of Our Own Times, A Symposium, edited by Hinneberg._ . Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1904. Payne, F., and E. W. Spieth, An Open Letter to College Teachers. Bloomington, Indiana: PrincTpia Press, Inc. Phelan, G. B., "Sequence of Courses in Philosophy in the Undergraduate Department in Catholic Colleges,Tt National Catholic Education Association Proceedings, 102-8, 1932. Prichard, H. A., "Mr. Bertrand Bussell’s Outline of Phil osophy, tf Mind, 37: 265-82, 1928. Rand, Benjamin, "Philosophical Instruction in Harvard Uni versity from 1636 to 1900," Harvard Graduate Magazine, 37: 188-200. 1928. Robinson, E. A., "Aftermath of Philosophy," Education Forum, 1: 495-503, May, 1937. ________ , "Place of Philosophy in the Junior College," Junior.College Journal, 6: 238-41, February, 1936. , "Teaching of Philosophy in California," and Society, 41: 708-11, May 25, 1935 School Russo, S., "Course in Philosophy for Junior Colleges," Junior College Journal, 7: 257-8, February, 1936. Sabine, G. H., "Place of~ Philosophy in the Modified Curricu lum of the College of Arts and Sciences at Cornell Uni versity," School and Home, 16: 629-32, April, 1935. Schilpp, P. A., "Is Standpointiess Philosophy Possible?" Philosophical Review, 44: 227-53, 1935. Sister M. -Thomas Aquinas, "Philosophy in Catholic Colleges for Women-," 'National Catholic Education Association Proceedings, 144-52, 1931. "Teaching of Philosophy: Summary," National Cath olic Education Association Proceedings, 107-22, 1934. Smith, Ethel S., "Philosophy and Practical Education," Per sonalist, 15: 19-31, January, 1934. Thilly, F., "The Teaching of Philosophy," College Teaching, edited by Klapper. Yonkers, .1920. 289 Todd, G. T., "The Mission of Philosophy," Philosophical Review, 14: 113-137, March, 1905. Unna, S., "A Conception of Philosophy," Journal of Phil osophy, 18: 29-41, January 20, 1921. Valentine, P. F . , "Philosophy and the Small College," School and Society, 43: 200-2, February 8, 1936. Walsh, F. A., "Philosophy: Is it Deflated," New Scholasticism, 9: 329-337, October, 1935. Ward, James, "An Introduction to Philosophy," Monist, 36: 119, 1926. Williams, A. M., "Philosophy and Education," Education Re v i e w , 47: 269-78, March, 1914. 290 0. PERIODICAL REVIEWS Adams, G. P., review of Sellar’s Essentials of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 27:’ 209', M a r c h , 1918'. A. E. M., review of M a j o r ’s An Introduction to Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy7 31: 83-84, February'1, 1934, Bakewell, C. M., review of F. Thilly’s A History of Philosophy, ■**n Philosophical Review, 24: 329-333, May, 1915. Balz, A., review of J. E. Russell’s A First Course in Phil osophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 12: 222-223, April 15, 1915. Blanshard, B., review of Leighton’s The Field of Philosophy, in Journal of Philo sophy, 21: 361-362, June 19, 1924. Brightman, E. S., review of G. E. M. J oad’s Guide to Phil.osophy, in Personalist, 18: 423, Autumn, 1937. Carr, H. W., review of Hoc k i n g ’s Types of Philo sophy, in Personalist, 11: 133, April, 1930. Chidsey, H. R., review of G. P. Conger’s A Course in Phil osophy, in Philosophical Review, 36: 597-8, November, 1927. Church, C. C., summary of L. Cellerier’s L ’interet, in Phil osophical Review, 24: 347-348, May, 1915. Cunningham, G. W., review of 0. 0. Fletcher’s Introduction to Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 23: 217-220, March, 1914. Cushman, H. E . , review of H. Hoffding’s Brief History of M o d e m Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 10: 386388, July 3, 1913* D. M., review of Fuller’s History of Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 35: 463-466, August 18, 1938. E. A., review of P. C a m s ’ Primer of philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 3: 244-246, March, 1894. Emery, S. A., review of Pifer and W a r d ’s The Fields and Methods to Knowledge, in Philosophical Review, 40: 489-491, S eptember, 1931. 291 Fisch, M. H., review of Hanger’s Practice of Philo sophy, in Philosophical Review, 43: 525, May, 1934. Flewelling, R. T . , review of P a t r i c k s Introduction to Philosophy, in Personalist, 6: 301, October, 1925. ____, review of Cunningham’s Problems of Philo sophy, in Personalist, 6: 302, October, 1925 Fuller, B. A. G., review of Windelband’s Introduction to Phil osophy, in Personalist, 5: 67, January, 1924. Gentry, George, review of Burnham and Wheelwright’s Introduc tion to Philosophical Analysis, in International Journal of Ethics, 43: 111, October, 1932. Gilbert, Katherine, review of Cushman’s Beginner’s History of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 29: 505-506, September, 1920. H. A. L., review of Rohrbaugh’s A Natural Approach to Philo so phy, in Journal of Philosophy, 32: 132-133, February 28, 1935. , review of F e r m ’s First Adventures in Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 34: 193-194, April 1, 1937 Holland, E. H., review of H. Hoffding’s The Problems of Phil osophy, in Philosophical Review, 15': 553-554, September, 1906. H. T. C., review of Patrick’s Introduction to Philosophy, in Journal of Philo sophy, 53: 160-161, March 12, 1936. Hudson, J. W . , review of Jerusalem’s Introduction to Philoso p h y , in Philosophical Review, 21: 107-109, January, 1912. I. E . , review of Barrett’s Philosophy, phy, 33: 187-188, March 26, 1936. in Journal of Philoso Irons, ID., review of H. Jones’ The Nature and’Aims of Philo so p h y , in Philosophical Review, 2: 492, July, 1893. _ , review of J. G. Hibben’s The Problems of Philo sophy, in Philo sophical Review, 8: 85'-"86, January, 1899. Jones, A. H., review of Brightman’s An Introduction to Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 36: 90-91, January, 1927, , review of H. E. Cunningham’s An Introduction to Phil osophy, in Philosophical Review, 29: 504-5, September, 1920. 292 Kennedy, G., review of G. P. Conger’s A Course in Philo sopfry;.J* H • Ryeii ’s All In tro du.ot ion "fco Philo sophy | G-• W . Cunningham’s Probl ems of Philosophyf G. T. W. Patrick’s Introduction to Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 22: 360-362, June 18, 1925. Lafferty, T. T., review of D. S. Robinson’s An Introduction to Living Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 30; 218221 ,r April 13, 1933. Lamprecht, S. P., review of Maritain’s An Introduction to Philosbphy, in Journal of Ph ilo sopEy,“ 28; 30'4-30V , May 21, 1931. ' Longer, S. K . , review of Burnham and Wheelwright’s Introduc tion to Philo sophical Analysis, in Journal of Philosophy, 29: 495-498, September 1, 1932. Larrabee, H. A., review of Barrett’s Philo sophy, in Inter national Journal of Ethics, 46: 407, April, 19367 , review of Gamertsfelder and Eva n s ’ Fundamentals of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 42: 326-327, May, 1933. Lefevre, A., review of A. S. Dewing’s Introduction to M o d e m Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 14: 103-104, January, 1905. ^ Leighton, J* A., review of G. W. Cunningham’s Problems of Philosophy: An Introductory Survey in Philosophical Review, 34: 526-7, September, 1925. Love joy, A. 0., review of P. Thilly’s A History of Philosophy, Journal of Philo sophy, 12: 272-277, May 13, 1915. Marvin, W. T., review of C. A. Dubray’s Introductory Philoso p h y ; A Textbook for Colleges and High Schools, in Journal of Philosophy, 10: 446, July 31, 1913. Moody, E. A., review of L. de Raeymaeker’s Introduction a la Philosophic, in Journal of Philosophy, 36: 77, February 2, 1939. Overstreet, H. A., review of G. S. Fullerton’s An Introduction to Philosophy, in Philo sophical Review, 17: 217-219, March, 1908. Paine, E. T . , review of Columbia Associates’ An Introduction to Reflective Thinking, in PhilosophicalHReView, 34: 202203, March 1925. 293 Roback, A. A., r e v i e w of Durant*s Story of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 36: 191-195. Rogers, A. K . , review of H. 1. Cushman fs A Beginner*s History of Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, £0: 212-215, March, 1911. , review of Jerusalem1s Introduction to Philo sophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 8:"'&2 0-221, April 13, 1911. Sellars, R. W., review of D. Drake*s Invitation to Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 30: 667-668, November £3, 1933. Smith, H. Jeffery, review of Patrick*s Introduction to Philosophy, in Personalist, £: 21£-213, April, 1937. Tawney, G-. A., review of G-. S. Fullerton*s Introduction to Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 4: 356-359, June £0, 1907. Tuttle, J. R., review of J. E. Russellfs A First Course in Philosophy, in Philosophical Review, 23: 93-94, January, 1914. Walsh, F. A., review of Dottererfs Philosophy by Way of the Sciences, in Hew Scholasticism, 5: 8£-85, January, 1931. ?/ard, P. W., review of R. H. Dotterer*s Philosophy by Way of the Sciences, in Journal of Philosophy, £71 505-504, May ££, 1930. Wenley, R. M., review of 0. Kulpe*s Introduction to Philoso p h y , in Philosophical Review, 7: 331, May, 1898. Wright, W . E . , review of J. A. Leightonfs An .Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy, in Philo sophical Review, £8: £l6-£l7, MarcF7 1919. ______ , review of J. A. Leighton*s The Field of Philosophy; An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, m Philoso phical Review, 297 £96, May 1920. ______ , review of R. W. Sellars* The Principles and Problems of Philosophy, in Journal of Philosophy, 24: 215-217, April 14, 1927. : Youtz, P. N., review of H. A. Larrabee*s What Philosophy I s , Journal of Philosophy, 26: 220-221, April 11, 1929.